Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia

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COVER: A woman at a gate decorated with the Somali flag inside Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, the office and residence of the President of Somalia.

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Map 2. Somalia
# Contents

Summary ........................................ 6

1. Introduction ..................................... 8
2. Statebuilding in Somalia, now and then ....... 16
3. Selected political elites and settlements ....... 27
4. Somali statebuilding by extraversion .......... 37
5. Conclusion ...................................... 57
6. Policy implications ............................. 60

Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases ........ 62
Bibliography ...................................... 64

Map 1.  Horn of Africa ............................ 3
Map 2.  Somalia .................................... 4
Summary

Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as ‘extraversion’. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support.

The report highlights four findings that partly echo existing scholarship but also offer new insights for statebuilding and political settlements. Firstly, in south-central Somalia a recurrent negative relationship between external stabilization attempts and peaceful political settlements can be observed. More significantly, coercive external statebuilding has encouraged violent attempts to produce a political settlement within the country. This holds particularly true for the time periods of 1991–1995 and 2006–2016 in south-central Somalia—and inversely, also for Somaliland after 1991, where external statebuilding efforts were minimal. Secondly,
while both political settlements and international interventions in Somalia have changed over time, some of the forms of extraversion have remained constant. The use of coercion, the appropriation of external resources, flight and trickery have been obstacles to more peaceful political settlements. They have led statebuilders to favour the creation of formal institutions as a prerequisite—rather than an outcome—of actual state formation. Thirdly, selective or partial recognition is the key foreign policy mechanism by which authority and resources are bestowed upon Somali constituencies in particular times and particular places. This recognition has fueled political competition, rewarded abuse and ineffective governance, and repeatedly encouraged the creation of briefcase organizations—including, most recently, federal member states. Lastly, the extraversion of foreign aid and external stabilization has been so long-standing and entrenched that donors and the range of external actors aiming to influence political developments in Somalia have become an integral part of these processes.
1. Introduction

Since 1991, Somalis and foreigners have tried periodically to reconstruct some form of centralized state authority in Somalia, with the intention of reducing violence and insecurity and improving lives and livelihoods. These attempts to stabilize and pacify war-torn Somalia have evolved considerably over the past two and a half decades. Interventions have included humanitarian relief, capacity-building, statebuilding, peacebuilding, security sector support, and direct external military support for counterterrorism and anti-piracy activities.¹ Yet these efforts have been undermined by a number of factors: evolving conflict dynamics from warlord politics to militant Islamism; profound distrust, grievances and trauma; the sheer number of people with a stake in Somali politics; and repeated political and humanitarian crises. A broad range of factors has contributed to the recurring political instability in post-1991 Somalia. The most prominent among these are the segmentary social fabric of Somali society—clannishness, tribalism—Somali distrust of centralized and, more often than not, predatory state authority, constituencies that benefit from armed conflict and ill-informed donor assistance and foreign policy initiatives.

What accounts for the failure and limited success of external stabilization policies in Somalia in terms of producing their desired outcomes? What impact did these statebuilding interventions have, or not have, on political actors, processes and events in war-torn Somalia? And to what degree did they transform existing or potential political settlements in the country? These questions can be addressed by focusing both on the broader conditions in which stabilization policies have been implemented in south-central Somalia and the recurrent patterns that have characterized relations between select powerful elites. In examining

¹ Somalia ‘has been the scene of some of the most ambitious, precedent-setting external stabilization operations in the post-Cold War period’. Source: K. Menkhaus, ‘Stabilisation and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: the Somali case’, Disasters 34/3 (2010), 320–41 (320).
these questions, this study pays particular attention to what the existing area studies literature reveals, often implicitly, about evolving political settlements in Somalia. Despite the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in August 2012, south-central Somalia remains in a state of profound political fragmentation and state failure.

A political settlement means different things to different people.\(^2\) In its most commonsense form, it refers to the process by which domestic political and economic elites compete for power and, eventually, settle on an agreement.\(^3\) More recently, political economists studying how institutions govern violence and economic growth have further developed the concept.\(^4\) With particular reference to developing countries characterized by clientelism,\(^5\) a political settlement can be defined as ‘a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’.\(^6\) At the macro level, a political settlement resembles a social order, capturing how a given society at a given time manages violence, maintains stability and produces welfare. At the micro level, a political settlement can be defined as ‘an institutional structure that creates benefits for different classes and


\(^3\) Hence the notion of ‘negotiated political settlement’, of which post-apartheid South Africa is a good example.


groups in line with their relative power’.\(^7\) No stable political settlement has emerged in post-1991 Somalia, since formal institutions are neither functioning nor growth-oriented and significant power holders are not aligned with formal institutions.\(^8\) Political settlements in Somalia have thus been unstable, marked by coercion and a heavy dependence on international support. Consequently, this study refers to political settlements not as a theoretical model or policy goal, as apparent in the 2013 Somali Compact,\(^9\) but to capture evolving interactions between competing elite groups, both domestic and foreign, which bargain over the distribution of political power and economic rents.\(^10\)

How have external stabilization efforts affected political settlements in post-1991 Somalia? This study argues that ‘elite extraversion’\(^11\) is a key causal mechanism and regular pattern that has continuously tied external interventions to local and national Somali politics. Extraversion is the process by which groups or individuals ‘employ their

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\(^8\) Somalia thus represents a ‘political settlement in crisis’ in which ‘most informal “economic” activity is supported by or based on the threat of violence’. Source: Khan, *Political Settlements*, 49.


\(^10\) Political settlements may also be described as ‘on-going processes of bargaining whose [sic] end goals are often contested among elites, between elites and other internal actors, and between elites, internal interveners and external interveners’. Source: C. Bell, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Political Settlements. Towards Inclusive and Open Political Settlements in an Era of Disillusionment’, PSRP Working Paper, University of Edinburgh, 2015, 7.

dependent relationship with the external world to appropriate resources and authority’. The term extraversion was first proposed by dependency theorist Samir Amin in 1974 to describe the under-development of peripheral economies in a global economy of unequal exchange. Jean-François Bayart further developed the concept to argue that Africa had never been disconnected from the world but that, on the contrary, its ruling elites had accustomed themselves to make their dependence on the colonial metropoles and donors both productive and advantageous. This observation fits squarely with present-day Somalia. While the 1990s saw the use of extraversion strategies in Africa based on either democracy or war, the 2000s have been marked by extraversion tactics based on statebuilding, security and counterterrorism. In other words, Somali and other elites convert the very ‘dynamics of dependence’ within which they operate into assets. Bayart identifies six recurrent modes of extraversion in the African continent: coercion, trickery, flight, intermediation, appropriation and rejection.

Bayart’s concept of extraversion is particularly insightful for understanding not only Somalia’s relations with the external world but also the frequent failures of successive stabilization attempts and their impacts on local and national political settlements. The bulk of this report illustrates this point empirically and discusses it analytically by identifying


14 Referring to Bayart’s ‘History of extraversion’, Kelsall writes, ‘the tendency of Africans to seek outside support in their internal struggles, even going so far as to render their own subjection and dependence into a deliberate strategy or mode of action’. Source: ‘Going with the Grain in African Development?’, Discussion Paper No. 1, Africa Power and Politics Programme, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008, 9.

15 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’.


recurring extraversion strategies that have marked statebuilding and political settlements in Somalia since 1991. This study demonstrates that extraversion strategies are central to any understanding of stabilization and statebuilding in Somalia. In so doing, this report uses a historical and contextual approach that adopts some critical distance from the current stabilization policy rhetoric. It also adopts a methodological standpoint according to which *a priori*, clear-cut distinctions between the terms ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘global’ make little sense when observing a noticeably transnational space, such as contemporary Somalia, which is marked by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors who exert *de facto* sovereignty. Much of the general peace and statebuilding literature has prioritized international causal factors in its analyses. The interpretation in this study shifts the focus towards the relation between local and national elite settlements and their interaction with external actors. The main argument is that local political settlements in Somalia cannot be studied independently of foreign actors and their agendas, because political rule in the country has been strongly internationalized.

Some disclaimers are warranted to delimit the geographical and analytical scope of this argument. Firstly, the bulk of this study and the political processes reviewed refer to south-central Somalia, where external intervention and concomitant extraversion tactics have been most prominent. The report does not provide an account of the significantly different political trajectories of Somaliland and Puntland. These two entities emerged not primarily on the basis of extraversion but rather


21 South-central Somalia does not represent a coherent political entity but is used to denominate the territory encompassing the regions of Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower Shaballe, Banaadir (Mogadishu), Middle Shabelle, Hiraan and Galguduud.
were driven by local elite bargaining and pacts, revenue generation and statebuilding that produced durable—if not entirely stable—political settlements. In many ways Somaliland represents the perfect counter-example to south-central Somalia in terms of the ability of the former to achieve peace and statebuilding with minimal external involvement.

Secondly, Bayart’s concept of extraversion should not be understood as a normative one that demonizes, in this case, Somalis for the failures of state reconstruction. Rather extraversion is used in this study to describe the processes by which international interventions are locally embedded via the strategic use that actors make of them. This approach highlights the room for manoeuvre available to those involved in transforming external recognition and resources into local clout. To emphasize the agency of local political entrepreneurs does not downplay the fact that they operate in a state of dependence vis-à-vis the outside world. Extraversion only takes place because of the paramount role of international actors, resources and agendas in state-centric stabilization, which ultimately accounts for this dependency. While there is a tendency to either blame local actors—Somalis—or external interveners—the international community—this analysis is premised on the assumption that the agency of both must be taken into account.

