Interstate Agreements to End Intrastate Conflicts

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This research draws on the PA-X Peace Agreement Database (www.peaceagreements.org), a database of all peace agreements at any stage of the peace process from 1990 to 2016. The database is fully searchable and supports both qualitative and quantitative examination of peace agreements.

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Executive Summary

Interstate peace agreements are widely used to resolve international conflicts between states. However, interstate agreements are used even more frequently to resolve violent conflict within states (intrastate conflict). The role of interstate agreements in ending intrastate conflict has received little attention but, increasingly, intrastate conflicts require multi-level peace processes capable of dealing with overlapping national and international conflict-related interests. This PA-X report examines interstate agreements that have been used to resolve internal conflict using a global dataset (PA-X Peace Agreement Database).

In particular we:

- consider in general terms why states external to that in which a conflict arises, sign agreements with each other relating to a conflict taking place within the borders of a third state, and why understanding this phenomenon is important to understanding peace process design;
- examine why, when, where and how states sign international agreements relating to intrastate conflict not within their borders, using global data;
- explore further the dynamics of how interstate agreements have been used in this way in particular contexts, drawing on different regionally-situated examples of Liberia, Cambodia and Israel-Palestine.

Findings:

Interstate agreements are an important tool in resolving intrastate conflict and can be used to address:

- the termination of outside state support to parties to the conflict;
- third party state commitments to collaborate with each other to support resolution of the conflict, including documenting agreement reached between the parties through robust forms of internationalised mediation;
- wider interstate disputes or past enmities that are implicated in what has ended up as an intrastate conflict;
- or simply to contain an intrastate conflict out of self-interest in terms of stability, for example because of influxes of people or movement of military actors are affecting neighbouring or regional states, or international peace itself.

Interstate agreements also offer:

- creative ways of ‘legalising’ agreements;
- ways of framing peace processes within international normative frameworks to include an emphasis on democracy, human rights, or other norms as key to any transition.
Introduction

The post-Cold War period saw increased attention to violent conflict occurring within states (that is ‘intrastate conflict’). While arising primarily within existing state borders, many intrastate conflicts have transnational dimensions (Bell 2006, 373). As a result, peace processes and peace agreements are often ‘multi-level’, dealing with intrastate conflict and international geo-political conflict simultaneously. This report examines why, when, where, and how peace processes end conflict within a state using agreements formally signed by international actors. We use the following definitions (for information on PA-X definitions and coding see Bell et al, 2017):

**Peace agreements** are formal agreements produced after discussions with parties to the conflict addressing the conflict with a view to ending it.

**Intrastate agreements in intrastate conflict** are agreements signed primarily by the parties within a state, but sometimes with international actors as signatories or witnesses to the agreement in some sort of ‘third party role’.

**Interstate agreements in intrastate conflict** are agreements between two or more third party states, with each other, in order to address intrastate conflict in a different state. These agreements can be distinguished from interstate agreements used to end interstate conflict between the signatory states, such as in peace agreements between the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina to conclude the Falklands War (see for example the Joint Declaration on Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic, 1995).

This report examines specifically interstate agreements in intrastate conflict. It considers when and why conflict between a state and its non-state armed opponents sees third-party states sign formal agreements with each other in order to support the peace process in another state.
There are a number of ways – both formal and informal – that outsiders engage in intrastate peace processes and peace agreements. The use of international actors in peace processes responds to conflicts that often have both national and international dimensions. Third party states and international organizations may provide convening, facilitation, mediation roles, or wider ‘friends of the process’ roles, and will often sign peace agreements as witnesses, observers, or even ‘moral guarantors’. For example, outside states and international organizations can facilitate peace processes by bringing the parties together, organizing the logistics of negotiations, and financially supporting processes among many other things. However, in other instances, outside states and organizations go beyond facilitating peace processes and formally sign peace agreements between each other to end intrastate conflict. Why is it valuable for outside states or organizations to sign agreements with each other, addressed on an intrastate conflict?

The use of international actors in peace processes often responds to conflicts that have an international as well as a national dimension. Outside states and international organizations sign peace agreements to end intrastate conflict to address all elements of the conflict – including international elements to which they are connected. Many intrastate conflicts have internationalized dimensions because they threaten international peace due to outside actors providing material or diplomatic support to conflict parties, due to large-scale displacement of people, and due to border areas often becoming particular points of tension. In these instances, an interstate agreement may be required to address these external dimensions to the conflict.

