



Success and Failure of Political Settlements

Defining and measuring transformation

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About Us



The Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) is centrally concerned with how political settlements can be made both more stable, and more inclusive of those affected by them beyond political elites. In particular, the programme examines the relationship between stability and inclusion, sometimes understood as a relationship between peace-making and justice.

The programme is addressing three broad research questions relating to political settlements:

1. How do different types of political settlement emerge, and what are the actors, institutions, resources, and practices that shape them?
2. How can political settlements be improved by internally-driven initiatives, including the impact of gender-inclusive processes and rule of law institutions?
3. How, and with what interventions, can external actors change political settlements?

The Global Justice Academy at The University of Edinburgh is the lead organisation. PSRP partners include, Conciliation Resources (CR), The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), The Rift Valley Institute (RVI), and the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI, University of Ulster).

Find out more at: www.politicalsettlements.org

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Abstract

This discussion paper develops a conceptual framework and methodology for defining and understanding transformation in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) through the lens of political settlements. Peace settlements are understood as the outcomes of ongoing political processes, making them hard to measure. This paper therefore proposes measuring transformation in the context of peace agreements i.e. one-off events. This paper then suggests measuring transformation along the core functions of the state, since peace agreements often deal with state function. Indicators for state capacity have been generated from current international debates, in particular those concerning state fragility and resilience, peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, and measures of inclusiveness. The aim of the paper is not to provide specific indicators of transformation at this stage but to rather provide a range of indicators that will allow for further discussion on the selection of suitable proxy indicators at a later stage. Once determined, different types of peace agreements can be mapped according to different transformative outcomes, which can influence policy making in the future.

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Executive Summary

Policy makers are faced with tough decisions when intervening in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). In a more austere global climate, donors are under pressure to spend resources wisely and effectively. At the same time, there is a lack of evidence on what policies really work. The re-emergence of conflict across the world demonstrates the need to find long-term solutions for addressing instability. The relationship between political settlements and development is particularly vexing from an evidence-based perspective. It is generally assumed that political settlements, and peace agreements in particular, impact on the developmental outcomes of a state, but is this really the case or are clauses on paper irrelevant when it comes to actual development outcomes?

This discussion paper develops a conceptual framework and methodology for defining and understanding transformation in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). Given that from a methodological point of view it is very complex to measure the outcomes of ongoing political processes, the paper focuses on the outcomes of peace agreements i.e. one-off events.

The paper is divided into five sections:

- I. Introduction**
- II. Political settlements, Statebuilding and Peacebuilding**
- III. What can be measured and how?**
- IV. Indicators and datasets**
- V. Way forward**

II. Political settlements, Statebuilding and Peacebuilding

Following a brief introduction to the paper in section I, section II frames the discussion of measuring transformation and mapping such transformation to different types of political settlements within the context of conceptual debate around the term political settlement. It also sets out the concepts of peace- and statebuilding and state fragility and resilience, which are directly relevant for discussing transformation in FCAS.

III. What can be measured and how?

Section III examines the practicalities of what can be measured and how with regard to transformation in FCAS. The paper reviews the current literature in this area and highlights challenges and opportunities for developing relevant indicators on transformation. Suggested opportunities include analysing political settlements in terms of their elite inclusiveness based on the assumption that the level of elite inclusiveness has at least implications for trajectories of stability and instability, and analysing trajectories of transformation or outcomes along the core functions of the state.

IV. Indicators and datasets

Section IV scopes out relevant indicators and data sources, for each core function of the state, and highlights potential problems and shortcomings with these indicators and sources. The indicators selected have been chosen specifically for this paper on the basis of their global representativeness (allowing for cross country comparison), time span that they cover,

whether they are regularly updated and whether they are considered measurable and accurate. Choosing the best proxy of this data will be important. Although the New Deal process advocates for combinations or 'baskets' of indicators to capture change in FCAS given that 'no single indicator can in every context tell a full, fair story about progress',¹ many proposed data sets do not currently exist. In addition, each of these routes has successively greater data compilation/data-availability challenges. Perhaps, a more viable route would be to identify an appropriate proxy/proxies that could serve to measure progress over time and allow for cross-country comparisons.

V. Way Forward

The concluding section of this paper summarises the main findings and suggests a way forward for measuring transformation through political settlements. Intervening in FCAS is complex and requires a detailed evaluation of how transformation can be best achieved. This paper makes a first attempt at defining transformation through the lens of a political settlement. It suggests indicators of transformation derived through different areas of state function according to contemporary debates and suggests analysing this through forthcoming data on political settlements. No measurements will ever be perfect but this does not mean that the data is not useful in providing initial indications of how different peace agreements lead to different outcomes. This paper provides avenues for measuring this in the future, which will allow greater analysis of when and how donors can intervene most effectively.

I. Introduction

This discussion paper develops a conceptual framework and methodology for defining and understanding transformation in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). It includes an indicator and data review. It is part of a larger consortium programme, The Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP, www.politicalsettlements.org), led by the University of Edinburgh and funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), which examines 'Transforming Political Settlements Towards Open and Inclusive Settlements.' This paper will directly address research theme six, '[Political settlements and defining and measuring transformation](#)' that has been identified as core to the programme's work. Ultimately, this paper aims to make a contribution to the ongoing debate about how measurement of complex political processes and their outcomes in terms of human development and human security and trajectories of state fragility and resilience is conducted.

With political settlements defined as bargaining outcomes among contending elites² reflecting the balance or distribution of power in a state³, defining and measuring 'transformation' in terms of concrete outcomes is difficult. Discrete political settlement events, such as peace agreements, often include roadmaps or more explicit goals for transformation and therefore allow for some degree of outcome evaluation. However, the level of implementation of such agreements differs widely and do not necessarily reflect the *de facto* balance of power that is in place in a particular state.

This discussion paper contributes to the debate on how to define and measure transformation in terms of outcomes of political settlement events, such as peace agreements, in FCAS. Given that from a methodological point of view it is very complex to measure the outcomes of ongoing political processes, the paper focuses on the outcomes of peace agreements. Drawing on Laws,⁴ once-off events and agreements are understood as part of political settlements in the context of ongoing political processes. Some of the questions this paper examines are: How do different actors define transformation? How can transformation be measured? What constitutes success and what constitutes failure?⁵ How and what change in FCAS can be measured and how this change relates to peace agreements? What screening indicators and data would be available (and what would be the most important data gaps)?

Two additional important caveats are that political settlements that emerge from peace processes or peace agreements need time to consolidate and that in most sectors it takes considerable time for measurable change to occur. Whilst fatalities from conflict, for example, are likely to decrease almost immediately after the signature of a peace agreement, indicators, such as infant mortality, educational enrolment or state capacity might only change in the medium to longer-term.

Section II provides a brief summary of the conceptual debate around the term political settlement. It also sets out the concepts of peace- and statebuilding and state fragility and resilience, as these are directly relevant for discussing transformation in FCAS. The above is important to contextualise the subsequent discussion about measuring transformation and mapping such transformation to different types of political settlements.

In Section III, the paper addresses the question, in more practical terms, of what can be measured and how. This includes review of the current literature, as well as challenges and opportunities in developing relevant indicators on transformation. It outlines how transformation can be considered in the context of peace agreements.

Section IV sets out relevant indicators and data sources and highlights potential problems and shortcomings. No statistical analysis or country case studies will be conducted at this stage. Section V summarises the main findings and points to the way forward in measuring transformation through political settlements.

This paper is based on a series of approaches/concepts that permeate the academic and policy debate about transformation in FCAS. The first is that “development is politics”⁶ (ie that donors need to consider the impact of politics on development) and that development is a non-linear process.⁷ History shows that states develop capacity unevenly and incrementally. The second is that a better understanding of the political settlement on which a state is based can provide important insights for developing new policy tools for FCAS.⁸ Thirdly, external interventions can both impact positively and negatively on processes of state- and peacebuilding; “the challenges of statebuilding are such that donors must develop a sophisticated understanding of political processes, patterns of state-society relations and sources of legitimacy in the countries where they are operating”.⁹ Lastly, it is important to recognise that external and internal interveners are faced with trade-offs between supporting short-term measures to secure stability and pursuing longer-term objectives of justice and statebuilding.¹⁰

Moreover, the increased pressure on donors and policymakers to deliver results and be accountable to their citizens has fuelled a debate about how to measure change and set benchmarks for success. Within this context, there is growing interest among academics and practitioners to quantify the drivers of peace and resilience in FCAS whilst previously the focus was on understanding the causes of civil war. In a similar vein, the debate around state fragility and state failure has shifted to increased efforts to understand what improves resilience to both internal and external shocks.