Finally, stabilization is used both in its narrower and broader sense. In its narrower sense, stabilization refers to the ongoing counter-insurgency and statebuilding attempts by the Federal Government of Somalia, its donors and its allies. In its broader sense, stabilization refers to more

22 This applies to Somaliland more than to Puntland, which has drifted towards extraversion in the past.
25 This point is made in J. Trapido, 'Africa’s leaky giant', *New Left Review*, 92 March–April (2015), 5–40 (8). Although in ‘History of extraversion’, Bayart describes extraversion as typically African, it really has been and is practised to different degrees by societies and governments around the globe.
generic peace and statebuilding efforts pursued by Somalis and external actors. Although the implementation of stabilization policies and programmes in Somalia is intrinsically linked to and affected by local and sub-national clan dynamics, this is a phenomenon this study does not document empirically. The everyday political effects and workings of the visible and invisible boundaries that result from Somali society’s segmentary genealogy, commonly referred to as ‘clan’, thus require further analysis.

This report draws predominantly on existing published materials, namely academic and policy analyses by authors with an established track record of data collection in and outside of Somalia, who all publish in English.26 These experts are predominantly Western anthropologists and political scientists who typically conduct fieldwork either as independent researchers or consultants.27 Because of long-standing problems of access and security, the existing literature on Somali and international politics is often fragmentary. It also has a bias towards studying important and male-dominated political events or processes, which are of interest to donors and diplomats. As is characteristic for such area studies, they tend to be primarily empirical and at times use categories or labels—for example, the terms ‘warlords’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘elders’—rather uncritically. A solid body of literature exists on the tumultuous and ever changing political history of present-day Somalia, as well as its political and economic elites. Yet authors often favour the use of occupational categories—for example businesspersons, government officials—or, importantly, clan or geographical affiliations to identify particular elite groups. Overall, Somali studies scholarship has a limited track record of providing meaningful explanations for the emergence of particular social, cultural, economic and political elites in the country. This reflects

26 Reports published by influential watchdogs like the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and the UN monitoring group are usually authored by experts who match this profile.

27 This report also draws on selected interviews with aid officials working for NGOs and international organizations who are currently involved in stabilization in Somalia. These interviews were conducted in Nairobi in July and August 2015.
one of the enduring legacies of British colonial anthropology, which has been preoccupied with clan genealogy, familial ties and, ultimately, belonging, more than with processes of class formation, social stratification or capital accumulation.

The next section outlines contemporary statebuilding policies in Somalia, dissects the stabilization policy paradigm and highlights some of the past paradoxes of externally supported statebuilding in the country. The third section identifies and discusses a select number of elite groups—warlords, the business class and donors—that have played important roles in shaping political bargains and unstable political settlements since 1991. The fourth section introduces a range of persistent extraversion strategies that have accompanied different phases of statebuilding and stabilization in south-central Somalia. It illustrates how entrenched extraversion has become in civil war Somalia, and also demonstrates historical continuities with the pre-war period and, importantly, how extraversion has been an obstacle to more durable political settlements among local and national elites. The conclusion discusses the major findings of this study in view of the broader literature as well as a number of policy considerations.
2. Statebuilding in Somalia, now and then

Since 2013 stabilization has been the overarching policy goal of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud.28 The government’s Somali Compact in 2013, which grew out of the 2011 Busan New Deal principles, puts a premium on the need to stabilize security institutions, territory and populations in Somalia.29 Unsurprisingly, this emphasis on stability reflects the FGS’s wish to survive politically by expanding security and government control in Somalia’s south-central regions.30 It also expresses donors’ renewed willingness to support and bolster the fledging Mogadishu-based administration against its violent competitors, particularly al-Shabaab.31 By adopting the stabilization agenda, donors sought to move away from project based interventions to a more comprehensive engagement that seeks to bolster the search for a more durable political settlement in Somalia. Previous transitional governments lacked international recognition and funding. Donors have now aligned themselves with the FGS’s security agenda to

29 The words ‘stabilize’, ‘stability’ and ‘stabilization’ are mentioned 16 times in the Somali Compact. While it is possible that a particular area is stable under insurgent administration, stabilization essentially is a euphemism for the need to expand a state monopoly of violence.
such an extent that it is difficult to distinguish which is the driving force behind current stabilization programmes in Somalia. The basic premise of these programmes is that territory conquered by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) must be stabilized in order to bring it permanently under government control and prevent a renewed loss to al-Shabaab.

The Somali Minister of Interior and Federalism, working with donors and consultants, is at the helm of the stabilization of what are referred to as the ‘newly accessible areas’. How did the FGS and donors envision the stabilization of south-central Somalia? On paper, stabilization was to proceed in linear fashion, with district-level caretaker administrations and peace and stability committees providing basic governance in the first two months after liberation, followed by the formation of interim district administrations. In reality, tensions between Mogadishu and the regions, local conflicts, boundary disputes, infighting within the FGS and the slowing down of the AMISOM offensive against al-Shabaab in 2015 thwarted stabilization in most of the regions.

Current state-centric stabilization policies and measures implemented by the FGS and the international community are an awkward mixture of technocratic and political motifs. On the one hand, stabilization has succumbed to the management logic of international aid as it has been translated into project log-frames, deliverables, budgets, infrastructure and capacity-building—giving it a technocratic and somewhat apolitical

33 MoIF, ‘Stabilization’. MoIF documents on file with the author put the infrastructural price tag of 25 districts to be recovered at USD 300,000 per district, covering the costs for building an administration building, a court and a police station. The MoIF budgeted an additional USD 242,000 per district for the running of the caretaker and interim administration.
On the other hand, stabilization activities motivated by counter-terrorism concerns are by definition partisan. Donors who side with the FGS’s counter-insurgency do so beyond the classic humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. Interestingly, this alliance with the federal government is accompanied—in official rhetoric and policy papers—by a terminology that emphasizes the need for dialogue, reconciliation and inclusiveness. Another feature of current stabilization efforts in Somalia is that it allows donors and implementing agencies to articulate and promote their interventions as contributing to stabilization, even though there is no agreement as to what exactly that means. One reason donors approve of or commit themselves to stabilization is because it allows for ‘flexibility in both funding and character of programmes’. As a result, ‘there are too many actors doing the same thing under this umbrella of stabilization’, explains a UN staff member.

The political nature of stabilization interventions is most obvious in the quick impact and other projects that accompany the entry of AMISOM and the SNA into newly recovered territories. In an attempt to win over local communities and stop them backing al-Shabaab, these projects aim at producing a peace dividend for local populations. In particular, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union have

35 In this sense, stabilization underwent a similar process of bureaucratization, just as civilian peacebuilding did before it. See L. Goetschel and T. Hagmann, ‘Civilian peacebuilding: peace by bureaucratic means?’, Conflict, Security & Development 9/1 (2009), 55–73.

36 Interview with senior NGO official working in partnership with the FGS, Nairobi, 22 August 2015.

37 While donors share FGS rejection of al-Shabaab, they took a less partisan position with regards to the relationship between the FGS and the federal states, attempting to broker agreements between the two.

38 Others argue that donors know what they want to achieve with stabilization in south-central Somalia but that the prospects for achieving these goals have been unrealistic from the onset.


40 Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 21 August 2015.
funded projects in south-central Somalia in support of the ongoing counter-insurgency. For instance, the Somali Stability Fund (SSF), a multi-donor initiative financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the United Arab Emirates, funds grassroots conflict resolution, institution-building and governance projects in line with the government’s stabilization policy. The United States created its own stabilization programme in Somalia with the six-year (2010-2016) United States Agency for International Development (USAID)–led Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS), which aims to ‘increase confidence in all levels of government through targeted, strategic interventions that improve service delivery and government responsiveness’. AMISOM also implements high visibility quick impact projects, including the construction of schools, health centres and police stations, with funding from the EU and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The absence of systematic and independent assessments of these stabilization projects makes it difficult to judge their effectiveness and durability. While projects might deliver much-needed infrastructural or capacity-building results, their ability to deliver desired political goals of stabilization is questionable.

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41 The SSF also works with Puntland and the Interim Jubba Administration, which was created in February 2012 as an outcome of the London conference on Somalia. The SSF is administered by the private consultancy firm Adam Smith International. DFID is both its founder and major contributor. See www.stabilityfund.so.

42 United States Agency for International Development, ‘Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS)’, factsheet, Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. The US embassy in Nairobi also funds the stabilization unit within the Somali Ministry of Interior and Federalism and other activities such as the rehabilitation of al-Shabaab defectors, dispute resolution, community development projects, local governance and youth employment. Source: Interview with TIS representative, Nairobi, 10 July 2015.


44 The same applies to most aid programmes in Somalia.

Stabilization as a global policy paradigm

Efforts to stabilize south-central Somalia with a combination of counter-insurgency and short-term development interventions must be understood within the broader context in which stabilization emerged as a global policy paradigm. Since 2001, the United States, the UK and the UN have been at the forefront of developing and implementing stabilization policies in response to security crises in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and Somalia. The term ‘stabilization’ may be described as ‘a combination of military, political, development and humanitarian resources’ that seeks to ‘mitigate perceived security threats posed by weak and fragile states’ such as Somalia. The adoption of integrated approaches and the combination of civil and military elements are often described as characteristic of ‘stabilization thinking’.

Real-life stabilization programmes range from more conservative security interventions targeting terrorist and insurgent groups or aiming to curb illicit flows of goods and people to those with potentially transformative goals that include peacebuilding, reconstruction and development. Moreover, it has proven notoriously difficult to pinpoint what stabilization is—and is not—as the ‘concept itself remains the subject of explicit and implicit contestation’. While stabilization appears as self-explanatory, what its actual goals, methods and practices


49 Collinson et al., ‘States of fragility’, 276–78. The objective of stabilization is, of course, stability, a goal that again amalgamates a broad variety of different policy interventions—from counter-insurgency to good governance and improvement of the target population’s general well-being.

50 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’, 298.
consist of is often vague. This is also the case with current stabilization efforts in Somalia. In other words, who or what is to be stabilized, what is stability and how can it be achieved or measured remain unclear.