Taking a recent example, the geopolitical conflicts of Syria have seen different interstate mediation tracks emerge, between the United States (US) and Russia (2013 US-Russian Joint Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons), Russia and Turkey (Astana process), as well as the United Nations (UN)-mediated Geneva talks, in processes that are as much competing as complementary. These different negotiation tracks exist to address the interstate conflicts that have become intertwined with intrastate conflict in Syria. This illustrates how conflict dynamics can propel the need for interstate agreements to accompany any internal settlement.
A review of peace agreements signed globally indicates that between 1990 and 2016, peace processes saw 206 interstate agreements to end intrastate conflict. In comparison, there were 1249 agreements to end intrastate conflict signed by internal parties to the conflict in intrastate peace processes (figures taken from PA-X 2017). Interstate agreements to resolve intrastate conflict have been used in over 30 peace processes spanning different geographic spaces and time periods. PA-X data indicates that forms of international agreement emerge at all stages of a conflict and are both multilateral and bilateral (PA-X 2017). States sign agreements in support of peace processes as members of an international organisation (see ECOWAS section), or as part of a regional grouping. For example, several agreements to address conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa were signed by multiple states in the Great Lakes region. In other contexts, agreements involve the states which have agreed to convene a particular process (see Cambodia section); and in others, bilateral agreements involve the state in which the conflict exists alongside neighbouring states who are connected to the conflict (see, for example, UK-Ireland agreements on Northern Ireland; Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia agreements relating to Nagorno Karabak; or the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement discussed below).
The following two charts show the dispersion of agreements across agreement stages and regions using the interstate agreements to end internal conflict that are in the PA-X peace agreements database.

Interstate Agreements to End Intrastate Conflicts by Stage, 1990-2016
Interstate Agreements to End Intrastate Conflict by Region, 1990-2016
Interstate Agreements and Stage of Negotiations

Interstate agreements can be used at all stages of a peace process, providing different functions.

Ceasefires agreements. Interstate agreements can be used to underwrite and support ceasefires. The 1992 Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova addressed the international dimensions of a secessionist intrastate conflict in which pro-Soviet groups sought the secession of the Transnistria region where Russian nationals were concentrated, when it became clear that Moldova would become independent from the Soviet Union. These groups made a declaration of independence for an area around the Dniester River to be known as the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (PMR in Russian). There were armed clashes, and violence that culminated in intense fighting in June 1992, and ex-Soviet forces intervened on behalf of the PMR. This led to a Moscow-brokered ceasefire in July 1992 (Williams 2004, 350).

The 1992 Moldovan-Russian agreement was signed by Russia and the Republic of Moldova. Remarkably, from a legal point of view, the agreement is between two states but involves commitments made for the primary parties to the conflict, who were internal to Moldova. For example, Article 1 states (in language that is repeated elsewhere in the agreement), “From the moment of the signing of this Agreement, the parties to the conflict pledge to take all the necessary measures to ensure a total cease-fire and to halt all armed actions against each other”. The parties to the conflict are mandated by the agreement to withdraw forces to create a security zone. Dealing with the internationalised elements of the conflict, the agreement also mandated that Russian forces stationed in Moldova observe strict neutrality moving forward.
**Pre-negotiation agreements.** Interstate agreements can set the terms and modalities of negotiations, and sometimes these frameworks emerge from an internationalised attempt to mediate the conflict. The **1992 London Conference Statement of Principles on Bosnia** saw an international conference of concerned states set out the acceptable provisions for any political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a phase of the conflict in which European states took primacy on diplomatic mediation. The conference was convened by the UK and participants included European Community countries, neighbouring states, the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, and representatives from the republics of Yugoslavia. The statement noted that a resolution to the conflict should emphasize the need to end expulsions of populations, respect for present boundaries unless changed by mutual agreement, and guarantees of rights among others. The breadth of outside actors and the issues emphasized in the conference statement show a range of motivations from concern about the spread of conflict to upholding democracy, state creation, and human rights norms. The conference conclusions attempted to set out commitments necessary for a settlement for the Bosnia Herzegovina conflict, and track a road-map to address potential future conflict, as part of a wider international attempt to address the conflicts emerging from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.