II Political settlements, statebuilding and peacebuilding

This section provides a brief summary of the conceptual debate around the term political settlement. It sets out how the concept relates to notions of peace- and statebuilding, and state fragility and resilience, as these terms are directly relevant for discussing transformation in FCAS. This is important to contextualise the subsequent discussion about measuring transformation and mapping such transformation to different types of political settlements. This section also explores a methodological approach to analyse political settlements in terms of their inclusiveness, based on the assumption that the level of inclusiveness has implications for trajectories of stability and instability.¹¹ Furthermore, the stability of a peace agreement and the degree to which it has been implemented can be expected to have implications for

potential outcomes relating to transformation, such as the effectiveness of state capacity to reduce conflict.

On the concept of political settlement

There is no consensus in the literature on the meaning of the term 'political settlement'. Rather, it has been used in a variety of different ways to describe quite different phenomena ranging from the outcomes of ongoing bargaining and negotiation between contending elites to one-off events or deals, for example, peace agreements in war-to-peace transitions. For some the term only refers to horizontal agreements between key elites whilst for others it includes vertical relations between states and societies.¹² This range of viewpoints has implications for the debate about inclusiveness. In the political settlement debate inclusiveness tends to be understood in two fundamentally different ways: as inclusive of elites or inclusive of elites and their followers.

With the aim of providing some conceptual clarity, this paper draws on some important conclusions of Laws:¹³

1. "Political settlements are ongoing political processes that include one-off events and agreements
2. Political settlements are two-level games, involving horizontal negotiations between elites and vertical relations between elites and their followers
3. Political settlements shape the form, nature and performance of institutions. In turn, institutions and their interaction with organisations can consolidate and embed political settlements
4. Elite pacts, elite bargains and peace agreements are discrete political events, rather than dynamic processes"

Laws also provides a chronological summary of existing political settlement definitions and functions that illustrate the broad spectrum of how the term is understood (see annex 1).¹⁴ One important common denominator of the different definitions is the underlying recognition that understanding the political settlement on which a state is based is vital for understanding trajectories of transformation and state performance in developing countries. In this regard, Putzel and Di John¹⁵ write:

"First, one of the most important insights emerging from the literature is that the 'design of institutions' (the rules and norms that govern behaviour), particularly formal state institutions, does not determine either political or economic outcomes. Democratic institutions in one state may be associated with violent conflict and economic stagnation, while in another they may be related to peaceful social relations and economic growth. The argument emerging from the literature is that it is the underlying *political settlement* (emphasis added) which determines political and developmental outcomes."

The above might be particularly true for many African states, which due to processes of delayed state formation often display organisational and institutional frameworks that are not representative of the *de facto* distribution of power that underpins the state, i.e. the political settlement. The role of donors that seek to support statebuilding in FCAS also needs to be

seen critically in this regard. This paper is particularly timely, given that a 2012 evaluation study by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs found, in a review of 100 documents aimed at assessing international statebuilding engagements, that few studies have employed a much needed political settlement lens to their analysis.¹⁶

International relations and peace and conflict scholars usually focus on transitions from war to peace and the relation between a political settlement and stability, or the avoidance of a relapse into conflict. Political economists take a broader view, looking at developmental progress or trajectories of fragility and resilience. In this sense, it has been argued that “(...) understanding the political settlement provides a route to understanding the differential performance of states in the developing world and the directions reform might take when it comes to fundamental state functions”, and that, for instance, “(...) developing the capacity of the state to increase taxation is centrally determined by the balance of power, or political settlement, on which the state rests”.¹⁷

When trying to measure outcomes of political settlements or discrete political settlement events it is useful to try and categorise these. An important finding that emerges from the literature is that the level of inclusiveness of political settlements has important implications for trajectories of stability and instability.¹⁸ Furthermore, the nature of the peace agreement and the degree to which it has been implemented can also be expected to have implications for potential outcomes.

As previously mentioned, due to methodological challenges, this paper proposes measuring the outcomes of peace agreements. This paper does not assume that there is a causal relationship between peace agreements and improvements in human development or human security conditions. Nor does it assume that more inclusive political settlements –understood in the broader sense of inclusiveness- necessarily lead to better development outcomes. In fact, Putzel and Di John point towards some evidence that, “at low levels of development, the general nature of political settlements that are likely to generate political order are far from inclusionary”.¹⁹

On the concepts of statebuilding and peacebuilding

The concepts of political settlement, statebuilding and peacebuilding are closely related but their distinctions are important to understand for subsequent discussions on measuring transformation.

Statebuilding can be defined as the ‘process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations’.²⁰ The definition points to five central dimensions of statebuilding:

“First are the *political processes* that mediate relations between the state and society through which bargains are struck and institutionalised. Those institutionalised bargains are the basis on which rests the political settlement that underpins the state.”²¹

The other four dimensions are the legitimacy of the state in society, the relations between state and society, the expectations society has of the state, and the capacities of the state to perform its basic functions.²² Within these, state capacity is the dimension that can be best measured in quantitative terms due to available data. Leaving the currency and accuracy of key datasets in FCAS aside for the moment, other dimensions would require efforts at additional or specific data-gathering or data-creation. This will be discussed in more detail later.

The UN refers to peacebuilding as “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.”²³ Peacebuilding therefore encompasses a wider range of activities than statebuilding, where the latter is seen as a prerequisite for the former.²⁴ Peacebuilding also contains a larger focus on inter-societal relations than statebuilding.²⁵ Furthermore, a recent UN report has noted that peacebuilding does not only occur in post-conflict settings but includes preventative measures. Thus it could occur before and after political settlements.²⁶

Statebuilding and peacebuilding are two processes that are not necessarily mutually reinforcing. Peace agreements can give rise to political settlements with only “tentative buy-in by former opponents” to processes of statebuilding²⁷. There are also instances where statebuilding can undermine peacebuilding, for example by benefitting authoritarian regimes that threaten the sustainability of the state²⁸.

Even so, peacebuilding and statebuilding have numerous overlaps that are relevant in the context of measuring transformation and many indicators proposed in current discussions on state fragility refer to both peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. In the next section, this paper suggests measuring transformation along the core functions of the state (i.e. a focus on statebuilding rather than peacebuilding) given that ultimately state capacity determines most of the human development and human security outcomes in a society.

III What can be measured and how?

This section addresses the question of how transformation in FCAS can be defined and what can be measured and how. In a more policy-oriented language this implies looking at how success and failure of peace processes and peace agreements can be defined and measured. This includes dealing with the following questions:

- What efforts exist to measure the implementation of peace agreements?
- What efforts exist to assess the nature of political settlements/political settlement events, in particular their inclusiveness?
- How do different actors define transformation and how can transformation be defined to make it (more) measurable?
- What kinds of indicators could be used for measuring transformation?
- How could actors measure how different types of political settlement produce different outcomes in terms of human development/human security? How could trajectories of resilience and fragility be measured in the context of political settlements?

Measuring the implementation of peace agreements

According to McLeod, eleven major databases exist in relation to peace agreements.²⁹ However, these differ in terms of time spans, how peace agreements are counted and defined and how they are considered in terms of implementation.³⁰ These include the UN Peacemaker database, the INCORE database (which also hosts the Database of the Transitional Justice Institute), the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Peace Agreement Digital Collection and the Kroc Institute's Peace Accords Matrix (PAM). Apart from PAM that collects data about the implementation of the peace agreement, all the databases focus on the text of the agreement.

At present, PAM is the only source of comparable data on peace agreements, allowing examination of 50 different themes across 34 comprehensive peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2012. The agreements are divided according to (1) the major parties to the conflict who were involved in the negotiations that led to the written agreement; and (2) the substantive issues underlying the conflict that were included in the negotiations.³¹ The database also collects information on the implementation of 51 different types of provision, including civil administration reforms, inter-ethnic state relations and judiciary reform³².