The harshest critique of stabilization to date likens it to an ‘essentially ... conservative doctrine that lowers the horizons of peace and normalises a military role in peace-support operations’.51 A cross-comparison of historical stabilization programmes finds no evidence that security is enhanced by the combination of military and development interventions.52 Along with academics, practitioners agree that stabilization ‘although clearly defined in ... handbooks and mission statements, has been vaguely conceptualised’.53 Among some aid officials working in and on Somalia, confusion reigns as to the exact meaning of stabilization. For instance, a coordinator working for a Somali peacebuilding NGO admitted that ‘we really don’t understand much of the stabilization strategies that are being employed’ and ‘most of the interventions like stabilization are only understood by the donors’.54 Stabilization discourse thus falls into the category of buzzwords in international development, such as ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘resilience’, ‘sustainable development’ or ‘rights-based approach’.55 As a buzzword, the term ‘stabilization’ is intuitively understandable and has a seemingly uncontested normative goal but it covers so many potential activities that it allows almost everyone to be involved in stabilization, ultimately rendering it apolitical.

54 Interview with a coordinator for a local peacebuilding NGO, Nairobi, 10 August 2015. Similar sentiments were also expressed by participants at a conference on stabilization in East Africa, held by the Rift Valley Institute in March 2014.
and meaningless. Consequently, stabilization is ‘as much a form of branding’ as ‘a distinctive process’.

In lieu of a concise definition of stabilization, this particular type of external intervention may be understood along the lines of three of its fundamental characteristics. Firstly, stabilization in Somalia—and elsewhere—represents the present day donor response to failed states and their accompanying ‘insecurity-underdevelopment problematic’. Secondly, stabilization as a practice is not entirely new but echoes coercive colonial and postcolonial counter-insurgency and pacification tactics, which in their contemporary form—as stabilization—bring together civil and military efforts and thus involve a greater number of actors, including, sometimes, private security companies. In essence, stabilization is ‘about powerful states seeking to forge, secure or support a particular political order, in line with their particular strategic objectives’.

Thirdly, stabilization is a fundamentally state-centred intention that goes hand in hand with statebuilding, as it seeks to eliminate violent competitors to the central state while increasing the loyalty to the state of populations living in contested territories. In Somalia, as in Afghanistan, stabilization that serves the purpose of statebuilding ‘essentially entails centralising power away from its current de facto and fragmented distribution across regional and local powerbrokers to a “formal” state governance system’.

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56 An official from the SSF describes stabilization as ‘a buzzword that is being constantly used to refer to the work being done in Somalia’. Interview with SSF official, Nairobi, 6 August 2015.

57 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’, 298.


59 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’. Barakat et al. also point out that stabilization rests on a key assumption; that is, a government that can control its territory and contribute to the fulfilment of basic human needs—such as education, food, health care, shelter and water—has the capacity to gain popular support and hence discourage or defeat counter-insurgent actors.

60 Collinson et al., ‘States of fragility’, 280.

Paradoxes of past statebuilding in Somalia

While stabilization is a relatively new policy concept, its objective and modalities are reminiscent of past international statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Current attempts to rebuild a Somali state can thus be gauged on the basis of past experiences with similar exercises. The political literature on stateless Somalia provides important insights into recurrent paradoxes of statebuilding, which can be summarized under three broad headings. A first and major finding of the area studies literature pertains to the unintentional consequences of external stabilization and statebuilding in post-1991 Somalia. Analysts agree that efforts by the international community to either initiate or support the restoration of a centralized government in (south-central) Somalia have either sparked more conflict or have proven ineffectual. Already during the UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia) period that began in 1992, centralized government was ‘the very thing that many Somalis have been fighting against’.62 While state restoration in Somalia was both ‘an apparent solution to the crisis and its most obvious underlying cause’, ‘externally driven stabilization efforts may in fact play in [sic] the prolongation and exacerbation of the conflict—especially where they aspire to disarmament and demobilisation’.63 A central problem in contemporary Somalia is ‘the persistent international effort to re-establish a government based on external rents’.64 In short, ‘formal state structures have rarely been effective in independent Somalia’.65 Moreover, ‘the fixation of the international community on state governance has inhibited the development of other, more feasible, forms of governance’.66 Somalia may

64 de Waal, Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 110.
be seen as a paradigmatic case study of ‘how large-scale international intervention ... perpetuates state failure’.  

In sum, foreign intervention in Somalia has been as much a part of the problem as it has been a part of the solution.

A second insight concerns the significant role of foreign resources and aid flows in Somalia’s postcolonial history, particularly after 1969. The Siyad Barre government was a major recipient of both military and humanitarian aid. By the mid-1980s, foreign aid accounted for 58 per cent of Somali Gross National Product (GNP) while, by 1987, more than 70 per cent of government expenditure was funded by foreign aid. Although bilateral foreign aid came to a halt with the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in January 1991, external resources continued to flow into the country, first in the form of relief aid, and later as part of military, diplomatic and development programmes. For instance, between 2000 and 2008 Somalia ranked ‘among the top recipients of humanitarian aid and has been the subject of eight CAPs [UN Consolidated Appeals Process], more than any other country’. Humanitarian aid in Somalia ‘is the story of how external resources have been used as one of the


68 Some Somali intellectuals are deeply sceptical of these findings, which they perceive as yet another postcolonial enterprise that aims to consign Somalia to a permanently weak status.


71 The UN spent USD 1.68 billion for UNOSOM I and II while US expenditure for UNITAF totaled USD 2.2 billion. Source: Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 315.

primary economic and political prizes in a resource-scarce country’.\textsuperscript{73} Because of this longstanding history of resource inflows, Somali political and economic elites have employed numerous strategies of extraversion centred on the appropriation of external rents and resources. The constant inflow of resources as part of stabilization and statebuilding interventions has generated an incentive structure that motivates elites to fashion their rhetoric and actions in response to it.

The appropriation of external resources is not a purely material or monetary process but also involves the spread and adoption of particular discourses—for example, on federalism, democracy and counter-terrorism. More importantly, resource allocation to and competition among Somali groups reflects acts of selective recognition by which external actors—whether an aid agency or a foreign government—formalize their working relationship with a particular Somali constituency, such as a government, a clan militia or a local NGO.\textsuperscript{74} Processes of recognition and exclusion are thus at the heart of extraversion strategies in post-1991 Somalia as local elites vie for greater recognition and, ultimately, more resources from external actors. Somali elites both in the country and the diaspora are not simply passive victims of state collapse but have actively mobilized outside resources that are part of the political economy of statebuilding. In other words, they have made their dependence productive by appropriating external resources and adopting discourses that are part of external state reconstruction efforts.

The third finding of existing political analysis of Somalia concerns the multitude of actors and relationships—local, foreign and transnational—that characterize Somali politics. Stabilization is thus not limited to, for example, Western donors and local Somali communities or a particular Somali sub-national administration, but it occurs within a global


\textsuperscript{74} With regard to how this works in relation to the economy, see P. D. Little, Somalia: Economy without State, Bloomington and Oxford: Indiana University Press and James Currey, 2003, 167.
network of relations that includes the Somali diaspora, African troops, foreign donors and local NGOs. The transnational character of the Somali conflict thus brings into interaction a broad range of Somali interest groups and regional countries—not just Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Uganda and Burundi but also Arab Gulf States, the United States, various European countries and new donors such as Turkey. These interactions are not only present in a regional conflict system but they translate into a complex and constantly evolving network of relations of both dependence and domination that connect Somali and non-Somali actors. Consequently, strategies of extraversion—the conversion of dependence into resources and authority—occur not only in a bilateral fashion but all along the different links in this network. Political settlements in Somalia thus reflect the often competing alliances, agendas and actors that confront each other in what amounts to a transnational but fragmented network of statebuilders in Somalia.
3. Selected political elites and settlements

As external stabilization and local extraversion proceed in Somalia, who are the elites that take part in the constantly evolving political settlements? Political analysis is often focused on male-dominated elite politics in Somalia, in particular governments, donors, clan leaders, politicians and traditional authorities. But the term ‘elite’ is frequently used without a proper theory or deeper understanding of the multiple processes behind the formation of particular social, cultural, economic or political elites. During the colonial period, elite status was predominantly achieved in the sphere of administration, where one could obtain prestige, power and wealth. After independence, a small urban bourgeoisie emerged in parallel with the expansion of the Somali state. The increasing commodification of the pastoral economy was a major driver of social stratification and the emergence of merchant capital. Elite formation is thus a long-term process that started before the civil war but was strongly transformed and reconfigured by the war. It is also a distinctly urban phenomenon that, again, is linked to global networks of trade and aid but also to the flow of ideas, education and diaspora experiences.


78 Marchal, ‘Somali Business Class’.

79 For instance, ‘more than 60 percent of the country’s foreign aid in the 1980s ended up in Mogadishu’ and that by 1990 ‘up to 95 percent of the country’s negotiable assets [were] controlled by residents of Mogadishu’. Source: Little, Economy without State, 47.
Elites are conventionally identified by reference to their superior economic, political and symbolic capital.⁸⁰ In particular, an elite is ‘a relatively small group within the societal hierarchy that claims and/or is accorded power, prestige, or command over others’.⁸¹ Possession of fixed and mobile resources, political clout and cultural distinction are key indicators for determining who belongs to the dominant social strata. These indicators can be measured empirically if the required statistical and survey data are available. In the case of Somalia, however, such data have been lacking for the past quarter century. Important questions with regard to the nature of political and other elites in contemporary Somalia thus remain partly unanswered. For instance, who is part of the elite? Who partakes in elite bargains that shape political settlements? What is the longevity of a particular elite individual or group? And what does it take to be a member of the elite, however defined, in Somalia today? This is likely to differ from place to place. As Somali society experienced war-induced localization, privatization and globalization,⁸² so local governance arrangements have involved different sets of local, national and international actors and coalitions in different localities.⁸³

This then raises a new set of questions. If for instance elders, religious leaders, neighbourhood associations, NGOs, diaspora returnees and security forces, including al-Shabaab, shoulder the everyday governance of a town or region, can they then be labeled as local elites? Or are they instead elites of their respective clan lineage? Or maybe they are

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⁸³ Menkhaus, K. ‘Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping’, *International Security* 31/3 (2007b), 74–106. While it is often argued that clan or clan elders are the primary guardians of local peace and security in rural Somalia, clan designations hide the fact that members of the same lineage may differ dramatically in terms of capital, education, gender, age or locality.
simply a pillar of the local political settlement without having real elite status? Such questions suggest that in a place such as Somalia where no national statistics exist, where mobility, displacement and political flux are recurrent and where genealogy constantly blurs and hides other social markers, the identification of local elites is difficult. While turbulent political settlements have frequently led to changes in political leadership—for instance, the dismissal and nomination of prime ministers—some influential politicians and warlords have managed to recycle themselves. Adjectives such as ‘local’, ‘national’, ‘political’, ‘economic’ or ‘religious’ all need to be lightly weighted when ascribing elite status to any particular actor. Furthermore, Somali elites often wear multiple hats—as elders, businesspeople, politicians, civil society leaders and so on. In spite of these disclaimers, the following functional elite groups are frequently mentioned in the literature.