**Comprehensive agreements.** Interstate agreements can support attempts to comprehensively resolve a conflict by committing to peaceful cross border relations. The **2007 Joint Communique of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda** dealt with substantive conflict issues in eastern DRC, even if it did not address all conflict issues. The communique committed the DRC to launching military operations to deal effectively with the threat of militia groups, particularly those comprised of fighters who participated in the Rwandan genocide and then fled into eastern DRC. It committed the Rwandan government, among other things, to take necessary steps to seal its border and refrain from supporting any armed group in DRC. In this case, the agreement between DRC and Rwanda was signed in response to a conflict that was intrastate in the sense of taking place primarily within eastern DRC. But this bilateral international agreement responded to concern about the conflict spreading and Rwanda’s support to armed groups within DRC, something that had seen it the subject of an International Court of Justice Judgment in 2006 (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), ICJ, 3 February 2006).
**Implementation agreements.** Interstate agreements can establish modalities to implement a peace agreement. By signing an agreement, outside actors can formalise their intent to assist with implementation. When state capacity is low, outside support to implement an agreement can be helpful (see Walter 1997 for importance of third party enforcement to security guarantees in resolving intrastate conflict). Although, if state capacity is too low then outside support may not make a difference in the success or failure of implementing a peace agreement, as has been the case in Burundi and Somalia in the 1990s (DeRouen et al. 2010).

The 2003 Agreement between the British and Irish Governments on monitoring and compliance mandated the creation of an independent body to monitor and report on the commitments to end paramilitary activity as set down in a Joint Declaration. The committee was to comprise four representatives, with two representatives appointed by the British Government (including a representative from Northern Ireland) and one representative each to be appointed by both the Irish and American governments. In this case, it was critical to have both the British and Irish governments as signatories because of their historic relationship to the conflict, their joint interests in Northern Ireland, and their joint commitment to cooperation to underwrite and support the peace process. Furthermore, having representatives from both governments as well as another representative nominated by the American government helped to maintain the impartiality of the commission and build public confidence in its role.

Finally, third party states often also unite to mobilise funds for implementation. Many of the conference mechanisms for addressing conflict have involved donor commitments to multi-donor trust funds related to supporting the implementation of agreements regarding state-building, with examples from Bosnia Herzegovina and Afghanistan (see Molloy 2019).

The examples above show diversity in when and where interstate agreements to end intrastate conflict are used across different stages of a peace processes. The following section considers the incentives for third party states to become involved in this way, drawing on additional examples of interstate agreements. It points to the complex relationship between an intrastate conflict and the wider multi-level and historical conflicts to which it may relate.
Part 2: How and Why are Interstate Agreements Used to End Intrastate Conflict?

What reasons drive the recourse to interstate agreements, and how effective are agreements in achieving their goals?

**Addressing the regional impact of conflict:** Third party states or organizations may sign peace agreements relating to intrastate conflict when they are concerned about the regional impact of the conflict. In the case of the civil war in Liberia, the sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed a ceasefire on the conflict parties due to concerns about the humanitarian impact and regional stability. Conflict and displaced populations can spill across borders, and regional and sub-regional organizations and neighbouring states may be particularly interested in resolving conflict in their areas to prevent consequences within their own states and regions. In the case of the first Liberian civil war, the parties to the conflict were not initially willing to come to the negotiating table, so the sub-regional organization imposed a peace plan and then worked to bring the conflict actors into the peace process.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed a ceasefire agreement in 1990, stating:

GRAVELY CONCERNED about the armed conflict existing in Liberia and the wanton destruction of human life and property and the displacement of persons occasioned by the said conflict;

CONSIDERING the massive damage in various forms being caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation...

The Standing Mediation Committee acting on behalf of the Authority of the Heads of State and Government, hereby calls on all the parties to observe an immediate ceasefire as a contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace and security throughout Liberia (07 August 1990, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90).
ECOWAS is a sub-regional organization created in 1975 with a focus on economic integration and development. However, the proliferation of conflict in the sub-region was detrimental to development outcomes, so West African leaders created mechanisms through which ECOWAS could address conflict in its sub-regional sphere ("Economic Community of West African States Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence" 1981).