Yet as noted in the conceptual work for the Programme, political settlement literature has neglected the use of political violence as a bargaining tool³³. It has also not adequately considered peace processes as formal attempts by elites and international actors to change political settlements. The literature also distinguishes peace agreements as events rather than processes, although research has shown that peace settlements are used to establish new processes and that multiple peace agreements revise and re-negotiate deals often in fairly rapid succession.³⁴ The conceptual working paper notes that very little is known about peace bargaining processes and outcomes, and that there has been very little systematic analysis of how peace processes manage issues of inclusion. Moreover, there is no consensus in the political settlement literature on what inclusiveness means. Rather the term tends to be understood in two fundamentally different ways: as inclusive of elites or inclusive of the broader spectrum of stakeholders in a society.

Lindemann³⁵ argues that "inclusive elite bargains permit the maintenance of political stability' whilst 'exclusionary elite bargains give rise to trajectories of civil war". Inclusiveness refers to a *political organisation* and the differences that might exist in different states. The author argues that many of the drivers of civil war that are salient in the literature, such as ethnic diversity, poor economic performance, vertical inequality, natural resource scarcity/abundance, and regime type are contingent on inclusive versus exclusionary forms of political organization. There is also a growing consensus that the inclusion and participation of women in peace processes can affect political settlements.³⁶

Despite the current lack of data, new conceptual and empirical work is being developed on peace agreements. As part of the PSRP's theme three ([Political settlements and peace processes](#)), analysis will be conducted on peace agreements to examine success with the inclusion of armed combatants over time, and to look at how security, human rights and development are shaped by these agreements. The quantitative work will allow a mid-level analysis (connecting large 'N' and small 'n' data), to be undertaken. Furthermore, a database called PA-X , A Peace Agreement Access Tool, will code and map all peace agreements

(around 1200 documents in 100 different countries) since 1990. This will be done in a way to “allow comparison of all elements of inclusion, development, and rights, using quantitatively defensible category definitions for ‘power-sharing’, ‘women’, ‘victims’, socio-economic rights, development, etc.” This database in turn will allow sets of correlations to be explored. It will be the most comprehensive attempt to map peace agreements and address the challenges mentioned previously.

As a result, this paper proposes using the newly developed PA-X Database to analyse transformation in the context of political settlements. It also explores a methodological approach to analyse political settlements in terms of their elite inclusiveness based on the assumption that the level of elite inclusiveness has at least implications for trajectories of stability and instability.

Defining and measuring transformation in fragile and conflict affected states

Over the past decade policymakers and academics have devoted considerable attention to supporting transformation towards more desirable human security and development outcomes by focusing on concepts of state fragility and resilience. In this way they have examined how external interventions can make positive contributions to processes of state- and peacebuilding. Within the policy community, the most prominent efforts are those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.³⁷

In 2010, the OECD proposed five key functions of the state: essential services; security; rule of law and access to justice; economic development and revenue.³⁸

These criteria have been further refined by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), a prominent forum for political dialogue that brings together a range of stakeholders to promote successful transitions from conflict and fragility. The forum is hosted by the OECD, in close collaboration with g7+³⁹, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)⁴⁰, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), civil society secretariats and a number of country representatives. Within this debate, fragility is understood as


a period of time during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery.⁴¹

Resilience, on the other hand, is seen as the end point that fragile states are working towards. It is defined as “the ability of social institutions to absorb and adapt to the internal and external shocks and setbacks they are likely to face.”⁴² Transformation is therefore understood in the context of a fragility spectrum, from fragility to resilience.

The IDPS forum has resulted in the establishment of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, an agreement between fragile states and international partners on the nature of their

engagement. Within this, there are Peace and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs)⁴³, namely legitimate politics; security; justice; economic foundations; and revenues and services.

Figure 1: PSG Goals⁴⁴



In an effort to measure the attainment of these goals, a working group was set up to develop indicators. This group therefore draws on a wide range of experts⁴⁵, including the IDPS representatives, the United Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank who can build on their previous efforts to measure fragility, such as the UNDP's 'User's guide to measuring fragility'⁴⁶ and the World Bank's World Development Indicators and Aid Effectiveness Data⁴⁷. Given the wide participation by a number of institutions, it has the political legitimacy and buy-in of a large number of actors. However it is still criticised for not fully embracing national ownership of countries affected by conflict.⁴⁸ Interim indicators have been established, although these are being piloted and are subject to further refinement.⁴⁹

However, there are still a number of common weaknesses on data and indicators relating to fragility. This includes measures of expert opinion risking subjective bias, the need for standardisation, proper disaggregation of data, difficulties in cross-country comparison due to capacity and definitions, gaps in data in particular for unstable contexts and poor data on specific themes, including informal justice, confidence in governance and so on.⁵⁰ Indicators must be complemented by country specific qualitative assessments of fragility, yet most African countries are not even fully equipped to collect and harmonise demographic data on a regular basis.⁵¹ For example, it was agreed that legitimate politics is partly measured by diversity in representation in key state institutions. This requires national administrative data, showing the breakdown of representatives within selected bodies, and disaggregated by gender, region and social group. Such information is potentially politically sensitive and if not used properly could result in doing harm. Furthermore, no datasets current exist that would allow cross-country comparisons. Annex 1 sets out some of the interim indicators proposed for the PSGs, and some of the challenges associated with using these indicators.

Further, the civil society platform for the IDPS cautions that ‘changes in capacity are not the same as better outcomes – and better outcomes are not enough unless they generate confidence among all social groups’.⁵² This would ideally require some measures of perception-based data, which is largely unavailable. Although perception-based measures are believed to help governments in developing peacebuilding strategies that build confidence on what the public wants⁵³ such data does not currently exist on a global level.⁵⁴

In particular, it is worth noting that the indicators proposed in the New Deal are, to some extent, a result of political agreement and not academic analysis and rigour. Furthermore, many indicators suggested require additional data collection. Therefore for the purposes of this study, the PSG goals give a good indication of areas of state capacity that should be measured, but require further analysis on which indicators are appropriate, discussed later.

The UN has also made attempts to define indicators on peacebuilding and statebuilding. It uses a range of frameworks, primarily based on national development priorities, including the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC’s) Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding, the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISFs). The UNDAF is intended to describe the collective response on the UN system to a country’s development priorities.⁵⁵

The UN’s frameworks have not always been well-aligned and there is a need for greater coherence. As a result, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office is in the process of developing a new model for Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Priority Plans that can be used by other stakeholders.⁵⁶ Indicators are organised around the four priority areas of the Peacebuilding Fund: Support to implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue; promotion of coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution; revitalisation of the economy and immediate peace dividends; and rebuilding essential administrative services and infrastructure. These priority areas are further refined and give guidance on indicators for which information should be collected.⁵⁷ Given that these proposed indicators were only produced in June 2014⁵⁸ and many require data collection by UN officials, these priority areas and indicators only serve to provide guidance on measuring transformation for the purposes of this paper. Importantly, they speak to the importance of state capacity as a relevant measure of transformation, and in particular, through the lens of political settlements. The four areas overlap considerably with the PSGs.

It is also worth noting that the debate on PSG indicators occurs amongst a broader parallel discussion – that of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With the aim of providing a global development agenda that focuses primarily on the poorest and most vulnerable, the SDGs replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Goal 16 relates to peace and security. The United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) is expected to lead on the process for creating an indicator framework but this process is still in initial stages and therefore such a framework cannot be used for the purposes of this paper.⁵⁹

In building the PSG and UN frameworks (and elsewhere in the literature), a number of data sets currently exist that can be drawn upon in informing indicators of transformation. Certain data sets are more applicable than others given the time period they cover, whether they are input, output or outcome orientated and whether they meet statistical or normative criteria. For example, with regards to the SDG framework, 135 data sources were assessed in terms of

their suitability for providing indicators of achieving goal 16. It was found that 11 out of the 12 targets could be measured by indicators meeting the basic criteria (long time span, outcome orientated, measurable, accurate, broad country coverage, updated regularly, comparable, relevant, universal, preventative and no unintended consequences).⁶⁰ Some of these indicators included the World Bank's World Governance and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) data, the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset, Freedom House data, Transparency International's (TI's) Global Corruption Barometer and Uppsala's Data Conflict Programme. Details of these indicators and data sources are further detailed in annex 2.

The UNDP's Human Development Index provides indicators for assessing the development of a country that are particularly applicable for measuring transformation. In particular, this includes measures of life expectancy, education and standard of living. It uses these three indicators as proxies, although broader measures such as inequality, gender disparity and human poverty are offered in the statistical indices of its annual reports.⁶¹ The Human Security Index builds on the Human Development Index to increase geographical coverage from 169 to 232 countries/jurisdictions. It uses over 30 composite indicators to develop three indices: economic⁶², social⁶³ and environmental⁶⁴ in an effort to broaden measures of human development and human security.⁶⁵ As discussed in the following section, a greater number of indicators does not necessarily imply a greater level of accuracy in understanding transformation. Rather, choosing the correct proxy is important. Measuring transformation will therefore require greater examination of the indicators that make up these composite indices.