**Warlords**

Leaders of armed clan-based factions in south-central Somalia—particularly in the 1990s—have commonly been referred to as ‘warlords’. Media and popular accounts portray them as the politico-military elites that ruined Somalia, after Siyad Barre’s defeat and the United Somali Congress fell apart, and their militias embarked on a looting spree targeting other clans and international organizations alike. Despite its popularity, the warlord label is misleading as it glosses over important differences between, on the one hand, faction leaders who once were ‘political

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85 Other important elite groups that shape political settlements are civil society leaders, politicians and Islamists, discussed in detail below. A more thorough review and discussion of the role of specific sub-national elites in the various federal states is beyond the scope of this report.

leaders with large constituencies’ and, on the other hand, those who were ‘defecting military commanders with no political background’. As violent entrepreneurs operating in a ‘market of violence’, they oversaw militias that looted private and public property, operated protection rackets and checkpoints, forced the business community to pay them and provided security to visitors, including humanitarian agencies. Warlords recruited and paid fighters from their own or closely related clan lineages. At times they ‘emerged as the means by which a group of interests (often rallying behind the name of a clan) could make a point, get recognition from the international community (always in need of interlocutors), or show autonomy or resistance towards another warlord’.

The trajectory of Mogadishu-based warlords evolved from protectors of clan interests to predators of weaker clan groups and security providers for businesses. Although they were and are well known, none of the warlords faced legal persecution in or outside of Somalia for the atrocities committed by their militias. To the contrary, up to the mid-2000s, external stabilization interventions sought to co-opt them into power-sharing agreements and transitional governments. Already at the end of United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), the UN had tried to appease some warlords through hand-outs and other favours.

90 Marchal, ‘Warlordism’, 1099. Warlords such as Ahmed Omar Jess or General Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan ‘manipulated and aggravated’ clan rivalries. Source: Little, Economy without State, 57.
92 Lewis, Modern History, 275.
In reality, the military clout of warlords has eroded since the mid-1990s as their fiefdoms decreased in size because clan factions ‘fragmented into smaller and smaller parts’. While the Arta peace and reconciliation conference that led to the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000 excluded warlords, the subsequent Eldoret–Mbagathi process recycled several warlords as members of parliaments and cabinet ministers. The political settlement that emerged during this time was one in which warlords ‘straddl[ed] … political and economic positions’ and at the same time managed to extort resources from foreign donors.

The alliance between warlords and business was based on protection and taxation. It lasted for about a decade until major Somali business companies either took security into their own hands or contracted local Shari’a courts for security provision. This compact between warlords and influential businessmen lay at the core of Mogadishu’s political settlements in the 1990s. It explains why beneficiaries of the war economy—warlords who were able to provide protection in exchange for taxes—had little interest in the revival of central state institutions.

As interviews with dozens of elite business community members and warlords active during UNOSOM reveal, ‘virtually all of the biggest businesses in Mogadishu made their first fortunes from international aid contracts during the UNOSOM mission’. Because they paid off warlords, they were able to transport relief aid across insecure territories without risking their goods. Extraversion—the presence and

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97 Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 323.
appropriation of foreign aid—was crucial in the emergence of ‘a marriage of convenience between warlords and the new business elite’ and this ‘elite pact continued long after UNOSOM and has kept Somalia in a state of perpetual failure’.\textsuperscript{98} While warlords no longer dominate Somalia’s political settlement as they did in the 1990s, they nonetheless shaped elite bargains in ways that continue to be effective today.\textsuperscript{99}

Business class

State collapse triggered the emergence of a private business class that has subsequently asserted itself as a dominant political force in political settlements in all parts of Somalia.\textsuperscript{100} The privatization of goods and services, as well as the absence of public tariffs and taxes, gave rise to risky but profitable business opportunities for importers, investors and—later on—producers of consumer goods.\textsuperscript{101} The net result was capital accumulation in the hands of a few very influential businesspeople and companies that have a dominant market share. In the early 1990s, the export of primary goods such as livestock, bananas and charcoal grew significantly.\textsuperscript{102} In return, businesspeople imported consumer goods, including textiles, sugar and cigarettes but also \textit{khat}—a mildly narcotic plant—and weapons.\textsuperscript{103} When the war in south-central Somalia de-escalated in the mid-1990s, major financial companies from other regions started to invest or reinvest in Mogadishu, collaborating with

\textsuperscript{98} Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 326. As proof of her argument, she also cites the fact that southern Somalia’s major food aid contractors in 2009 had all made their fortune in the early 1990s through ‘elite-level security arrangements with local warlords’. Source: Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 323.


\textsuperscript{100} For an in-depth account of this development, see Marchal, ‘Somali Business Class’ and R. Marchal, ‘A Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy’, Nairobi: European Commission/Somalia Unit, 2002.

\textsuperscript{101} Marchal, ‘Somali Business Class’.

\textsuperscript{102} Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’, 58.

\textsuperscript{103} Webersik, ‘Economy without a state’.
warlords to ensure the protection of their property.104 Between the middle and the end of the 1990s, many businesses re-established themselves in Mogadishu, changing the structure of their businesses.105 This period saw the establishment of more advanced sectors, including the spread of telecommunication companies and the opening of small factories.106 To pursue business across clan fiefdoms and political boundaries, many businesspeople adopted shareholder-based companies drawing on religious and old student networks, creating ‘a potential for expansion beyond areas dominated by a single clan’.107 The globalization of the Somali diaspora—and henceforth of Somali capital—aided the rise of business, with Mogadishu, Dubai and Nairobi acting as major hubs.108

Politically, the elite stratum of Somali business owners gradually emancipated itself from the clan politicians and warlords who had dominated the political settlement in the 1990s. While at first businesspeople financed armed factions in return for protection,109 they began to fund their own security forces and, later on, turned to local Shari’a courts for protection.110 This allowed them to reduce security expenses, which had diminished profitability. By 1999, the ‘business class had become an independent political force’ as leading businesspeople stopped paying

104 Marchal, ‘Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy’.
105 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’, 53.
109 Hansen’s account of the Mogadishu business class in the early 1990s differs starkly from Ahmad’s findings. While Ahmad describes a private sector that benefited from political turmoil due to the above-mentioned alliance with the warlords, Hansen highlights how most businesses lost property and financial capital between 1991 and 1993. See, respectively: Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’ and Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’
110 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’ and Ahmad, ‘The security bazaar’. 
protection money to militia leaders of their clans. Many of these Mogadishu-based businesspeople played prominent roles in the Arta peace conference, the subsequent formation of the TNG and, later on, in support of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). While the relationship between the business elite and violent entrepreneurs, as well as the nature of Somali business, changed over time, the partnership with international aid agencies that continue to sub-contract goods and services to major Somali companies has remained constant—albeit with fluctuating levels of contracts and financial transactions.

The political position of the rising Somali business class towards state-building has thus evolved considerably over time. Earlier on, critics had pointed out that ‘the scrap merchants’ could only lose from a peaceful political settlement and consequently ‘actively promoted’ a ‘protracted state collapse’ that ‘serves [their] interests and objectives’. Business owners also suffered from insecurity—particularly theft—and successfully embraced legitimate business activities. They thus do not reject the rebuilding of a Somali state altogether but rather seek, as is currently the case in Somaliland, to limit its authority by ‘block[ing] higher taxes and greater regulation’ that threaten to diminish their profits. Moreover, the creation of effective multi-clan shareholder companies that allowed the private sector to overcome clan and territorial fragmentation offers important lessons for statebuilding which are not primarily based on extraversion but on cooperation and mutual benefits.

112 See Webersik, ‘Economy without a state’.
113 Lewis, Modern History, 308.
115 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’.
116 International Crisis Group, ‘Strains of Success’.
Donors

Because of their prominent and longstanding role in funding and directing humanitarian, development and reconstruction aid in Somalia, donors have both shaped and partaken in elite bargains in Somalia. This has occurred in spite of the typically short periods of expatriate postings in diplomatic missions, international organizations or NGOs. Managing and attempting to control resources has positioned them as important intermediaries between Somali elites and the broader world, as they ‘negotiate the links between broader international dynamics and local context’.\(^{118}\) Much of this intermediation occurs through processes and relations of sub-contracting by which local actors—NGOs, private companies and public administrations—implement aid programmes. With the rise of the stabilization agenda, aid has increasingly been channeled through multi-donor funding mechanisms like the SSF or the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF).\(^{119}\) Despite commitments to participation, partnership and empowerment ‘relations between donors, international NGOs, and local civil society remain asymmetrical and strained’.\(^{120}\) Somalia’s donors are not a homogenous group but marked by competition and conflicts of interest. While the UN was the most prominent funder in the early 1990s, the EU—then the European Commission—played a prominent role in directing aid policy in Somalia from the mid-1990s onwards.\(^{121}\) Following a phase of relative withdrawal between the end of the 1990s and the mid-2000s, the UN, the United States and various European donor agencies increased their assistance to Somalia again after 2010.