The civil war in Liberia began when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor invaded the country in 1989 seeking to overthrow President Samuel Doe. The conflict quickly spread across the country and had devastating humanitarian consequences. ECOWAS took up the issue of conflict in the sub-region at Banjul Summit in May 1990. The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government addressed the issue of the increasing number of conflicts between and within member states by establishing the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to investigate and promptly intervene in disputes between states that threatened the stability of the community (Conteh-Morgan 1998, 46). Upon its creation, the SMC took up the issue of conflict in Liberia even though the conflict was largely contained within the borders of Liberia, due to its impact on the region.

Initial calls for the conflict parties to negotiate an end to the violence went unheeded. Building on the work of Liberian civil society, notably the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC), the SMC worked through the summer and essentially proposed the IMFC prescriptions as an ECOWAS peace plan at a summit in Banjul in August 1990 ("The Liberian Peace Process 1990-1996" 1996). The plan called for (i) an immediate ceasefire; (ii) the deployment of an ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) to restore law and order and supervise the ceasefire; (iii) the creation of an interim government of national unity; (iv) holding free and fair elections; and (v) setting up an emergency fund and appointing a Special Representative.\(^1\) ECOWAS sought, largely unsuccessfully, to impose the peace plan by setting up an interim government and deploying ECOMOG.

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\(^1\) The ECOWAS peace plan is set out in four ECOWAS decisions. Please see Appendix A for links to all decisions.
In some cases, an interstate agreement to end an intrastate conflict occurs when bilateral agreement is reached between conflict parties, and an outside organization or state supports the agreement. In the case of the first civil war in Liberia, ECOWAS member states were proactive in setting out the terms of the peace plan albeit that they based its key elements on the preceding inter-faith-led dialogue, but the NPLF did not initially agree to abide by the ceasefire or the ECOWAS peace plan. ECOWAS went ahead with their plans to create an interim government and deploy ECOMOG. Dr Amos Sawyer, leader of the Liberia People’s Party, was elected as the interim president during a summit from 27-31 August 1990, and the deployment of ECOMOG proceeded with a mandate to enforce the ceasefire among other things. The NPLF rejected these developments and labelled them an unwelcome intervention by outsiders (Aboagye 1999, 60–61).

The military intervention faced challenges from the onset and, in the meantime, ECOWAS continued to try to facilitate negotiations and bring the conflict actors into the negotiating processes. The initial agreements that outlined the ECOWAS peace plan were signed by ECOWAS in August 1990, but it was not until November that a ceasefire was signed by all major conflict actors under pressure from ECOWAS after it had deployed a military intervention to impose a ceasefire. Although the conflict would continue for several years, the first agreements to attempt to resolve the conflict were constructed and signed by a group of outside states with each other. While member states may have had their own motivations, the organization justified the engagement with concern for civilian populations and the safety and security of the sub-region (see agreement texts and Levitt 1998).

The International Conferences on Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Afghanistan, have played similar roles in attempting to work with the parties to set out an internationally agreed framework for resolving intrastate conflict and coordinate internal state-building efforts, and all in conjunction with international use of force.

**Resolving Multi-Level Conflicts:** When internal conflicts have been internationalized, outside states and organizations may need to engage formally in the peace process to resolve all aspects of the conflict from domestic to international. In the case of the conflict in Cambodia, outside actors had been engaged historically in the conflict by supporting various parties to it. As such, it was vital for the peace process to not only resolve conflict issues between groups within Cambodia, but between the major powers that supported opposing sides, and whom had their own past colonial links in the region.
Cambodia has a long and complex history of conflict and outside interference. It became independent from France in 1953 and was led by Norodom Sinanouk until 1970 when he was overthrown by General Lon Lon. In 1964, the US began to escalate the Vietnam War, and in 1969 President Nixon ordered bombing raids in areas of Cambodia. During this period, there were also massive abuses happening within Cambodia with military campaigns against Vietnamese civilians and other minority groups. In 1975, Khmer Rouge forces took control of the capital and established the new state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). Under the Khmer Rouge, there was forcible resettlement from urban to rural areas, mass starvation and repression, and the targeted killing of many groups of civilians (Kiernan 2010, 483–86).