There have also been efforts to measure different types of peace using existing datasets. Traditionally, indicators have focused on negative peace, that is an absence of violence, due to a greater availability of data and less controversial measurements. For example, in its Global Peace Index, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) uses three domains for measuring negative peace: ongoing domestic and international conflict, societal safety and security, and militarisation. Each of these domains draws on a range of available data, including information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the UN and the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD). In total 22 qualitative and quantitative negative peace indicators are used (see annex 3).⁶⁶ Other important datasets for measuring negative peace include the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset from the Centre for Systemic Research⁶⁷ and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Such indicators are particularly relevant when examining the security aspects of statebuilding capacity. However, whilst violence-related indicators are important measurements of the success/failure of a peace agreement, they imply an overly narrow definition and fail to capture the full extent of transformation.

The Kroc Institute has argued for five other dimensions associated with sustainable peace: the importance of civil society, security, governance, economic reconstruction, and reconciliation.⁶⁸ In line with this thinking, IEP has developed the Pillars of Peace, a conceptual framework for assessing peace, defined as the "attitudes, institutions and structures, that, when strengthened, lead to a more peaceful society."⁶⁹ It therefore looks at a country's overall resilience. The Pillars of Peace aims to ensure monitoring and evaluation of country progress to enhance evidence based policymaking.

The different Pillars of Peace consist of:

- A well-functioning government;
- A sound business environment;
- An equitable distribution of resources;
- An acceptance of the rights of others;
- Good relations with neighbours;
- Free flow of information;
- A high level of human capital; and
- Low levels of corruption.⁷⁰

These pillars are considered interdependent, and rather than isolating causality, describe the “optimal environment for peace to flourish.”⁷¹ It should also be noted that, according to IEP findings, countries with higher levels of peace tend to be more resilient to external shocks. The Pillars of Peace use IEP’s Global Peace Index (GPI) as a research base for cross-country comparisons with other data sets when examining positive peace.⁷² It draws on data selected from 20 data sources, including the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and TI. Some of these indicators and data sets could be considered applicable in measuring transformation specifically in the context of state capacity, although individual indicators need to be considered in terms of their applicability and effectiveness of proxy indicators. Details of these indicators are found in annex 3.

The Pillars of Peace also considers the importance of inequality as drivers of conflict and argues that the level of inequality in a nation may have some capacity to predict future levels of peace.⁷³ This has also been noted in joint paper by the UN PBSO, Saferworld and Columbia University in the context of the Post-2015 Development agenda, which examines horizontal inequalities, that is, inequalities among and between groups among economic, social, political, cultural, security and justice dimensions.⁷⁴ It is important that efforts to measure transformation also include indicators relating to inequality.

In this regard, Lindemann⁷⁵ has proposed indicators that can be developed on inequality, such as distribution of access to state structures (jobs) and state resources (rents). In particular he advocates for using data such as representation in a country’s main political institutions and social composition within these institutions. As previously mentioned, such data is not currently available from national institutions.⁷⁶ However, for the purposes of this study, it is worth noting that there is expert opinion data that does examine issues of inclusion. For example, Polity IV data examines democratic and autocratic quality in governing institutions and considers factors such as executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition.⁷⁷ Polity data is produced by experts in the academic, policy and intelligence community. Although it relies on opinions (albeit a number of experts making judgments according to strict coding regulations), it has the benefit of ensuring that there is no missing data. In some datasets, computers estimate missing data with statistical models, which result in skewed data. Polity coding is also revisited on a regular basis.

One further tool is worth mentioning that is useful when examining ways to measure transformation. When looking at human development and human security outcomes in FCAS it is also useful to introduce a forecasting element and look at how trajectories of human development are likely to unfold in the future. The African Futures Project, a collaboration between the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver uses the International Futures model (IFs)⁷⁸ to analyse trajectories of human development in Africa.

IFs is designed to help stakeholders think more concretely about potential futures and then design aggressive yet reasonable policy targets to meet those goals. IFs facilitates this in three ways. First, it allows users to see past relationships between variables and how they have developed and interacted over time. Second, using these dynamic relationships, a base case forecast is built that incorporates these trends and their interactions. This base case represents where the world seems to be going given historical and current circumstances and policies, without any major shock to the system (wars, pandemics, etc.). Third, scenario analysis augments the base case by exploring the leverage that policymakers have to push the systems to more desirable outcomes. This allows the user to ask “what IF?” questions about possible policy interventions. Since IFs is highly integrated, one can explore how interventions made in one sector of one country at one time affect every other sector of every other country across time.


Furthermore, by using scenario analysis, IFs can be used as a thinking tool for considering different policy options. IFs can also be used as a planning tool (such as for integrated planning; target setting, etc. including for monitoring and evaluation). Using a macro-scale model like IFs can be useful to shape and manage expectations about current development trajectories; assess how changes in one issue area have an impact across multiple other areas; evaluate strategic policy choices; set aggressive but reasonable and customised targets; and develop strategies for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development plans and programmes. It can therefore be used to inform policy options about enhancing transformation in the context of political settlements and in prioritising statebuilding activities.

Not only does IFs work as a forecasting system, but it also contains an extensive database from which indicators for transformation can be used. This includes datasets from the World Bank Governance Indicators, Polity IV, Freedom House and so on. More importantly, IFs has also developed a model to measure governance, which of course relates to measuring state capacity. In this regard, governance is defined as “a broader concept than government ... the manner in which societies manage themselves; governance emphasizes the critical two-way interaction of governments and society.”⁷⁹ Governance is also described in relation to development:

“Good domestic governance can support the creation of public goods that facilitate development, in particular the provision of reliable systems of market regulation, infrastructure, and education and health care”.⁸⁰

Thus governance refers to the ability of the state to regulate society and is relevant to measuring transformation in terms of development. Governance is measured as a result of three main variables with driving factors:

Diagram 1: Governance⁸¹



The model has been simplified in order to make measuring and forecasting feasible. As a result, two variables were used for each of the governance dimensions: 1) Security looks at the probability of intrastate conflict and vulnerability to intrastate conflict 2) Capacity focusses on government revenues and the level of government corruption (more accurately, the perceived absence of corruption) 3) Inclusion examines the extent of democracy and gender empowerment.⁸²

The drivers for each of these variables which the model aims to measure are:

- 1) Probability of intrastate conflict: past conflict, neighborhood effects, economic growth rate (inverse), trade openness (inverse), youth bulge, infant mortality, democracy (inverted-U), state repression (inverse), and external intervention.
- 2) Vulnerability to intrastate conflict: energy trade dependence, economic growth rate (inverse), urbanization rate, poverty level, infant mortality, undernutrition, HIV prevalence, primary net enrollment rate (inverse), intrastate conflict probability, corruption, democracy (inverse), government effectiveness (inverse), freedom (inverse), and water stress.
- 3) Government revenues: past revenue as percentage of GDP, GDP per capita, and fiscal balance (inverse).
- 4) Corruption: past corruption level, GDP per capita (inverse), energy trade dependence, democracy (inverse), gender empowerment (inverse), and probability of intrastate conflict.
- 5) Democracy: past democracy level, youth bulge (inverse), gender empowerment, and dependence on energy exports (inverse).
- 6) Gender empowerment: gender empowerment level, GDP per capita, youth bulge (inverse), and primary net enrollment rate.⁸³

The database makes use of large numbers of datasets, detailed in appendix 4. These include data from Polity IV, Freedom House, Transparency International, Cingranelli-Richards, UNDP, UNODC, World Bank, Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Uppsala. Governance transitions are examined from a historical empirical perspective using the forecasting system to adjust the weighting of each variable. This includes an examination of relationships across measures and the dimensions of transformation. Justifications on each driver of conflict are also made.

This paper, drawing on the above-mentioned work suggests analysing trajectories of transformation or outcomes along the core functions of the state, given that political settlements are primarily concerned with state functions. Increased state capacity is a necessary though insufficient condition for better outcomes. As IEP points out, positive peace is associated with a range of different factors, but as not all of these link to state capacity, only those relevant will be considered.