\(^{119}\) With the exception of Turkey and the Gulf States, donors have been reluctant to directly fund the Somali government’s treasury. Turkey became an influential donor after the 2011 famine.


\(^{121}\) Bradbury, *State-building*, 4.
Increased aid levels following the formation of the FGS have accentuated relations of dependence but also highlighted practices of extraversion between Nairobi-based agencies and local implementers. They have also raised concerns that externally funded institution-building in Somalia is overly dirigiste (directed by a central authority) because it is dominated by international aid agencies and donors. The establishment of the SDRF in November 2013—the main financing mechanism for the Somali Compact—occurred with little input from Somali actors. The elite alliance between donors and the FGS that informs the New Deal, the Somali Compact and the SDRF have led to criticism among some aid professionals. Asked about the New Deal, a stabilization advisor remarks on the exclusion of societal actors from current statebuilding in the country: ‘The deal is supposed to [involve] the government, the donors and civil society. But in Somalia, the only partners are the government and the donors.’ Another aid official describes how the New Deal connected particular donors to particular Somali government officials and local NGOs, giving way to a ‘powerful elite group that has monopolized implementation’. Many Somalis perceive these connections between donors and particular groups in the light of clan politics; that is, as a preferential relationship between particular donors and particular clan lineages. With regard to current stabilization programmes in Somalia, a UN worker observes that decision-making power not only lies with local Somali elites ‘but within NGO elite circles where jobs and opportunities circulate amongst themselves’.


125 Interview with stabilization advisor, Nairobi, 8 August 2015.

126 Interview with stabilization official, Nairobi, 6 August 2015.

127 Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 21 August 2015.
4. Somali statebuilding by extraversion

This section highlights recurrent modes of extraversion at the nexus between local Somali political settlements and international stabilization attempts, using Bayart’s six modes of extraversion—coercion, trickery, flight, intermediation, appropriation and rejection.128 Two clarifications should be borne in mind. First, these modes of extraversion are not mutually exclusive but may draw on other modes or combine. Second, extraversion modes are not equally distributed through time. They have a life of their own. Some are more durable than others and some are more prominent at particular times and in particular places. Nonetheless, it is possible to pinpoint persistent extraversion mechanisms for each of these six modes in order to highlight which among them have been particularly powerful in shaping political settlements.

Coercion

Coercion has been a staple extraversion strategy for powerful Somali elites with a stake in internationalized forms of statebuilding. It may be seen as an integral part of political life in post-colonial Africa and as a ‘means of regulating the imported state and of laying hold of its resources’.129 Siyad Barre’s aid-dependent administration relied on an oppressive security apparatus—initially established with support from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic—using the national army and the infamous National Security Service to crack down on domestic political opposition, namely the Majerteen (1979–1981) and the Issaq (1981–1991) rebellions in the north-east and north-west respectively.130 With the disintegration of the central state, the power of coercion was no longer restricted to a government. Instead it spread

among clan-based armed groups of variable size, durability and ability to generate revenue or hold territory. Among south-central Somalia’s factions, military strength allowed them to defend clan interests and to appropriate resources through taxation, looting and violence. Significantly, this in turn increased the likelihood of their being included in the repeated ceasefire agreements, reconciliation conferences and peace accords brokered by the UN, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and regional countries between the early 1990s and 2009. In these crucial moments of internationally sponsored peace-making, coercion guaranteed armed factions access to a future political settlement which was supposed to revive state authority.

More importantly, external stabilization policies have repeatedly involved arming and training of Somali groups as part of proxy warfare, counterterrorism or centralized statebuilding, aided by international military missions. Time and again, Somali political groups have managed to garner foreign military assistance in pursuit of their political projects. To cite a few examples: Ali Mahdi was supported by UN troops in his power struggle against Mohammed Farah Aideed (1993); Ethiopia backed the Rahanweyn Resistance Army militarily in Bay and Bakool (1998–2002), along with the former Puntland and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) president Abdullahi Yusuf (2002, 2004–2008), and the current FGS. In 2006, the Central Intelligence Agency funded a group


132 While UNOSOM did not entertain direct military alliances with Somali politico-military groups, its legacy in terms of contributing to coercion is highlighted by the conjecture that ‘UNOSOM probably left Somalia more heavily armed than it had found it’ after equipping and arming a Somali police force that would soon disintegrate and hand over ‘containers full of weapons to the faction leaders’. Source: Bryden and Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia’, 255.

of prominent Mogadishu warlords as part of covert counterterrorism operations against foreign al-Qaeda members and radical Islamists associated with the ICU.\textsuperscript{134} After 2007, AMISOM’s peacekeeping troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Kenya have carried out most of the day-to-day fighting against al-Shabaab, in coalition with TFG and FGS forces and allied militias.\textsuperscript{135} Over the years, Eritrea has supported various warlords and, later on, the ICU in its proxy war against Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{136} Al-Shabaab also practises military extraversion as foreign fighters have joined its ranks and it allied itself with al-Qaeda in early 2012.\textsuperscript{137} Furthermore, Islamist insurgents have purchased arms from Somali government forces. Recent reports controversially point to commercial relations between AMISOM, namely Kenyan forces, and al-Shabaab—centred on the charcoal and sugar trades.\textsuperscript{138} Such military interventions, on behalf of or in support of a particular Somali party, are associated with some of the most violent episodes in the post-Barre period.\textsuperscript{139} More often than not, coercion as a method of extraversion has undermined peace and statebuilding in south-central Somalia. It

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\textsuperscript{137} At the end of 2015, a split occurred within al-Shabaab, with one faction pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).


has permitted political competitors to resort to violence rather than to negotiate a new political settlement with their opponents.

With the decision of UN-mandated AMISOM peacekeeping force and Western donors to secure the survival of the TFG in 2007 and, after 2012, the FGS against al-Shabaab, statebuilding in south-central Somalia became an essentially ‘partisan project supporting one side of the conflict’.140 The return of international peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 2007 was followed by the TFG’s 2011 National Security and Stabilization Plan, which committed donors to backing various Somali state security forces, in particular the Somali Police Force (SPF)141 and the SNA. Since the mid-2000s, the United States has irregularly conducted covert operations and drone attacks on targets in south-central Somalia in collaboration with government intelligence officials.142 Meanwhile in Somaliland, donors have supported the coastguard and the counterterrorist Rapid Reaction Unit, a special police unit tasked with protecting diplomatic personnel.143 Military support to the FGS has been complemented by quick-impact stabilization projects intended to increase popular support for the government in areas liberated from al-Shabaab.144

140 Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, ‘Humanitarian Space’, 9. While different external actors supported different factions in Somalia up to the mid-2000s, after 2006 the UN and the international community aligned themselves more overtly with the TFG–FGS. In 2012, the United States lifted its arms embargo in support of the current government.


144 For a detailed breakdown of military and security assistance to various Somali parties, see Suri, ‘Barbed Wire on our Heads’, who indicates that between 2007 and 2015, the US government spent USD 1.4 billion in support of African forces fighting against al-Shabaab; the EU provided EUR 800 million to AMISOM in the same period.
The key insight here is that violence has recurrently been practised and actively invited by Somali constituencies in defence of what has been referred to as the ‘imported state’. The TFG/FGS perfectly fits this label, as it was forged, with heavy external involvement, in Djibouti and Kenya before it moved to Mogadishu. Its survival appears to require constant externally funded, and often externally implemented, coercion against its domestic competitors, indicating a lack of domestic acceptance and credibility. This said, donors have been torn between strengthening the FGS’s coercive capacity and restraining it. Many Somalis on the other hand view the armed forces as a source of employment to be shared among clan lineages.

Trickery

Deception and trickery represent a second type of extraversion that may be described as ‘attempts to mislead the foreign master [sic], his representatives and indeed his successors’. In essence, trickery allows individuals and groups to make a living by circumventing the law, policies or rules imposed by foreign authority. While trickery might be considered immoral, illegal or at least informal, it also attests to the agency of local populations or the striving for self-improvement and a better future, as in the case of Somali migrants who undertake tahriib. State collapse has allowed for the proliferation of various forms of trickery and deception in Somalia. These include but are not limited to the importation of fake or expired goods, the counterfeiting of the Somali shilling, the widespread use of forged identity documents, diplomas and certificates, and the

146 Already in 2007, the TFG was not trusted by the population nor did it represent the powerful interest groups in Mogadishu. Source: C. Barnes and H. Hassan, ‘The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’, Africa Programme Briefing Paper, London: Chatham House, 2007, 7.
148 The Arabic word tahriib refers to a specific form of illegal emigration involving a large number of young Somali men and women leaving for Europe via Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya, and then across the Mediterranean Sea. This word now has widespread currency in the contemporary Somali lexicon.
use of false identities for obtaining asylum or residence abroad—often in connection with family reunion programmes. While many of these tactics are harmful to others, they are also practical coping mechanisms when the boundary between the legal-formal and the illegal-informal is blurred. In terms of stabilization—both in its more political variant of statebuilding and its more classical variant of development—trickery and deception have accompanied foreign interventions. Two prominent examples are the opportunistic creation of ‘briefcase NGOs’ and fictitious public administrations. Both reflect Somali elite preoccupation with attracting foreign resources and the established practice of re-hatting themselves in whatever form facilitates access to foreign patronage.

Fake NGOs flourished in the early 1990s during UNOSOM. The massive inflow of humanitarian and development aid, the absence of a governmental counterpart and donor commitment to working with civil society incentivized some Somalis to fabricate local NGOs. These ‘frequently turned out to be designed simply to attract foreign money rather than to accomplish their declared aims’. Donor demands for local counterparts in Somalia led to ‘the rapid formation of thousands of NGOs, most of which only had a single member’. This type of deception was only possible because external stabilizers desperately required implementing partners who could absorb aid money. For example, UNOSOM has been criticized for ‘unintentionally distort[ing] the concept of the local NGO’, for ‘produc[ing] an epidemic of hundreds of bogus NGOs’ and thereby ‘contribut[ing] to a culture of corruption and lack of accountability’.