In addition to violence within Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge undertook cross-border attacks against Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Vietnam responded with a huge assault in December 1978 and took the capital in January 1979. A new government was formed, and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established. The US, China, and the regional body, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all supported the deposed Khmer Rouge regime, and the Khmer Rouge continued to hold Cambodia’s seat at the UN throughout the 1980s (Kiernan 2010, 487–88). But the PRK was supported by Vietnam, Laos, and the Soviet Union. It gained control of the major populated areas, while the Khmer Rouge remained active in rural areas, particularly along the Thai-Cambodian border (Amer 2007, 733). The conflict occurred predominantly within the borders of Cambodia, but it was also internationalized with major powers supporting opposing sides, and implicated in the conflict’s entanglement with the Vietnam War.

There were embryonic, but ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to solve the Cambodian conflict in the early 1980s. The first significant attempt to find a political settlement to end the Cambodian conflict was the Paris Conference from 30 July to 30 August 1989. The conference was co-chaired by France and Indonesia, and participants included the Cambodian conflict parties, six ASEAN states, and the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council among other actors (Koh 1990, 83). This process ended without an agreement, and after this initial failure, the conference facilitators undertook extensive consultations to forge agreement before bringing all parties back together once more for formal negotiations. The 1990 Statement of the Permanent Five (P5) Members of the Security Council, set against the backdrop of ongoing internal negotiations, operated in-essence as the pre-negotiation agreement that laid the groundwork for the second Paris Conference from 21 to 23 October 1991.
The 1990 Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations on Cambodia set the stage for the second Paris Conference. It highlights the role the UN is willing to play to support peace in Cambodia and indicates that the P5 will respect Cambodia’s sovereignty, stating:

The basic principle behind the Five’s approach is to enable the Cambodian people to determine their own political future through free and fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations in a neutral political environment with full respect for the national sovereignty of Cambodia.

Implementation of this approach requires the full support of all parties to the Cambodia conflict. The Five therefore urge the acceptance of this framework document in its entirety as the basis for settling the Cambodia conflict.

The Paris conferences were attended by a multitude of domestic and international actors. There were four Cambodian delegations representing the different factions of the civil war, alongside delegations from Laos, Vietnam, and ASEAN. The P5 were also represented along with Australia, India, Japan, the non-Aligned Group, and the UN. The 1991 conference was again co-hosted by Indonesia and France (Koh 1990, 83). The participation in the peace conferences illustrates the various layers of this conflict that the design of both the peace process and the peace agreements had to address. These layers included the domestic conflict between four Cambodian factions, the involvement of neighbouring states and the impact on the region, and the internationalisation of the conflict through support given to the internal factions by outside states.
The P5 statement laid the basis for a renewed round of negotiations leading into the second Paris conference in October 1991. The Paris conference produced four documents that taken together encompass the peace agreement. They include:

- **The Final Act of the Paris Conference;**
- **Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict;**
- **Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, and Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality, and National Unity of Cambodia; and**
- **Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.**

The Paris agreements are an interesting mix of documents addressing the internal organization of Cambodia and external relationships to Cambodia that together address the intrastate conflict and its historic and contemporary geopolitical dimensions. The parties to the Final Act, two agreements, and declaration are the 19 states that participated in the Paris conference making them interstate agreements (Ratner 1993, 8).

The peace agreements were designed as interstate agreements both because of the substance contained within the agreements, and the nature of the conflict they were meant to address. Regarding substance, the agreements sought to ensure the sovereignty and neutrality of Cambodia and to create conditions where free and fair elections could take place. In order to do this, the Supreme National Council (SNC) was created. The 1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict created the SNC as “the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia are enshrined” (Section III, Article 3). The SNC then delegated to the UN all necessary powers to ensure the implementation of the agreement leading to free and fair elections.
The Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality, and National Unity of Cambodia created obligations for both international actors and Cambodia as a state vis-à-vis each other. Cambodia agreed to maintain and defend its sovereignty and neutrality and to refrain from any action that may impair the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of other states. The other parties to the agreement agreed to respect Cambodia’s sovereignty and independence and refrain from actions that would be inconsistent with Cambodia’s neutrality.