The following section draws on all the data sets detailed in the literature and outlines different indicators that can be used along different lines of state function. This list is by no means exhaustive. Nor does it advocate for all indicators to be used. Rather, proxies that best reflect different measures of state capacity should be identified at a later stage.

IV Indicators and datasets

Section IV of this paper scopes relevant indicators and data sources and highlights potential problems and shortcomings. No statistical analysis or country case studies will be conducted at this stage.

For each core function of the state, this paper outlines a range of suitable indicators or proxies that together will represent a basket of indicators for each state function derived from the PSG goals. These indicators have been selected specifically for this paper on the basis of their global representativeness (allowing for cross country comparison), time span that they cover, whether they are regularly updated and whether they are considered measurable and accurate. Choosing the best proxy of this data will be important. Although the New Deal process advocates for combinations or ‘baskets’ of indicators to capture change in FCAS given that ‘no single indicator can in every context tell a full, fair story about progress’,⁸⁴ many proposed data sets do not currently exist. In addition, each of these routes has successively greater data compilation/data-availability challenges. This paper proposes that a more viable route would be to identify an appropriate proxy/proxies that could serve to measure progress over time and allow for cross-country comparisons.

Table 1: Core functions of the state and indicators (drawn from various data sources)

Core function of the state	Indicator(s)	Data source
Legitimate politics	Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and accountability	World Bank (World Governance Indicators)
	Governance	Legatum Prosperity Index
	Functioning of government, political culture	Democracy index, Economist Intelligence unit
	Quality of democracy	Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainable governance indicators

	<p>Political Effectiveness</p> <p>Indices of social development, Civic activism</p> <p>Freedom of the world (civil liberties), freedom of the press</p> <p>Confidence in the honesty of elections, expressing political views</p> <p>Freedom of association, speech, electoral self-determination</p> <p>Inter-group disputes producing violence</p> <p>Voter turnout</p> <p>Minorities at risk</p> <p>State membership in the international system</p> <p>State system membership data</p>	<p>Polity IV</p> <p>International Institute of Social Studies</p> <p>Freedom house</p> <p>Gallup world poll</p> <p>Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) database</p> <p>ACLED</p> <p>International Idea</p> <p>Centre for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland</p> <p>Pardee Centre for International Future, University of Denver</p> <p>Correlates of War</p>
Justice	<p>Rule of law</p> <p>Rule of law index</p> <p>Legal certainty, Rule of law, judicial review</p> <p>Confidence in local police</p> <p>Laws (legal environment)</p>	<p>World Bank, World Governance Indicators</p> <p>World Justice Project</p> <p>Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainable governance indicators,</p> <p>Gallup world poll</p> <p>Freedom House, Freedom of the press index</p>
The provision of security	<p>Intentional homicide rate per 100,000, number of internal security officers and police</p> <p>Direct deaths from armed conflict per 100,000</p> <p>Violent deaths of children</p>	<p>UNODC</p> <p>Uppsala Data Conflict Program</p> <p>Global Health Estimates, WHO, Demographic Health Survey</p>

	<p>Absence of armed conflict</p> <p>Number and duration of internal armed conflict</p> <p>Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal)</p> <p>Number of deaths from organized conflict (external)</p> <p>Number, duration and role in external conflicts</p> <p>Violent discipline of children, Child marriage</p> <p>Number of refugees and internally displaced people</p> <p>Impact of terrorism</p> <p>Political terror scale</p> <p>Number of jailed population per 100,000 people</p> <p>Volume of illicit financial flows</p> <p>Stolen asset recovery initiative</p> <p>Military expenditure as a % of GDP, number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people</p> <p>Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier per 100,000 people</p> <p>Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities</p> <p>Security Effectiveness</p> <p>Intra-state war data</p> <p>Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV)</p>	<p>Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)</p> <p>Uppsala Data Conflict Program</p> <p>UCDP Armed Conflict Database</p> <p>International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)</p> <p>UCDP, IEP</p> <p>UNICEF</p> <p>UNHCR</p> <p>IEP Global Terrorism Index</p> <p>University of North Carolina and Arizona State</p> <p>World Prison Brief</p> <p>Global Financial Integrity</p> <p>Stolen asset recovery initiative</p> <p>IISS</p> <p>SIPRI Arms Transfers Database</p> <p>IISS, SIPRI, UN register of conventional arms, IEP</p> <p>Polity IV</p> <p>Correlates of War Project</p> <p>Centre for Systemic Peace and George Mason</p>
Economic foundations	Financial freedom, business freedom	Freedom House (Index of Economic Freedom)

	<p>Entrepreneurship and opportunity, education, health</p> <p>Institutions, global competitiveness overall score</p> <p>Infrastructure, technological readiness, innovation, business sophistication, goods market efficiency</p> <p>Telephone lines, quality of port infrastructure, improved water source, tariff weight, burden of customs procedure, GDP per capita, trading across borders</p> <p>Home has access to the internet, standard of living</p> <p>Human development inequality, Life expectancy inequality, education inequality</p> <p>Youth Development</p> <p>Infant mortality, life expectancy, population below \$2 a day, vulnerable employment (% of total employment), Gini coefficient</p> <p>Social Effectiveness, Economic Effectiveness</p>	<p>Legatum prosperity index</p> <p>World Economic Forum</p> <p>World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness report)</p> <p>World Bank</p> <p>Gallup World Poll</p> <p>UN Human Development Index</p> <p>IEP</p> <p>World Bank (World Development Indicators)</p> <p>Polity IV</p>
Revenue and services	<p>Government revenues, Government revenues total as per cent of GDP, Government taxes by type, Income tax as per cent of GDP</p> <p>Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector</p> <p>Birth registration</p> <p>Property rights</p> <p>Nurses and midwives (per 1000 people)</p>	<p>IFs</p> <p>CPIA Score World Bank, Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, Gallup World Poll</p> <p>UNICEF, UNHCR, National data</p> <p>Freedom House, Index of Economic Freedom</p> <p>World Bank (World Development indicators)</p>

Datasets (drawn from various data sources) that also consider state fragility as a whole include:

Dataset	Indicator
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) (measure of state fragility)	Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University
Failed States Index	Fund for peace
Gleditsch and Ward List of Independent States	Researchers a University of Essex and Duke University
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World	Brookings Institution
Peace and conflict instability ledger	Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland
State failure Problem set	Political Instability Task Force Centre for Global Policy, George Mason
State fragility index	Centre for Systemic Peace

V Way forward

Intervening in FCAS is complex and requires a detailed evaluation of how transformation can be best achieved. In the words of OECD, ‘Donor countries are faced with trade-offs between supporting short term measures to secure peace and pursuing longer-term objectives of statebuilding’.⁸⁵ In order to inform policy making, this scoping paper has suggested ways of analysing transformation through the lens of political settlements, where peace settlements are considered as peace agreements. The PA-X database, currently being established for the PSRP, will provide sufficient data in this regard, and will allow for analysis according to different elements of inclusion, development and rights.

In measuring transformation, this paper has suggested indicators along the lines of state capacity. Drawing on the PSG indicators, it proposes a number of indicators and data sets that can be used in this regard. Whilst there is a dearth of perception-based data and a number of indicators that cannot be used as they rely on national administrative data that is not readily available and comparable, it is suggested that from the indicators and data sets listed, proxies that give sufficient indication of state capacity can be determined. Such indicators will be refined by experts on measurement at a later stage of this project. Suffice it to say that state capacity varies substantially across functions and that states perform differently across different dimensions⁸⁶. In any case, transformation is likely to be an uneven process. Historically, the three most important governance transitions –security, capacity and inclusion–happened sequentially but in the context of a globalized world they tend to happen simultaneously in FCAS which presents significant challenges for both policymakers as well as external partners.⁸⁷

The IFs model of governance may provide a way of measuring transformation given that it has developed composite indices to measure governance across three dimensions: security,

capacity and inclusion, and that these indices are comprehensively justified in a methodological manner. Given the availability of these indicators in the IFs system and the ability to use these indicators to make forecasting predictions, these indices may be appropriate for later work on transformation. However, the indices may require further modification according to the level at which indicators are being measured (such as how broad or specific they are). This will require further deliberation by measurement experts at a later stage.