Corruption and different types of financial misappropriation have not been limited to the NGO sector in Somalia but have also been regular features of the various transitional governments. In many ways, they

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149 The term ‘briefcase organization’ refers to a fraudulent organization set up by one or two people for the sole purpose of obtaining money from donors but having no programmes on the ground.

150 Lewis, Modern History, 299.


152 Menkhaus et al., ‘Civil society in a collapsed state’, 330.
reflect a historic type of extraversion based on corruption and grandiose but ultimately unrealistic projects promoted by Italian colonialists between the 1930s and 1960s. A large informal economy already existed during the Siyad Barre years, ultimately contributing to state collapse, as people pursued business outside the heavily regulated formal economy. Deception, pretension and trickery in Somalia’s development sector have also been aided by the fact that a large part of international aid to the country since 1995 is controlled remotely from Nairobi. As a review of donor networks in Somalia indicates, ‘Few donors have actually seen the institutions they debate, and rumours about their Potemkin-like nature abound (and are frequently confirmed).’ In recent years, donors have sought to counter corruption and increase accountability by strengthening the monitoring and evaluation components of their programmes.

Trickery has thus extended into the realm of statebuilding, more so in south-central Somalia than in Somaliland and Puntland. Because external stabilization has been state-centric, propping up weak, unpopular and ineffective administrations, some Somali political entrepreneurs have produced what may be best described as fictitious, ceremonial, theatrical or even counterfeit ministries and offices. They present themselves with official titles, organigrams and letterheads but have or have had little meaning or substance other than absorbing aid rents—a phenomenon of which donors are well aware. A telling example of this trend is the 2005 TFG administration under then President Abdillahi Yusuf, which ‘sported over 80 cabinet ministers, including a minister of tourism’.

154 Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos.
156 Schmidt, ‘Coordinating development’, 61. The metaphor of Potemkin (or Potemkin village) refers to an elaborate show or construction that aims at disguising an undesirable fact or condition.
157 For example, DFID funds a six year accountability programme in Somalia (Implementation and Analysis in Action Accountability Programme).
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s administration (2009–2012) continued this practice. A scathing analysis by the International Crisis Group describes the internal workings of the administration as a ‘caricature’ and an ‘illusion of a government’ but one that enjoyed ‘the virtually unqualified backing’ of the international community.¹⁵⁹

Most of the post-1991 Mogadishu-based governments have, to a greater or lesser degree, been illusory. Rather as in Hans Christian Andersen’s fairytale, The Emperor’s New Clothes, this type of political trickery was only made possible by a naïve belief in these institutions.¹⁶⁰ This can be taken even further, with one review of the TFG proposing that ‘the international community appeared to need a revived central government more than the Somalis themselves’.¹⁶¹ Briefcase administrations also proliferated locally in the form of sub-national administrations, or mini-states, that were created across the Somali territories, in particular in 2010 and 2011. Those who established such mini-states were motivated by the hope that the federal government would recognize them as regional entities, as part of the decentralization and federalism move that the international community had prescribed to the TFG. Many of these mini-states possessed a very small constituency and some lacked even a presence on the ground.¹⁶² Like the fake local NGOs created in the early 1990s, these pseudo-local administrations were projects that lacked genuine local anchorage, political capital or significant popular support.¹⁶³ Tellingly for the extraversion strategy that lies at the heart


¹⁶³ Trickery has not been limited to the executive branches of transitional governments but can also be seen in some of the legislatures, for example the federal parliament, which suffers from absenteeism. Source: ‘Somali MPs fined for absenteeism’, Shabelle Media, 22 December 2015.
of these entities, many of them were announced abroad or initiated by diaspora groups.¹⁶⁴

Trickery has been a recurrent feature in the formation of local and national administrations across the Somali territories. Essentially, it illustrates how Somali political entrepreneurs have made creative and calculated use of external stabilization funds by either pretending to rule or by cashing in on international recognition of the various transitional governments.¹⁶⁵ External rents have thus been attracted on the basis of ‘legal command’¹⁶⁶—the fact that internationally backed transitional governments can claim de jure authority for Somalia. Stabilization that involves the emergence of illusory governments does little to transform local political settlements. It awards those who can claim to be in office with rents and does occasionally allow for power-sharing and political inclusion. The Djibouti process in 2009 that resulted in the reformed TFG is an example of this. But it has failed to produce a durable political settlement that produces governance by local efforts rather than outside budgets.

Flight

Flight has been another continuing and prominent mode of extraversion in conflict-ravaged Somalia. It may be described as ‘a strategy which the weak are more or less obliged to take in the face of the strong’.¹⁶⁷ Flight manifests itself in forced displacement and migration but also in more


personalized forms of escapism and escape.\textsuperscript{168} Although flight refers to a movement away from a particular place, it contributes to people’s insertion into a globalized world. Flight is also important for understanding the relationship between the governed and those who govern as the movement of people ‘turns the state into a political space which is both relative and highly contested’.\textsuperscript{169}

Once again, a historical precedent must be noted when contrasting this particular mode of extraversion between pre and post-1991 Somalia. Some 700,000 refugees had fled to Somalia after the disastrous 1977–1978 Ogaden war with Ethiopia. Emergency aid and resettlement schemes run by the government’s National Refugee Commission then gave way to an international relief industry that benefited the Somali government.\textsuperscript{170} Since the end of the 1980s, a large proportion of relief aid has targeted war-displaced Somalis in the country and in neighbouring Ethiopia\textsuperscript{171} and Kenya.\textsuperscript{172} Humanitarian aid to Somalis fleeing war and famine saved thousands of refugees through feeding programmes and the provision of shelter, water, sanitation and other services. While not considered to be stabilization in the contemporary sense, refugee aid has been instrumental in stabilizing the lives of those recently displaced and, subsequently, of maintaining large refugee populations in camps like Dadaab or Kakuma in north-eastern Kenya.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{168} The widespread addiction to the mildly narcotic \textit{khat} leaf among male Somalis is an indicator of escapism.
\textsuperscript{170} Lewis, \textit{Modern History}, 247.
\textsuperscript{171} K. van Brabant, \textit{Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours: The Political Economy of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern Ethiopia}, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1994.
Mass population displacement might not immediately appear relevant as a factor that determines how external stabilization affects local political settlements. Yet from a longer term perspective a connection between these two phenomena emerges. Forced migration has mostly been the result of coercion, as well as droughts and famines.\footnote{A. Lindley, ‘Displacement in contested places: governance, movement and settlement in the Somali territories’, \textit{Journal of Eastern African Studies}, 7/2 (2013), 291–313.} In the first quarter of 2016, the registered Somali refugee population in the greater Horn of Africa region alone was nearly one million.\footnote{‘Refugees in the Horn of Africa: Somali displacement crisis’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Accessed 11 December 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php.} Longstanding out-migrations of Somalis—from guest workers in Saudi Arabia during the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, to refugees fleeing government oppression and clan militias in the late 1980s and early 1990s and, more recently, the fighting between AMISOM, the FGS and al-Shabaab\footnote{Lindley, ‘Leaving Mogadishu’.}—has led to the creation of a global Somali diaspora. In recent years, this diaspora has become part of Somalia’s political settlement by actively engaging in stabilizing and destabilizing the country. In the past decade, Somali diaspora groups have reinserted\footnote{This term is from Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’.} themselves into humanitarian aid, political brokerage and statebuilding across the Somali territories.\footnote{At times, reinsertion was of limited duration; for example, see the case of former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed’s short-lived tenure in J. Leland, ‘After a break to run Somalia, back at his cubicle’, \textit{New York Times}, 6 December 2011.} Diaspora groups have positioned themselves as ‘agents of development’.\footnote{N. Kleist, ‘Mobilising “the diaspora”: Somali transnational political engagement’, \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies} 34/2 (2008), 307–23.} They ‘enthusiastically provide assistance to various political authorities back home’\footnote{M. V. Hoehne et al., ‘Differentiating the Diaspora: Reflections on Diasporic Engagement “for Peace” in the Horn of Africa’, Working Paper No. 124, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany, 2010, 10.} and also engage in peacebuilding and mediation.\footnote{N. Majid, ‘Livelihoods, Development and the Somali Diaspora’, PhD thesis, University of Bristol, 2013.}
returnees have figured prominently in consecutive TFG, Somaliland and Puntland administrations but also in the running of local political entities and businesses. The current attraction of *tahriib* and migration for young Somalis is partly motivated by a quest to find education and income abroad, in the hope of a future return to Somalia as successful businessmen or women.\(^{182}\) Consequently, flight has left its marks on statebuilding both indirectly—by inviting humanitarian relief—and directly—by creating a class of often more educated professionals and activists who reinsert themselves in local political settlements.\(^{183}\)

**Intermediation**

The archetype of institutionalized intermediation was British indirect rule, which delegated everyday governance to newly created or co-opted chiefs. Intermediation is a mode of extraversion practiced by a wide range of social categories that position themselves to take advantage of colonial and postcolonial relations of dependence. For example, prominent examples of colonial intermediaries include African ‘catechists, interpreters, school-teachers, nurses, clerks and traders’ but also ‘foreign or transnational imperial elites’, such as Asians or Lebanese, prophets and religious movements.\(^{184}\)

In contemporary Somalia intermediation takes different forms. It manifests itself in the donor-dependent FGS, local and international NGOs, civil society actors and advocacy groups, which often pursue parochial, clan-based agendas. Intermediation was also produced during the UNOSOM period when the international community collaborated with and promoted traditional leaders, encouraging ‘political, business or factional entrepreneurs’ to create customary authorities.\(^{185}\)


\(^{183}\) Diaspora experience has increasingly become a prerequisite for attaining (political) elite status in Somalia.