International actors needed to be party to the agreements to recognize the SNC, but also for the SNC to delegate the Cambodian state’s authority of domestic functions to the UN to enable it to implement the agreement and manage the transition (Ratner 1993, 10). So in addition to buying-in international actors, their involvement as the signatories of the agreement was part of a complex technique of construction of the required legal authorities, necessary to putting in place the transition as legally constituted at both the domestic and the international levels. Of course, international actors who had previously supported various sides to the conflict and undertaken military operations on Cambodian soil were also key to include in an agreement that recognized Cambodia’s sovereignty and independence and created a permanent neutral state. This facet of the agreement helped to solve the conflict within Cambodia by removing outside influence that could stoke conflict. But it also created a commitment to Cambodia as a neutral buffer between Vietnam and Thailand and so allayed concerns about further geo-political-fuelled conflict and tension amongst states in the region (Ratner 1993, 33). Finally, the presence of international signatories also helped to remedy conflicts between the states that supported various sides to the conflict.
Addressing conflicts with strong historic and regional dimensions: As the Cambodian example begins to illustrate, interstate agreements are often used when an intrastate conflict has significant geo-political implications for the wider region. Here, an interstate agreement may be needed to address the core conflict issues. The Arab-Israeli conflicts have involved conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as well as between Israel and neighbouring states, including Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria among others. Very briefly in ways that do not do justice to the complex conflict history within the region, on 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the creation of the state of Israel, and five Arab states then invaded Israel. Israeli victories saw it gain substantial territory. By 1949, Israel controlled 73 percent of Palestine, Jordan controlled the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem, and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip (Watson 2010, 26). The Six-Day or June War in June 1967 led to Israel taking control of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights (until then held by Syria), and the West Bank, with further interstate conflict in October 1973, when Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israel. The conflict between Israel and one of its neighbours, Egypt, was addressed through the Camp David Accords and 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. Other Arab states and the Palestinians refused to participate, and conflict continued throughout the 1980s. In 1987, Palestinians began an uprising against Israel – known as the first intifada, which put pressure on all parties to the conflict to find a solution (Watson 2010, 27–38).

In 1991, international actors attempted to restart an Israeli-Palestinian peace process through the Madrid Conference process. The Conference, was co-chaired by the US (President George H. W. Bush) and (then) Soviet Union (President Mikhail Gorbachev), was attended by Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese delegations, as well as a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Israel had refused the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and Palestinians did not concede to be represented other than through the PLO, accounting for this configuration. The Conference achieved little, but it established a set of Israeli bilateral talks with Palestinian representatives, Jordan and Syria. Yet, by 1993 these talks had become deadlocked (Office of the Historian, n.d.).
The talks were overtaken in practice by additional secret talks which had begun in Norway between the Israeli government and Palestinians directly. These developed into open negotiations, and the first *Oslo Accord* between Israel and the PLO was signed in September 1993 (Yitzhak 2017, 567). The first Oslo Accord provided mutual recognition of political rights and set the goal of achieving a lasting and comprehensive settlement (Watson 2010, 42-43). Around this agreement other international agreements were signed, notably between Israel and Jordan, who had also bypassed the Madrid talks to continue their negotiations.

Following the signing of the first Oslo Accord, Israel and Jordan entered into negotiations. The signing of the Oslo Accord provided increased legitimacy for Jordan to pursue peace with Israel without provoking ire from other Arab states, given that the Palestinians had already begun substantive negotiations (Yitzhak 2017, 567). The 1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan establishes a formal peace between the two countries and deals with an extensive list of bilateral issues, including border demarcations and water-sharing (see agreement text and Eisenberg and Caplan 2010, 99). In this case, the agreement was signed by states to address past enmity and normalize relations between them, in a conflict that had seen both involved directly as primary conflict parties, but also saw both linked to ongoing conflict in Palestine. These agreements had the clear character of bilateral interstate agreements, which, like the Camp David Accords before them, aimed to deal with the regional dimensions of the conflict by providing mechanisms that would cement Israeli cooperation with its neighbours. Of course, as their name indicates, the agreements also responded to primary conflict between Jordan and Israel, which had involved the West Bank as part of the multiple ways that the relationship of the two states were tied up in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The **1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan**, states:

The parties will apply between them the provision of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in time of peace. In particular:

1. They recognize and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence;

2. They recognize and will respect each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders;

3. They will develop good neighbourly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security, will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes by peaceful means;