Once transformation indicators have been defined, different types of political settlements can be mapped to different types of outcomes. Using PA-X data, different levels of inclusivity can be analysed according to different types of transformation. For example, do exclusive peace agreements result in less economic growth? Do inclusive peace agreements, in particular those that include women, bring about more legitimate politics? Are comprehensive peace agreements more likely to bring about general transformation? A scorecard type methodology could be developed, where peace agreements are mapped according to their development trajectories. This can be used to inform policy making on external interventions.

Two further difficulties exist in defining and measuring successful interventions, which are worth bearing in mind. First, some of the end goals, such as rule of law, or democracy, are themselves “essentially contested concepts” that is, concepts about which there is fundamental disagreement over their content.⁸⁸ Secondly, it is also worth mentioning that, as noted in the terms of reference, political trade-offs may exist between having a stable political settlement and an open and inclusive one. In the middle of an ongoing process, it is quite difficult to define what ‘transforming’ a settlement looks like and whether it is being achieved.

Nevertheless, this paper makes a first attempt at defining transformation through the lens of a political settlement. It suggests indicators of transformation derived through different areas of state function according to contemporary debates and suggests analysing this through forthcoming data on political settlements. No measurements will ever be perfect but this does not mean that the data is not useful in providing initial indications of how different peace agreements lead to different outcomes. This paper provides avenues for measuring this in the future, which will allow greater analysis of when and how donors can intervene most effectively.

Annex 1: Definitions of the term ‘Political Settlement’⁸⁹

<i>Author</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Function</i>
Khan (1995)	The overall balance of power in society	Explains the performance of formal and informal institutions
Fritz and Menocal (2007)	A negotiated agreement binding state and society An on-going process, rather than a one-off event	Provides the foundation for core state functions
OECD/DAC (2008)	The outcome of peace processes	Underpins the social contract
Whaites (2008)	Informal, unarticulated understandings between elites	Brings about an end to conflict and prevents its re-occurrence
Menocal (2009)	A common understanding between elites about how power should be organised and exercised Includes formal institutions and informal agreements	Determines the success or failure of peace-building and statebuilding
Di John and Putzel (2009)	The outcome of bargaining and negotiation between elites	Constrains and facilitates institutional and developmental change
Brown and Gravingholt (2009)	A two-dimensional concept - the outcome of an historical event and a property of society	The cornerstone of every social and political order. Leads to institutions that prevent violence
DFID (2009)	Starts with a common understanding between elites, then expands into a contract between state and society An adaptable political process, formalised through or grounded upon one-off events like peace agreements	Stabilises peace agreements and establishes state-society relations
Barnes (2009)	A common understanding between elites about how power should be organised and exercised The outcome of peace processes in war-to-peace transitions	Defines the nature of institutions and the role and power of political organisations and their members
Khan (2009, 2010)	The ‘social order’ A compatible, viable and sustainable combination of power and institutions	Describes how societies solve the problem of violence and achieve minimum political stability and economic performance
DFID (2010a)	A common understanding between elites about how power should be organised and exercised Includes formal institutions and informal agreements	Establishes basic rules governing economic relations and resource allocation

Annex 2: PSG Indicator Overview⁹⁰

PSG 1: Legitimate Politics	Data Collection	Notes
Representation in political system		
1. Diversity in representation in key state institutions (basket)	Breakdown of representatives (%) within selected bodies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Needs to be complemented with indicator #2 Need to be carefully thought through so to avoid doing harm
<i>Whether elected and appointed officials in key state institutions and decision-making bodies are representative of the population.</i>		
2. Perception of representation (and its effectiveness) in government (basket)	Perception survey questions will need to be developed or drawn from existing surveys.	Will require follow up work to define exact methodology/basket of indicators.
<i>The population's level of satisfaction in the political system's inclusivity and effectiveness.</i>		
Political Participation		
3. Participation in and satisfaction with elections (basket)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participation in recent national elections Perception survey question(s) regarding satisfaction with elections 	
<i>A measure of electoral participation and public satisfaction with the electoral process.</i>		
4. Participation in political processes and civic engagement at local level (basket)	Suggestions (not yet selected): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Membership of political parties and political NGOs % of people who have taken part in 	a) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specific indicators for basket and/or methodology not yet selected. Three suggestions provided

<p>Assesses <i>civic engagement and the extent to which people can participate in the political process at the local level and have a say in key decisions that affect their vital interests.</i></p>	<p>or would consider attending lawful demonstrations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of people who are consulted and/or can participate in local processes (e.g. planning) affecting their daily lives. 	<p>in data collection column.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will require follow up work to define exact methodology/basket of indicators.
<p>Societal relationships</p>		
<p>5. Number of inter-group disputes that produce violence</p>	<p>Available data source: ACLED</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could look at types of conflict, e.g. land, electoral related violence, etc.but need to recognise that conflicts can have multiple causes. • Could qualify levels of violence. • Challenges in measuring disputes that produce violence, may be easier to measure disputes that produce violent deaths.
<p><i>Number of violent disputes between groups, representing rifts in the social fabric.</i></p>		
<p>6. Number of joint initiatives involving different groups in society</p>	<p>“Initiatives” should cover associations (membership or non-membership driven), organized or spontaneous events, or collective actions, projects, or enterprises. Initiatives can also be conceived as “social networks” and could be broken down into economic (e.g. collaborative business ventures and development projects), social (e.g. community meetings, public/cultural events, NGOs and CBOs, disaster response related) and political (e.g. political parties, civic organizations that engage in political advocacy or activism)</p>	<p>Discussion in Nairobi also identified Inter-group or inter-faith marriage. This does not easily fit into the conceptualisation of ‘initiative’. While it is a good measure of inter-group ties between communities it has been shown that it is not a strong enough social bond to prevent inter-group conflict or to promote human development.</p>
<p><i>Assesses social cohesion, social capital, intergroup relationships and societal resilience.</i></p>		

PSG 2: Security	Data Collection	Notes
Security Conditions		
1. Violent deaths per 100,000 population	Various methodologies exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGOs can help generate data. It will be important to look into more detail how alternative data sources can better inform this data. • Need to have section on the need to build country capacity-technical issues remain.
<i>Prevalence of violence in society resulting in death.</i>		
2. Political refugees and internal displacement caused by conflict and violence (basket)	<i>Available data sources: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC); UNHCR</i>	
<i>Estimates the number of people fleeing a country due to fear of persecution and the number of internally Displaced People (IDPs) within a country, as a proportion of the total population.</i>		
3. Incidence of rape and sexual violence	Need to determine parameters for measurement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data problems and reporting biases acknowledged but group felt it had to be kept • Source of the data will be critical. • This is one of the agreed indicators to measure the implementation of UN Resolution 1325
<i>Measures the number of cases of sexual violence that have occurred in a specific time period (in a specific population) relative to total size of the population at risk</i>	<i>Available data sources: UNODC collects data on sexual violence, including rape against adults and children</i>	
4. % of people that feel safe	Perception survey questions will need to be developed or drawn from existing surveys	
General perceptions of security and safety.		
5. Number of deaths as a result of external influences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible way to measure: • Could also look at interstate conflict, frequency of cross- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challenges in measurement acknowledged • Need to define "external influence"
<i>Measures the number of death associated</i>		

<p><i>with conflict and violence where there is an external influence.</i></p>	<p>border violence resulting in death.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a strict coding system for comparable reporting over time and across space. 	<p>(financing? weapons? Foreign combatants?)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need to determine the timeframe parameters for measurement.
<p>Performance of Security Institutions</p>		
<p>6. Public confidence in the performance of security institutions (basket) b)</p>	<p>Perception survey questions will need to be developed or drawn from existing surveys</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed to keep conceptually, but some technical issues remain. Need to revisit how technically you evaluate 'confidence'.
<p><i>General satisfaction with the performance of security institutions.</i></p>		
<p>Capacity of Security Institutions</p>		
<p>7. PROPOSED: Presence of police and state security across the territory vs non-state armed groups</p>	<p>Territorial coverage (%) of police and state security actors vs % coverage by non-state armed groups</p>	
<p><i>Capacity of the state to provide security throughout its territory.</i></p>		
<p>8. Frequency of payment of salaries within police force c)</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comment by Liberia: should we look at detailed aspects of capacity if we already measure level of confidence in police/military which will also be a reflection of public confidence? Should be used in addition to the confidence level indicator
<p><i>Whether police officers experience frequent delays in receiving their salary.</i></p>		
<p>9. PROPOSED: Quality of human resources</p>	<p>To assess the quality of human resources within the police force one or</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could also look at numbers per population and

<p>within police force (basket)</p>	<p>several of these indicators could be selected:</p>	<p>regional coverage (similar to PSG indicator #7)</p>
<p><i>Whether police have personnel who are adequately screened, fairly recruited and sufficiently remunerated.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether police recruiting practices are perceived to be fair and effective • Whether entry-level salaries for police officers are sufficient to recruit and retain qualified individuals • Whether the existing vetting process is adequate to ensure that individuals who committed gross human rights abuses and other serious crimes are identified and prevented from serving as police officers <p><i>Available methodology: UN Rule of Law Indicators</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comment by Liberia: should we look at detailed aspects of capacity if we already measure level of confidence in police/military which will also be a reflection of public confidence?
<p>PSG 3: Justice</p>	<p>Data Collection</p>	<p>Notes</p>
<p>Performance and Independence of Justice Institutions</p>		
<p>1. Public confidence in the performance of justice institutions (formal/customary), including human rights mechanisms</p>	<p>Perception survey questions will need to be developed or drawn from existing surveys</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The customary justice system would include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, traditional, informal, faith-based systems, etc. • The indicator 5 (under PSG 1) would be important for PSG 3 to measure the effectiveness of the performance of alternative dispute
<p><i>General satisfaction with the performance of justice institutions.</i></p>		

<p><i>Theory of change: Assess whether the public believes that the judicial system (both formal and customary) is accessible, affordable, fair and effective and respects individual rights</i></p>		<p>resolution mechanisms.</p>
<p>2. % of victims who reported crime to authorities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of victims who reported crime to authorities within the last 12 months • Victimization survey could also capture the authority to which the crime was reported, including non-state authorities (e.g. elders, chiefs, etc.) 	<p>Potential (good way to triangulate with indicator 1). Also good indicator to assess confidence in police.</p>
<p><i>Percentage of victimized individuals who reported their victimization to the authorities within the last 12 months.</i></p> <p><i>Theory of change:</i></p>		
<p>3. PROPOSED: Independence of judiciary – Tenure of judges</p>	<p>% of judges who are appointed for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed tenure, which is protected until retirement age or the expiration of a defined term of substantial duration.</p>	<p>Proposed as way to measure independence of the judiciary.</p>
<p><i>Percentage of judges who are appointed for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed tenure (term).</i></p>		
<p>Capacity of Justice Institutions</p>		
<p>4. Extent of pre-trial detention</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average length of time suspects spend in jail or prison before trial or sentencing <p>Or</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The percentage of prison detainees who have been held in detention for more than 12 months while awaiting 	<p>Was generally seen as good but not fully consensual. Concern was raised on including a new indicator that has not been part of the fragility assessment and the risk of not reflecting a commonality in all fragile countries</p>
<p><i>The average length of time suspects spend in jail or prison before trial or sentencing.</i></p> <p><i>Theory of change: The indicator assesses the extent to which justice systems are capable to effectively process cases in a responsive</i></p>		

<p><i>manner. It also captures whether pre-trial detention is used as tool against political opposition.</i></p>	<p>sentencing or another final disposition of their case (excluding appeals)</p>	
<p>5. % change of police files / cases accepted by prosecuting agency</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % change of police files / cases accepted by prosecuting agency • Could also focus on gender-based violence only (agreed UN indicator to measure the implementation of UN Resolution 1325: %change in cases of sexual and gender-based violence referred, investigated and sentenced) 	<p>Potential but there was concern about including a new indicator that has not been part of the fragility assessment in and the risk of not reflecting a commonality in all fragile countries</p>
<p><i>Capacity of justice institutions to process cases.</i></p> <p><i>Theory of change: Assesses the effectiveness of the criminal justice spectrum, i.e. how well police investigates crimes, collects evidence, assemble case files etc.</i></p>		
<p>Access to Justice</p>		
<p>6. People's legal awareness, including human rights and legal representation / assistance</p>	<p>Perception survey questions will need to be developed or drawn from existing surveys.</p>	<p>It is difficult to measure awareness but it is a crucial part of people's access to justice and rights. There are examples where awareness has been measures through large n surveys. Could be narrowed down to look at those issues that are critical from a conflict and fragility perspective ('priority case types')</p>
<p><i>The extent to which citizens are aware of their basic rights.</i></p> <p><i>Theory of change: Reflects citizen capacity to seek redress and actively engage in political, social and economic life.</i></p>		
<p>7. Proximity to formal and</p>	<p>Could include several indicators:</p>	<p>Challenge: geographic proximity doesn't necessarily</p>

<p>customary justice institutions to the public (basket)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of judicial sector personnel (qualified judges, magistrates, ...) per 100,000 population and distribution across the territory. • Number of legal professionals produced annually. 	<p>translate to access for many people that need it most. Needs to be complemented by indicator 1, i.e. confidence in justice institutions to which people have access.</p>
<p><i>Physical accessibility of formal and customary judicial services to the public.</i></p>		
<p>PSG 4: Economic Foundations</p>	<p>Data Collection</p>	<p>Notes</p>
<p>Productive Resources and Prospects for Growth</p>		
<p>1. Population with access to usable and serviceable transport networks, communication, water and energy (basket)</p>	<p>% of population with access to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • useable and serviceable transport networks • communication • potable water • energy 	
<p><i>Extent the population has access to key infrastructure related to transportation, communication, water and energy.</i></p> <p><i>Theory of change:</i></p>		
<p>2. Income inequality among regions</p>		
<p><i>Extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households between regions deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.</i></p>		
<p>Employment and Livelihoods</p>		

3. % of labour force under- and unemployed (basket)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of labour force underemployed • % of labour force unemployed 	
<i>Prevalence of underemployment and unemployment.</i>		
4. % change in food prices over last three months	% change in food prices over last three months	
<i>Degree of fluctuation in food process.</i>		
Natural Resources Management		
5. Existence and enforcement of regulatory framework for natural resource management (basket)	Will require additional work to define methodology or indicators for basket.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs more work to define way to measure
<i>Whether natural resource management is managed through an effective regulatory framework which is enforced.</i>		
6. Perception of fair use of benefits from natural resources	Perception survey questions will need to be developed or drawn from existing surveys.	
<i>The population perception of whether the benefits of the state's natural resources are used equitably.</i>		
PSG 5. Revenues and Services	Data Collection	Notes
Revenue Management		
1. State monopoly and		Monopoly over customs collection could be calculated

<p>capacity to collect tax, customs and fees across its territory (basket)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which the state has a functioning tax and customs office presence at all major trading points and in all major urban areas cities in the country • Alternative sources of tax authority (warlord payments, protection rackets) as determined through expert assessment 	<p>by drawing on data from national income accounts and trade statistics.</p>
<p><i>Ability of the state to monopolise tax and customs collection in relation to other competing sources of state authority and extend tax and customs services over the full territory of the state.</i></p>		
<p>2. Tax revenue as share of GDP</p>	<p>Tax revenue as share of GDP</p>	
<p><i>Ability of the state to generate official tax payments as a source of development finance and service delivery.</i></p>		
<p>Public Administration</p>		
<p>3. Quality of public financial management and internal oversight mechanisms (basket)</p>	<p>PEFA indicators are based on scores determined on an agreed framework.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs to take into account development of an indicator as part of the Busan process. • Care must be taken that this indicator also goes down to the subnational level. • Aid on budget and predictability are critical issues that will be measured as part of the post-Busan indicators and the FOCUS and TRUS indicators.
<p><i>The quality of public financial management as a core government function.</i></p>		
<p>4. % of population that reports paying a bribe when obtaining a public service or when</p>	<p>% of population that reports paying a bribe when obtaining a public service or when interacting with a public official</p>	<p>Also covers people's experience of bribery in the justice system and with security institutions.</p>

interacting with a public official		
<i>Prevalence of petty corruption based on people's experience.</i>		
Service Delivery		
5. Distribution of services		Access to water could be included in this indicator instead of indicator 1 under PSG 4.
<i>Whether key basic services are distributed equitably between regions and social groups</i>		
6. Public satisfaction with service delivery (basket)	Perception survey questions	
<i>Public satisfaction with standard, performance and fairness of basic social service delivery.</i>		

Annex 3: IEP's Global Peace Index Indicators

Domain	Indicator	Source
ONGOING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	Number and duration of internal conflicts	Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
	Number of deaths from organised conflict (external)	UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset
	Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal)	International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD)
	Number, duration and role in external conflicts	UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; IEP
	Intensity of organised internal conflict	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
	Relations with neighbouring countries	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
SOCIETAL SAFETY AND SECURITY	Level of perceived criminality in society	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
	Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population	Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)
	Political instability	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
	Political Terror Scale	Qualitative assessment of Amnesty International and US State Department yearly reports
	Impact of terrorism	IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
	Number of homicides per 100,000 people	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates

	Level of violent crime	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
	Likelihood of violent demonstrations	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
	Number of jailed population per 100,000 people	World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex
	Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people	NODC; EIU estimates
MILITARISATION	Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP	The Military Balance, IISS
	Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people	The Military Balance, IISS
	Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database
	Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
	Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions	United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP
	Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities	The Military Balance, IISS; SIPRI; UN Register of Conventional Arms; IEP
	Ease of access to small arms and light weapons	Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

Annex 4: Measuring Goal 16 of the SDGs⁹¹

Target	Indicator	Data Source
16.1 - Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	Intentional homicide rate per 100,000	UNODC
	Direct deaths from armed conflict per 100,000	Uppsala Data Conflict Program
16.2 - End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children	Violent deaths of children 0-19	Global Health Estimates, WHO, Demographic Health Survey(DHS)
	Violent discipline of children	UNICEF (MICS, DHS, GSHS, HSBC surveys)
	Child marriage	UNICEF (MICS, DHS, GSHS, HSBC surveys)
16.3 promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all	Transparency, accountability & corruption in public sector	CPIA Score World Bank
	Rule of Law	World Governance Indicators, World Bank
16.4 by 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime	See next column	Volume of illicit financial flows Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative
16.5 substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms	Was there at least one instance in the last 12 months when you had to give a bribe/ present, or not?	TI Global Corruption Barometer / Gallup World Poll
16.6 develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	Quality of public administration	CPIA, World Bank
16.7 ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	Voter Turnout	International IDEA
	Ability to express political opinions Diversity in Representation in key state institutions	Gallup World Poll Breakdown of gender, religious, social group as representatives in representative bodies
16.8 broaden and strengthen the participation of developing	No indicators meet criteria, entirely	

countries in the institutions of global governance	politically determined.	
16.9 by 2030 provide legal identity for all including birth registration	Birth Registrations	UNICEF, UNHCR, National administrative data
16.10 ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements	Freedom of the press	Freedom House, Combined scores: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly & association, electoral self-determination, Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) database
16.a strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacities at all levels, in particular in developing countries, for preventing violence and combating terrorism and crime	See next column	Combined scores: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly & association, electoral self-determination, Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) database
16.b promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development		Combined scores: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly & association, electoral selfdetermination, Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) database

Annex 5: Domains and Indicators of Positive Peace⁹²

POSITIVE FACTORS	PEACE	INDICATOR	SOURCE
Well functioning government		Government Effectiveness	World Bank
		Rule of Law	World Bank
		Political Culture	EIU
Sound business environment		Ease of Doing Business	World Bank
		Economic Freedom	Heritage Foundation
		GDP per capita	World Bank
Equitable distribution of resources		Life Expectancy Index Loss	UNDP
		Gini coefficient	EIU
		Population living below \$2/day	World Bank
Acceptance of the rights of others		Intergroup Cohesion	ISS
		Empowerment Index	CIRI
		Gender Inequality index	UNDP
Good relations with neighbours		Number of visitors	EIU
		Regional Integration	EIU
		Hostility to Foreigners	EIU
Free flow of information		Freedom of the Press Index	Freedom House
		World Press Freedom Index	Reporters without borders
		Mobile phone subscriptions	ITU
High levels of Human capital		School enrolment, secondary (% gross)	World Bank
		Youth Development Index	IEP
		Scientific publications	World Bank, IEP calculation
Low levels of corruption		Control of Corruption	World Bank
		Factionalised Elites	Fund for Peace
		Perceptions of Corruption	Transparency International

Annex 6: Major Databases and Governance Measures Used in Strengthening Governance Globally⁹³

Name of database or measure	Auspices or organizational home	URL
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project Researchers at Binghamton University (SUNY), University of Connecticut, and University of Georgia	http://www.humanrightsdata.org/
Civil liberties scale	Freedom House	http://freedomhouse.org
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)	Transparency International	http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) (measure of state fragility)	Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University	http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_data_methodology.pjp
Failed States Index	Fund for Peace	http://ffp.statesindex.org/
Gleditsch and Ward List of Independent States	Researchers at University of Essex and Duke University	http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html/statelist.html
Human Development Index (HDI)	United Nations Development Programme	http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World	Brookings Institution	http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/02/weak-states-index
International Human Development Indicators	United Nations Development Programme	http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/ldcs
Intra-State War Data set	Correlates of War Project	http://www.correlatesofwar.org
Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset	Armed Conflict and Intervention project Center for Systemic Peace jointly with George Mason University Center for Global Policy	http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm
Minorities at Risk (MAR) Data	Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland	http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp
Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger	Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland	http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/executive_summary/exec_sum_2012.pdf

Physical Integrity Rights Dataset	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project Researchers at Binghamton University (SUNY), University of Connecticut, and University of Georgia	http://www.humanrightsdata.org/
Political Instability Index	Economist Intelligence Unit	http://www.economist.com/node/13349331
Political rights scale	Freedom House	http://freedomhouse.org
Political Terror Scale	Researchers at University of North Carolina at Asheville and Arizona State University, Tempe	http://politicalterrorsscale.org
Polity autocracy scale Polity democracy scale Polity Score (Autocracy/Democracy scale)	Polity IV Project Center for Systemic Peace	http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
State Failure Problem Set	Political Instability Task Force (PITF) PITF website hosted by Center for Global Policy George Mason University	http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
State Fragility Index	Center for Systemic Peace	http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFIMatrix2012c.pdf
State Membership in the International System	Pardee Center for International Futures University of Denver	http://pardee.du.edu/diplometrics
State System Membership Data set (v 2011)	Correlates of War Project	http://correlatesofwar.org
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset	Uppsala Conflict Data Program Uppsala University	http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_one-sided_violence_dataset/
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset	Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Centre for the Study of Civil War Uppsala University (Sweden) and Peace Research Institute Oslo	http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/
UNODC Homicide Statistics	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/index.html?ref=menuse
Women's Political Rights Dataset	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project Researchers at Binghamton University (SUNY), University of Connecticut, and University of Georgia	http://www.humanrightsdata.org/
World Development Indicators (WDI)	World Bank	http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
Worldwide Governance	World Bank	http://data.worldbank.org/data-

Indicators (WGI)		catalog/worldwide-governanceindicators
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- ⁶⁰ IEP, Measuring Goal 16, Identifying priority indicators based on key statistical and normative criteria, 2014, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Measuring-Goal-16.pdf>
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- ⁶³ Made up of health, education and info empowerment, protection of, and benefits from, diversity, peacefulness, governance, including protection from official or illegal corrupt practices, food security
- ⁶⁴ Made up of environmental vulnerability, environmental protection (clean water, etc.), policies & deliveries, environmental sustainability
- ⁶⁵ Human Security Index, About, http://www.humansecurityindex.org/?page_id=2
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- ⁷¹ Ibid, p.2
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- ⁷³ Ibid, p.16
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- ⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 23
- ⁷⁷ Centre for Systemic Peace, Polity Project, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>
- ⁷⁸ IFs is large-scale, long-term, highly integrated modelling software housed at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Originally developed as an educational tool, the model forecasts hundreds of open source variables for 186 countries until 2100 using more than 2 700 historical series and sophisticated algorithms based on correlations found in academic literature. The IFs software consists of 11 main modules: population, economics, energy, agriculture, infrastructure, health, education, socio-political, international political, technology and the environment. Each module is tightly connected with the other modules, creating dynamic relationships among variables across the entire system.⁷⁸ It is particularly well suited to high-level target-setting.
- ⁷⁹ Pardee Centre for International Futures, Patterns of Potential Human Progress, Volume 5. Strengthening Governance Globally: Forecasting the Next 50 Years, 2014, http://pardee.du.edu/sites/default/files/P5_Full_Volume.pdf, p.6

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⁹³ Pardee Centre for International Futures, Patterns of Potential Human Progress, Volume 5. Strengthening Governance Globally: Forecasting the Next 50 Years, 2014, http://pardee.du.edu/sites/default/files/PPHP5_Full_Volume.pdf, p. 171