\(^{184}\) Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 261.

\(^{185}\) Marchal, ‘Warlordism’, 1099.
Senior positions in many humanitarian and development organizations continue to be occupied by expatriates, with educated Somali aid workers—another example of intermediaries of external stabilization—taking mid-level management jobs in these organizations. In refugee and Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps throughout Somalia, local camp managers who control access to land and local power holders act as gatekeepers—to the detriment of the displaced. These gatekeepers effectively intermediate between foreign humanitarian aid and refugee populations.186 Both Somalis and non-Somalis have also been mediating Western counterterrorism policy since 2001. Among them is the coalition of Mogadishu warlords who formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism in February 2006, tendering their services to the US intelligence community. The TFG, AMISOM, Somaliland and Puntland187 have made use of private security companies against piracy and radical Islamists.188 This reflects a broader trend. Somali private security companies, another intermediary, have replaced local militia and individual security guards in securing international organizations’ compounds and infrastructure in Somalia.189

Since 2007, AMISOM soldiers have mediated global stabilization efforts, namely Western counterterrorism concerns, as well as the FGS’s security agenda.190 AMISOM initially had a limited protection mandate but developed into a ‘conventional military counterterrorism force’ and, in 2011, adopted a more comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy

187 These private security companies were mostly paid by foreign sponsors—e.g. the Gulf States.
189 In times of widespread political violence, the mediation of foreign policy interests invariably becomes involved in coercion, which is the first mode of extraversion.
190 Major offensives by AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) dislodged al-Shabaab from many parts of Mogadishu (November 2010 and February 2011), Badhaade (February 2012), Kismayo (September 2012), and Afmadow and Afgoye (May 2014). Source: International Crisis Group, ‘It Will Be a Long War’.
that includes ‘multi-stakeholder dialogue and reconciliation’, stabilization, disarmament, humanitarian protection work and even human rights training.\textsuperscript{191} Financed by the EU, the United States and the UN but operationalized by African soldiers, AMISOM represents a classic case of intermediation. As part of AMISOM, troop-contributing countries Ethiopia,\textsuperscript{192} Uganda and Kenya can pursue their own security agendas and economic interests in Somalia, where they have soldiers on the ground.\textsuperscript{193} Concomitantly, their participation in AMISOM makes them reliable partners in the global war against terror for Western donors, which no longer send their own troops to African conflict zones.\textsuperscript{194} Counter-insurgency and the expansion of the federal government’s territorial presence is thus—with the exception of some government-affiliated Somali militias—predominantly shouldered by foreigners. That is, fought by African neighbours and assisted by foreign security firms and Western counterterrorism specialists.

What is the significance of foreign intermediaries in implementing the TFG and FGS’s military operations and stabilization policy? Firstly, they demonstrate the multi-layered and nested strategies of extraversion present in contemporary Somalia. State-centric processes of statebuilding, stabilization and counter-insurgency are heavily internationalized—to the point that external actors take pre-eminence over Somalis. Secondly, the prominence of external forces and funding in fighting al-Shabaab partly undermines the very statebuilding it is supposed to assist. Not only

\textsuperscript{191} Moe, ‘The strange wars of liberal peace’, 8–9.

\textsuperscript{192} Ethiopia formally joined AMISOM in January 2014, providing some 4,000 troops. Since 1996, Ethiopia has regularly dispatched its troops to south-central Somalia, first against al-Ittihad al-Islam (The Islamic Union) in Gedo Region and later, backing particular clan factions in Bay and Bakool from 2006 to 2008, as part of a broader occupation following the ouster of the ICU and more recently as part of AMISOM. Also see M. Bryden, ‘No quick fixes: coming to terms with terrorism, Islam and statelessness in Somalia’, \textit{Journal of Conflict Studies} 23/2 (2003), 24–56.

\textsuperscript{193} Albrecht and Haenlein, ‘Fragmented peacebuilding’.

does the presence of so many foreigners play into al-Shabaab propaganda but abuses by AMISOM troops—indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Mogadishu after attacks on their soldiers and highly publicized sexual violence against women and girls—are reminders of predatory state authority rather than the democratic promise of the federal government. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the outsourcing of violence to AMISOM by the FGS is unlikely to stabilize the country’s political settlement because it hinges on continued external funding and the contradictory security interests of Ethiopia and Kenya.

Appropriation

Appropriation is at the centre of any extraversion activity that garners authority and resources from dominant outside powers. It includes non-material elements, for instance learning a new language or new religious practices, the adoption of Western lifestyles, tastes, goods and clothes, or socialization in new milieus. In the realm of the political imaginary, appropriation includes the transfer and adaptation of meanings and thus the authentification of new ideas and discourses. Clearly, both in colonial Africa and present-day south-central Somalia, the imported state, which was and is so often governed with coercion, needed first to be appropriated. In civil war Somalia, this has occurred not once but repeatedly. Political leaders embraced juridical statehood—and accompanying external recognition—when they formed a series of


196 Albrecht and Haenlein, ‘Fragmented peacebuilding’. The FGS may also be described as an ‘internationally sponsored plan for a vertically integrated cartel to manage the Somali political marketplace’. Source: de Waal, Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 124.


transitional governments from 2000 onwards. State-centric stabilization that entails the creation of Somali national transitional governments has ‘often privilege[d] some groups and systems of governance over others’, creating ‘a political economy of prestige and resources around the newly built or reformed state’.199

Numerous examples of illegal appropriation of foreign resources occurred in Somalia after the downfall of the Siyad Barre government. During the UNOSOM–UNITAF (Unified Task Force) period, rival factions fought over aid resources, leading to ‘criticisms that humanitarian agencies were fuelling a war economy’.200 The diversion of aid, such as the theft of food aid by armed groups and contractors, continues to be a headache for humanitarian agencies.201 Extraversion by appropriation is not limited to material resources or physical assets, such as food aid, vehicles, buildings, materials or weapons. Somalis have actively appropriated the humanitarian, development and diplomatic rhetoric, paradigms and blueprints that have accompanied consecutive external stabilization attempts. Western discourses centered on secular political concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘federalism’ and ‘human rights’ or military vocabulary such as ‘counterterrorism’ and ‘stabilization’, quickly find currency among Somali leaders who use them to their own ends.202 Spiritual and religious beliefs have also been appropriated from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt and Sudan by a new Salafi business elite, whose ascendancy in Somali politics has reconfigured the political settlement over the past 15 or so years.203

The intimate connection between internationalized political stabilization and local appropriation cannot be stressed enough when accounting for the failures of state-centric statebuilding in south-central Somalia. In

200 Bradbury, State-building, 16.
sum, formal state structures ‘have been used to attract aid, and as a useful source of patronage ... but seldom as providers of essential services and public goods’. Consequently, ‘Political elites in newly declared governments have devoted most of their energies toward securing foreign aid in the name of statebuilding.’ Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue, the provision of public services and the building up of popular support. Since 2000, Somali transitional governments that have claimed to be the sovereign successor of the former Somali Democratic Republic have increasingly suffered from this self-defeating dynamic. The TNG, for instance, did not enjoy international recognition but its leadership obtained around USD 50 million from Arab Gulf States in the two years of its existence between 2000 and 2002. Successive TFG cabinets managed to increase their hold on foreign aid as donors refocused their efforts on strengthening a central government after the rise of al-Shabaab and the end of the Ethiopian occupation. This ongoing effort to breathe new life into the TFG included, among other things, direct salary payments to members of parliament and its security forces. In many ways, the extraversion strategies pursued by political figures who were part of the transitional and now of federal governments are not a surprise. They are the logical consequence of the commodification that had occurred in their formative stages, during the peace and reconciliation conferences that created them.

204 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, 11.
205 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, 11.
207 See Hills, ‘Somalia works’.
208 C. Webersik, ‘Bargaining for the spoils of war: Somalia’s failing path from peace to war’, African Security 7/4 (2014), 277–302 (278). This pattern was already present during the brokerage of the 1994 peace agreement between Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aideed, during which the UN paid participants’ hotel bills ‘running at USD 150,000"
One of the most problematic extraversion strategies in peace and statebuilding is the appropriation, both by Somali political leaders and the international community, of fixed definitions of clan identity as a parameter for power-sharing. In the flux and confusion that so often characterizes interactions between competing armed and political groups in Somalia, the word ‘clan’ is often assumed to be the fundamental category that informs Somali political life. The international community often fails to account for the ‘diversity of local social groups’, instead treating clans as ‘fixed entities’, and thus ‘contribut[ing] to the proliferation of clan and sub-clan identities’.209

The suggestion that the fragmentation of Somali society along clan lineages is primarily the result of colonial anthropologists and foreign interventions appears far-fetched.210 International statebuilding and extraversion, however, certainly contribute to the spread, entrenchment and reproduction of political representation based on a problematic notion of fixed clan identities. Faction leaders, politicians, elders and business-people use their family ties not only to mobilize support internally but they also appropriate the idea of clan as the predominant criterion for determining power-sharing and representation in statebuilding. The adoption of the famous 4.5 formula, during the formation of the first TNG in August 2000, marks the highpoint of this appropriation strategy by which kinship is made productive by interaction with external stabilizers.211 Considered to be a pragmatic way of attaining power-sharing

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209 Little, *Economy without State*, 155, making an observation about the UN intervention.
210 This argument was made by Abdi I. Samatar in a lecture held at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, 8 May 2014.
211 The 4.5 formula for clan representation ‘envision[ed] 400 seats divided evenly between the four major clan groups, and minority groups collectively receiving half as many seats as a major clan’. Source: International Crisis Group, ‘Salvaging Somalia’s Chance for Peace’, Africa Briefing n. 11, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 9 December 2002, 5. The formula was repeatedly used in bargaining power-sharing agreements and for allocating seats for legislative and executive positions in the
among Somalis, the 4.5 formula encouraged the nomination of officials who—apart from being members of particular clan networks—often had little political clout or personal credibility and lacked a track record of actual political achievements.\(^{212}\) Precisely because state-centric stabilization entails a centralization of power, it encourages the proliferation and hardening of clan lineage identity that is instrumentally appropriated by elites who seek to increase their role in bargaining processes. Consequently, the politicized use and abuse of the idea of clan in post-1991 Somalia is not merely the result of local tradition or culture, as primordialists suggest, but has been co-produced by extraversion under conditions of external stabilization.