4. They respect and recognise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the region;

5. They respect and recognise the pivotal role of human development and dignity in regional and bilateral relationships;

6. They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either party should not be permitted.
Providing peace agreement commitment with a binding legal quality. It is often difficult to find a legal form that gives a peace agreement any form of enforceability. Classical international law came into existence in the context of state-to-state relations. But the international sphere has evolved so significantly that there are now many more states and non-state actors making and participating in international law (Handl et al. 1988, 372). Similarly, patterns of conflict and processes to resolve them are no different. Conflicts are not simply between states but within states and with internationalized dimensions, and prescriptions to end conflict now typically bring in domestic, regional, and international actors. The above example of Cambodia again aptly illustrates these complex dynamics and how interstate agreement can be used to help give peace agreement commitments a form of legal status.

Interstate agreements can provide a technical legal solution by enabling the crafting of a legally binding agreement in this context. Under international law, treaties are between states, which makes them binding. Incorporating peace agreement commitments in an interstate agreement between states can add a dimension of legalization that raises the reputational cost of noncompliance (Bell 2006, 386). An example of an innovative signatory configuration to enhance the treaty status of an agreement is the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement). The agreement was signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was witnessed by other states and international actors, and the annexes were each signed by a combination of different actors, including the internal conflict parties to recognize the relationships between neighbouring states and the conflict parties.
Norm promotion. Outside actors can support allies or particular norms, ensure the effective use of international funds and resources, or simply want to pursue a foreign policy of conflict mitigation in pursuit of the common good. In the 1980s, the Esquipulas process established by five Central American Presidents (Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica) aimed to address conflicts in the region. It resulted in two interstate agreements between them (Esquipulas I, 1986 and II, 1987), which emphasised a framework for achieving peace based on a commitment to pluralist democracy and human rights. This interstate formation saw echoes throughout the Colombian peace process in concepts of ‘friends of the process’, in the form of external states who supported different processes at different times. In addition to addressing the conflict conditions, the agreements helped embed democracy and human rights as norms to which Central American countries were committed to, and this chimed with wider Inter-American standard setting regarding democracy.

Elements of all these reasons. As most of the examples above illustrate, many interstate agreements are responsive to several of the above drivers alongside a complex set of interests relating to the intrastate conflict they address. These include: a wish to remove themselves from the conflict; concern about the regional impact of conflict; a historical connection to conflict; or a wish to support the peace process by internationalising and even legalising the peace process and its agreements, and providing third party enforcement of elements of the transition, or funding implementation.
Conclusion

While by no means an exhaustive picture of the reasons behind outside involvement in intrastate conflict and peace processes, this report provides a typology of the major reasons why interstate agreements are used to end intrastate conflict.

Overall, the above examples show that outside states sign peace agreements to end intrastate conflict for a number of often overlapping reasons, including:

► supporting the peace process, often for self-interested reasons. For example, regional stability, making commitments to each other as to how they will collaborate to provide an ongoing framework for resolution, and making commitments regarding their own relationship to the conflict, and therefore the peace;

► raising the reputational cost of non-compliance for the key parties to the conflict;

► providing alternative ways of legalising agreements as treaties;

► dealing with multiple levels of the conflict, including international support to conflict actors;

► promoting particular norms; and

► using innovative regional brokerage in intractable conflict.

It is important to note, however, that international agreement between states is important to addressing intrastate conflict, and discussions of process design should ideally address how these international pieces of the peace process jigsaw can be brought together to help lock in, or at least commit to not undermining, peace process efforts between the parties at the national level.
Additional Resources


References


Appendix A: Peace Agreements Referred to in Text


Joint Declaration Issued by The Prime Minister Rt Minister John Major MP and the Taoiseach Reynolds TD (Downing Street Declaration), 15 December 1993 (https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/127)


Agreement between the British and Irish Governments: Monitoring and Compliance, 01 April 2003 (https://peaceagreements.org/view/134)

Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, 01 April 2003, (https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/132)


Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia (Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Accords), 23 October 1991 (https://peaceagreements.org/view/378)

Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Accords), 23 October 1991 (https://peaceagreements.org/view/364)

Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Accords), 23 October 1991 (https://peaceagreements.org/view/252)

Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia (Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Accords), 23 October 1991 (https://peaceagreements.org/view/243)


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