Rejection
Even though extraversion has been an ingrained pattern of stabilization and statebuilding in post-1991 Somalia, not all actors have succumbed to it. Rejection of external resources and agendas, rather than appropriation, has also taken place. A telling case of partial opposition to external intervention can be found in the Somaliland government’s dealings with international organizations, particularly its fraught relationship with various UN agencies dating back to the early 1990s.\(^{213}\) Al-Shabaab’s position has consistently been characterized by marked rejection of the international community’s statebuilding agenda and of interference by frontline states Ethiopia and Kenya. Conversely, al-Shabaab arguably pursues its own, predominantly immaterial, extraversion by positioning itself as part of a global Islamic movement. Its declaration of allegiance

\(^{212}\) The problem of politicians and parliamentarians who are part of formal statebuilding exercises but ‘represent … themselves rather than anyone else’ was already noted during the Arta conference. Source: Lewis, *Modern History*, 293. This is partly the result of a decentralized patriarchal pastoral political culture in which, historically, every man was allowed to speak and participate in politics.

\(^{213}\) Somaliland’s strained relations with the UN is motivated by the latter’s refusal to fully recognize the self-declared republic. These strained relations continue to persist; e.g. Somaliland’s rejection of the UN population census in May 2015.
to al-Qaeda in February 2012 is evidence of this. Although rejection is the opposite of appropriation, it often goes hand in hand with extraversion.\textsuperscript{214} Two brief examples illustrate this. First, while TFG soldiers appropriate external resources provided by foreign donors, they simultaneously reject or undermine stabilization when they mistreat civilians. Second, while bandits may loot the property of a humanitarian organization—which could be seen as rejection of extraversion—at the same time they ‘assimilat[e] the symbolic forms or the military technology of the contemporary world’.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{214} Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 263-265. Accordingly, ‘forms of rejection can also be modes of appropriation and reinvention, just as nationalist movements were in matters of state institutions and the imagery of the state in the years after the Second World War’.

\textsuperscript{215} Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 264.
5. Conclusion

Extraversion has been a frequent cause and feature of failed internationalized statebuilding in south-central Somalia over the past quarter century. Evidence points towards an inverse relationship between external stabilization and peaceful elite bargaining in post-1991 Somalia. Statebuilding that is more coercive has increased rather than reduced violent conflict. Recurrent extraversion strategies such as the use of violence, the appropriation of external resources, flight and trickery have been obstacles to both peace and statebuilding. They have led Somali and external statebuilders to prefer the creation of formal institutions to actual state formation. External recognition bestowed on particular domestic political actors, policy processes or institutions has fuelled competition between and among local and national elites. It has also encouraged abuses and ineffective governance, while also undermining important liberal and democratic statebuilding objectives. The dysfunctional effects of internationalized statebuilding in south-central Somalia are the result of both external and elite Somali agendas.

Donors’ current stabilization programmes and their alignment with the Federal Government of Somalia resemble a ‘peacebuilder’s contract’ by which external actors, state and sub-national elites produce statebuilding that is either compromised or captured.216 As donors and the FGS enter into a statebuilding alliance, their interactions centre once again on extraversion and the production of formal—but largely fictitious—statehood. Even if a concerted political and military effort succeeded in pacifying Somalia and expanding the government’s degree of statehood, it is unlikely to transform the type of state it represents.217 The reason for this is that external actors are themselves part of a political settlement that includes domestic elites who have co-opted statebuilding resources


and rhetoric for their own survival. If history is an indicator for the future, current stabilization policies and the international community’s support of the FGS are unlikely to be either sustainable or effective.

The overwhelming evidence of past statebuilding in civil war Somalia points to a sobering conclusion. External stabilization that affords local and national elites extraversion opportunities has often reproduced political instability. It has encouraged the formation of political administrations that are unaccountable at best, predatory at worst, and usually ineffective. From the colonial period until now, centralized state authority in Somalia has been dependent on external rents, fostering political elites whose survival has depended and continues to depend on external recognition. While a future state must be and will be built in Somalia, it cannot simply be rebuilt, as neither colonial nor postcolonial administrations serve as models to emulate. Nor will a working state emerge as a result of liberal Western blueprints transposed—both by foreigners and by Somalis—to local political realities. Instead, state formation is likely to proceed on the basis of more stable political settlements that are not primarily geared towards the outside world but result from domestic bargaining, resource mobilization and, ultimately, recognition.

Conversely, statebuilding in places such as Somaliland has been successful because it was based on ‘peace contracts’ among local constituencies, contracts that were renegotiated over time, were predominantly funded by the participants themselves and did not follow predefined templates or outcomes. Importantly, the negotiation of these agreements was not based on converting external resources into local authority, although Somaliland’s claim to international recognition clearly follows a strategy of extraversion. Instead they were locally initiated, funded and implemented. While political settlements have simply been reshuffled

218 Also see Menkhaus, ‘Aid and Institution-building’, 1.
219 Farah and Lewis, ‘Roots of Reconciliation’.
220 A telling example of this is the fact that Somaliland clan elders were instrumental in disarming and demobilizing their own militias in the early 1990s, while armed groups in Mogadishu repeatedly refused to hand over their weapons to the government of the moment. See Bryden and Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia’.
in south-central Somalia—at times involving rather arbitrary appointments of officials and the recycling of leaders—in Somaliland, and to a lesser degree in Puntland, political settlements have survived because locally driven stabilization was proceeded by negotiation, compensation and trust-building among key constituencies.\footnote{It also involved traditional institutions and a particular relation of local elites to the economy. See W. Reno, \textit{Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy}, Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, 2003.} In summary, under external state-centric stabilization, local elites convert financial and social capital into social relations that are beneficial for them. Under locally owned statebuilding, social relations are transformed into political capital which benefits broader segments of society while resources such as tax revenue and foreign aid are redistributed.
The policy implications of these observations suggest a rethinking and redesigning of statebuilding strategies in Somalia. Complete political disengagement from Somalia is neither a realistic nor a desirable policy option. But interventions will have to find a way to reduce the negative effects of statebuilding by extraversion. Future policy should consider the following.

Reorienting financial resources for statebuilding
Statebuilding budgets should be reoriented in order to limit extraversion opportunities. Policies and programmes should consider changing their incentive structure. Instead of rewarding elite promises that bank on external funding, aid could be given to actors, institutions and processes that have a proven track record of creating social contracts and public goods. Where this is absent, statebuilding resources could be withheld.

Finding statebuilding partners with capacities for domestic resource and political mobilization
More effort is required to identify formal and informal institutions, both in Somalia and abroad, which have existed before and independently of external funding opportunities and which might become partners for joint statebuilding interventions at local and national levels. Policies should consider encouraging local actors to create a realistic and more durable political settlement that is based on domestic resource and political mobilization. Although in principle the existing aid structure already adopts these aims, the geopolitical, security and strategic considerations of donors regularly lead them to disregard these.

Creating space for an alternative trajectory for state formation
In light of the ongoing counter-insurgency operations against al-Shabaab and shared donor willingness to defend the FGS, urgency and improvisation are likely to preoccupy statebuilders more than anything else. In
spite of these pressing matters, arguably there is a need for Somalis to
debate and develop long-term visions and strategies for the creation of
a new Somali state that minimizes external dependence, draws upon
domestic resources, popular support and locally negotiated political
settlements. It is this hard work of envisioning and realizing an alterna-
tive trajectory to state formation in south-central Somalia that is perhaps
the most important.
## Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>briefcase NGO/organization</td>
<td>a fraudulent organization set up for the sole purpose of obtaining money from donors but having no programmes on the ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia, established in August 2012; also known as the FSG</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, headquartered in Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>khat</td>
<td>mildly narcotic plant (<em>catha edulis</em>) native to the Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>Somali Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Somali Stability Fund, a multi-donor initiative financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government, established in November 2004 and ended in August 2012, when it was replaced by the Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government, established in August 2000 and replaced by the TFG in 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>tahriib</td>
<td>(Arabic) term referring to a specific form of illegal emigration that involves a large number of young Somali men and women leaving for Europe via Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya, and then across the Mediterranean Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>Transition Initiatives for Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force, a US-led multinational force operating in Somalia (December 1992–May 1993); code-named Operation Restore Hope</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Bibliography


*Shabelle Media*. ‘Somali MPs fined for absenteeism’. 22 December 2015.


This study uses the concept of extraversion to show how different Somali actors—who do not share the statebuilding vision of international donors—have successfully used externally driven peacebuilding and statebuilding projects to their advantage. Moving away from established narratives on the tribulations of such projects, this approach not only transfers agency back to Somalis in internationally engineered interventions, but also demonstrates the need to rethink statebuilding strategies. In doing so, it provides fresh insights to policymakers and academics working on Somalia.

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In critically exploring 25 years of internationalized statebuilding in south-central Somalia with Bayart’s concept of extraversion, this report brings a thought-provoking perspective on how and why statebuilding efforts have repeatedly failed. It also establishes a much needed link between Somali political processes and a broader literature on the state in Africa.

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Why is Somalia still far from achieving a lasting political settlement, after decades of international military, diplomatic and aid interventions to stabilize the war-torn country? This study argues that international aid and the interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices has frequently undermined state-building efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are external to the evolving conflict dynamics of warlord economies, militant Islamism or political settlements, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia concludes that they should instead be understood as integral to them. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be considered in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies.