




PROGRESS IN PEACE PROCESSES



Assessing and Influencing Progress in Peace Processes Workshop Report



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The workshop explored new and emerging developments in methodologies and approaches used to assess and influence progress in peace processes. This report provides an overview of the workshop discussions and will feed into a Policy Paper on Assessing and Influencing Progress in Peace Processes, which will be published by the end of 2018.

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Executive Summary

This report has been produced from the workshop on Assessing and Influencing Progress in Peace Processes held at Barcelona on May 30-June 1, 2018. The workshop brought together a fruitful combination of researchers, policy actors and practitioners, including a mixture of state and civil society actors. The overarching purpose of the workshop was to explore new and emerging developments in methodologies and approaches used to assess and influence progress in peace processes.

The report is divided into three sections, with the primary findings of each presented below. These findings are relevant to those working in the areas of implementing and monitoring peace agreements, measuring peace, and developing new areas and approaches for improving the likelihood of successfully transitioning from conflict to peace.

Section 1: Implementing, Monitoring and Measuring Peace Agreements

This section focuses on the relationship between peace agreement implementation and peace. It suggests that successful implementation of an agreement can contribute to peace in a range of ways but that numerous impediments, including the complexity of implementation process, the diversity of actors involved, the presence of potential spoilers, and the ongoing negotiation during the implementation phase, can hamper successful implementation.

This section also explores the role of monitoring mechanisms, particularly the Third-Party Monitoring Team in the Philippines and the Kroc Institute's Barometer Initiative in Colombia, in helping to support peace agreement implementation.

The main findings include:

1. **Monitoring bodies perform crucial roles in overseeing technical aspects of the implementation process.** These roles include monitoring and providing information on areas of successful implementation and identifying lags in the implementation process. Alongside these technical contributions, third-party monitors also play a range of additional roles, which include:
 - a. *bridging knowledge gaps and trust between parties;*
 - b. *identifying emergent positive and negative patterns;*
 - c. *detecting issues of concern and catalysing greater efforts in implementing lagging areas;*
 - d. *drawing on comparative experiences to help offer solutions to difficult implementation issues;*
 - e. *providing public spaces for ongoing dialogue; and*
 - f. *championing areas of successful implementation.*

2. **Monitoring bodies also face a number of difficulties and limitations, which include:**
 - a. *power disparities at the negotiation table, which can undermine the inclusiveness of provisions being implemented and monitored;*
 - b. *implementation processes are fluid, thus subject to ongoing (re)negotiation and change; and*
 - c. *limitations associated with what can be assessed (i.e. the impacts of implementation)*

Section 2: Benchmarks and Indicators of Peace beyond Implementation

This section engages with discussions around existing measurements of peace, beyond the measurements on levels of implementation of a peace accord. These include programme evaluation and monitoring; indices of peace (e.g. the Global Peace Index); and indicators that, depending on the context in question, may be pertinent to peace (e.g. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index or the World Bank's World Development Indicators).

The main findings suggest that existing measurements of peace are limited in a number of fundamental respects. Problems include:

- a. *the pitfalls of defining indicators which operate on an assumption that social change can be mapped in a linear: cause-and-effect way;*
- b. *the limitations of benchmarks, particularly the failure to connect different indicators to each other in order to give a better appraisal on the state of peace in a given setting;*
- c. *the problem of dominant narratives when defining indicators and choosing and excluding which ones to use;*
- d. *the restrictiveness of quantitative measurements, which can fail to capture matters such as, intercommunal and personal relationships;*
- e. *organisational bias, namely the use of indicators to justify external interventions; and*
- f. *the lack of context reflected in indicators.*

Section 3: Potential Solutions

This section outlines a number of proposals to improve the implementation, monitoring and measuring of implementation, and measuring peace more generally.

The main recommendations are addressed in two parts:

Implementing and Measuring Implementation

- a. *inclusive negotiations can lead to inclusive outcomes, thereby increasing the relationship between implementation and durable peace;*
- b. *carefully designed implementation mechanisms can improve prospects for successful implementation, while also providing a dynamic mechanism for responding to implementation;*
- c. *inclusive implementation mechanisms can increase legitimacy and safeguard gains for minority groups during negotiations;*
- d. *increased implementation and monitoring mechanisms at sub-national levels can support and improve implementation at sub-national levels; and*
- e. *feedback loops between those implementing agreements, monitoring agreements and the wider public can help to increase public buy-in and legitimacy.*

Measuring Peace

- a. *there is a need to better understand the varieties of peace that can emerge from conflict, and the circumstances that are more likely to influence these varieties;*
- b. *there is a need to embrace and construct non-linear, adaptable and flexible indicators;*
- c. *multiple narratives and perspectives should be included when defining indicators and benchmarks approach;*
- d. *indicators and benchmarks should be context-specific, and should include different benchmarks and indicators for different territorial levels, such as national, sub-national and local; defining priorities and short / long term implementation goals can help to manage expectation*

Part I: Implementing, Monitoring and Measuring Peace Agreement Implementation

Peace agreements are documents produced after discussion with some or all of a conflict's protagonists with a view to ending violent military conflict (Bell, 2013: 1). Peace agreements also act as roadmaps for the broader peace process. They can seek to address the main causes of conflict, create institutional mechanisms to allow access to state power and economic resources, empower minority or oppressed groups, compensate victims and employ other mechanisms to avoid future conflict, either by demobilising rival groups' combatants or integrating them into the armed force (Joshi and Darby, 2013: 260).

What is the impact of peace agreements?

Workshop participants discussed the impact of peace agreements on 'peace'. Some participants referenced the importance of peace agreements in ending violence. At their core, agreements represent commitments from previously at war parties to forego the use of force as a means to achieve particular ends. To this end, peace agreements can also provide the foundations for sustaining these commitments by providing for such processes as the decommissioning of weapons, demobilising soldiers and reintegrating former combatants back into society.

For others, peace agreements act as roadmaps for the broader peace process. From this perspective, peace accords help to create institutional environments in which those involved in conflict can pursue their objectives in less violent ways: peace agreements contain rather than solve the conflict by creating spaces to continue disagreement through political means (Bell and Pospisil, 2017). In addition, peace agreements affect social processes over a longer time period, which raised issues popular legitimacy and inclusion for many, not least women, whom often constitute the majority of the adult population in a conflict area (Olsson, 2018). Participants also suggested that peace agreements can help to create 'peacebuilding architecture', understood as institutions and mechanisms that can respond to challenges to the agreement and ensure an implementation process that benefits broader segments in society.

Various participants also drew on bodies of research that have sought to explore the connections between peace agreement implementation and material improvements in specific areas. Some of the findings include:

- ▶ a 1% increase in implementation rate increases peace duration by over 6%. The effect is even more significant for the non-signatory groups, standing at about 9% (Joshi and Quinn, 2015a);
- ▶ a higher implementation rate is correlated to a decline in infant mortality rate (Joshi 2015); and
- ▶ implementation contributes to a significant inflow of foreign capital (Joshi and Quinn, 2015b).

The Complex Process of Implementation

Notwithstanding the importance of, and significant milestones that are peace agreements, conflict-affected settings are often characterised by 'credible commitment' problems (Joshi and Mason, 2011: 390), capacity constraints on the part of those responsible for implementation (Peksen, Taydas and Drury, 2007), the presence of spoilers (Stedman, 1997), and elites reluctant to share the spoils of power (Kaldor, 2013; De Waal, 2015). These factors often impede the implementation process significantly.

Moreover, workshop participants also referenced a host of additional factors, which further complicate the materialisation of an accord:

- ▶ during the implementation phase, parties frequently try to reclaim concessions made during negotiations;
- ▶ peace agreements craft and write in constructive ambiguities, which frequently lead to uncertainty regarding the substantive content of peace agreement provisions, with the existence of multiple interpretations complicating the implementation process;
- ▶ in other cases, as in Northern Ireland, certain issues such as those on transitional justice, are deliberately avoided, intended to be readdressed during the implementation phase;
- ▶ even when provisions are explicit, expectations can change when parties fail to receive peace dividends – political, economic or otherwise – or when perceptions arise that different groups are benefitting in varying ways;
- ▶ elections mean that those who signed the agreement on the state side, often change, and with are frequently replaced with governments who have stood on platforms of opposing or significantly revising the peace accord, creating a new imbalance in the commitment to implement the peace agreement between the government and non-state opponents; and
- ▶ there are rarely clear pathways to implementation – processes that seek to translate the accord from paper to practice are uncertain.

These issues often converge to make the processes of implementing an agreement highly complex. Against this backdrop, supporting the implementation of agreements to ensure that they translate from pieces of paper to practice is a critical component of a peacebuilding process. Workshop discussions turned to the involvement of third parties in helping to facilitate and support the process of implementing a peace accord.

Monitoring the Implementation of Agreements

To support the implementation of peace agreements, accords often provide for the involvement of third parties. Third parties, which can be individual actors, organisations or mechanisms, play a range of diverse roles in the implementation phase of a peace agreement (Bell and Molloy, 2018). The literature often posits that third-party actors are essential in peace implementation processes (Sambanis and Doyle, 2007; Fortna, 2004, 2008; Quinn, et al. 2007).

However, there are often variations in the perceived success of including additional actors. In Cambodia, for example, the deployment of peacekeeping operations have proved to be obstacles for implementing the agreement. The question, therefore, is not necessarily whether third-party actors contribute to implementation and peace but rather which mechanisms do, how and why. To this end, workshop participants discussed two mechanisms in particular: the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) in the Bangsamoro; and the Barometer Initiative of the Kroc Institute in Colombia. The intention was to develop understandings about the mandates, methodologies and range of roles played by these mechanisms.

Box 1:

Origins, Mandates and Methodologies: The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT)

The TPMT was set up by the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to monitor the implementation of the GPH-MILF peace agreement, as provided for in the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed on Oct. 15, 2012. The TPMT has five members: two representatives from Philippine NGOs, and two representatives from international NGOs (one of each being nominated by each party, all being agreed by both parties); and one “eminent international person” (jointly nominated by the two parties) to act as chair, convenor, and spokesperson of the TPMT.

The document entitled Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) and its Terms of Reference outlines the mandate and responsibilities of the TPMT, which include responsibilities:

- ▶ to monitor and evaluate the implementation of all Agreements (3.1.a);
- ▶ review and assess the progress of the implementation of commitments by both Parties under the Agreements (3.1.b);
- ▶ submit comprehensive periodic reports and updates to both Parties for their appropriate action (3.1.b); and
- ▶ communicate to the public the progress and developments in the implementation of the Agreements of the Parties (3.1.c).



In performing these tasks, the TPMT meets regularly with both Panels and with other bodies associated with the peace process, with senior figures of the Government and of the MILF, with members of Congress as well as regional and local government officials, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) commanders, civil society organisations, religious leaders, and with representatives of the private sector and academics. The TPMT normally conducts two-week long visits and interviews every two months. After each visit, the TPMT produces confidential reports ('exit letters') with recommendations to both peace panels. The TPMT also produces an annual public report, with the agreement of both peace panels (www.tpmt.ph).

TPMT members also attend various peace process-related events as observers, such as the formal resumption of the peace talks under the new Duterte administration in Kuala Lumpur on 14-15 August 2016, and the formal launching of the new Bangsamoro Transition Commission in Davao on 24 February 2017 (TPMT, 2016). The TPMT also has access to all reports and activities connected to the implementation of the agreements and is permitted to observe the meetings of all bodies concerned with the implementation of the agreements. These processes and procedures provide the basis for assessing and reporting on implementation.

Box 2:
Origins, Mandates and Methodologies: Kroc Institute, Barometer Initiative

The Peace Accord Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID) is a project of the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, which traces the implementation of 34 comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) (<https://peaceaccords.nd.edu>). The project recognizes 51 different types of provisions that form the corpus of issues or topics found within peace agreements worldwide with qualitative and quantitative longitudinal data on the implementation of 34 CPAs negotiated between 1989 and 2012.

The Barometer Initiative is a project established as part of Kroc's mandate to monitor the implementation of the 2016 Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace in Colombia, signed between the Government of Colombia and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). The Barometer Initiative, inspired by the PAM methodology, applies a tailor-made methodology for the Colombian context to monitor contemporaneously the 2016 accord implementation. The initiative examines the degree of implementation in 578 stipulations (actionable items) in the accord, which are then grouped into 70 subthemes and 18 themes. The PAM coding process employs a four-point ordinal scale: 0 for not initiated, 1 for minimal implementation, 2 for intermediate implementation, and 3 for full implementation.

The terms of reference for Kroc are stipulated in the text of the 2016 agreement. Kroc contributes to international and domestic implementation mechanisms by providing technical support. The tasks assigned include:

- ▶ designing the methodology for identifying the progress of the agreements;
- ▶ providing the technical support for the follow-up, verification and monitoring of the implementation of the agreements;
- ▶ drawing up a model for evaluation and follow-up which will enable fulfilment of the agreements to be measured with sufficient accuracy and which will allow decisions to be taken and adjustments made, in real time, all within the framework of a logic of continuous improvement of the performance capabilities in the building of peace; and
- ▶ providing reports, matrices and products to the International Verification Component and the CMPVI, in compliance with the confidentiality criteria established there (Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, pp. 224-225).

The coding process used in Colombia is based on an extensive information collection system that includes the daily review of dozens of published sources of information on the peace process in Colombia and direct contact with the key institutions and other stakeholders involved or analysing the implementation. This information is validated and supplemented through cross-checking of other data sources and the gathering of additional information and documentation through on-the-ground observation and investigation by a mobile team of peacebuilding professionals employed in Colombia. The mobile team comprises experts with local reach who collect data from a variety of sources, from government offices to media and NGOs. To further assist in this process, the Kroc Institute's primary implementing partner for these efforts in Colombia is the Social Pastorate of the Catholic Archdiocese of Colombia - the social justice arm of the Catholic bishops - which has a long record of supporting local justice and peacebuilding efforts in local communities throughout Colombia. More info and reports:

<http://kroc.nd.edu/research/peace-processes-accords/pam-colombia/>

As is often reflected in the mandates of third-party mechanisms tasked with monitoring the implementation of an agreement (see boxes 1 and 2), the roles and responsibilities assigned are often technical in nature: these bodies assist in overseeing and supporting the implementation of agreements. Existing scholarship often draws on the various roles that third-party actors play in monitoring implementation, including interpreting an agreement, reporting on the progress of implementation, and providing validity and impartiality to politically contentious processes (Bell and Molloy, 2018).

More recent research has pushed beyond the broad claims that the involvement of third-party actors correlates with more successful implementation processes, to instead examine the more specific aspects of third-party involvement that leads to successful implementation. Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty (2017: 1007), for instance, find that the full implementation of verification mechanisms on average leads to an over 28% increase in the CPA implementation rate.

At the same time, while the influence of international actors in peacebuilding processes is well known, there is little discussion on the roles that third party actors involved in monitoring agreements play in shaping the dynamics of the implementation process or the contributions that these mechanisms make beyond fulfilling their original mandates.

The workshop discussions sought to address this gap by considering the various impacts that these actions have on the broader peace process. These additional contributions include:

► *Bridging knowledge gaps and trust between parties.*

Monitoring mechanisms often produce reports at the end of their mandates. The difficulty is that in publishing these reports at the conclusion of a process, it is often too late to make improvements or alter the trajectories of implementation. By contrast, both the TPMT and the Barometer Initiative provide information to parties in real-time. These bodies do not seek to 'finger-point' but instead navigate the difficult task of highlighting implementation gaps while at the same time maintaining the commitment of parties involved. In doing so, both mechanisms build trust between parties by demonstrating good will and adherence to commitments made.

► *Positive Cascading and Early Detection.*

Alongside building trust, real-time reporting allows parties to assess what has worked and what has not. Highlighting areas of limited development can inspire either side to increase their efforts, leading to a 'positive cascading' effect. Similarly, quantitative and qualitative data can help to identify high-risk areas. In both cases, by providing information on implementation, parties are afforded the necessary information to help navigate the process of implementation.

► *Learning from Comparative Experiences.*

The Barometer Initiative has an additional component to its work. Existing as a sub-part of the broader Peace Agreement Matrix programme, Kroc can also provide comparative information, drawing on the approaches adopted in other processes to address difficulties or to create ideas. The availability of comparative data makes it easier to identify common empirical patterns, outlier cases, and in some instances, possible solutions to gaps in implementation, including early preventive measures to emerging gaps (Joshi, Melander and Quinn, 2017).

► *Providing Public Spaces for Ongoing Debate.*

In providing information on implementation, monitoring bodies also offer the general public insights into the progression, regression or inertia of the peace processes in their respective settings. For instance:

- the TPMT reports to the public, on a yearly basis or as the TPMT deems necessary, providing an overall assessment of developments in the implementation of the agreements;
- Kroc issues nonpartisan analyses and periodic assessments of the pace, strengths, and gap in implementation of the agreements. Similarly, the information has also been made available to around 280 other organizations, which can offer their own interpretation of the data (Abdenur, 2018). These efforts, in turn, have a pedagogical effect, helping to inform the wider public about both the substance of the agreement and the state of implementation.

► *Supporting the work of advocacy.*

In providing information on the stage and state of implementation, mechanisms such as Kroc's Barometer project and TPMT can be seen as furnishing groups with data to support advocacy efforts. For instance, groups working on areas such as land reform and social justice are able to identify lags in implementation and use this information to strengthen their advocacy work in these particular areas. Making information and data on implementation available can, therefore, help to promote further implementation.

► *Championing Success and Sustaining Inactive Processes.*

Discussions on implementation often focus on the failures. But an important factor in helping to sustain a peace process is acknowledging and celebrating success.

- Although Kroc can provide early detection warnings, it has also been successful in celebrating the achievements of the Colombian implementation process so far. As an example of these successes, the disarmament process, from a global comparative perspective, is a significant achievement.
- The TPMT has, through affiliated organisations like the United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc., and GZO Peace Institute, held a number of outreach initiatives¹. Particularly in the context of Mindanao, these activities help to sustain support and public buy-in during periods of relative inactivity.

While the primary responsibilities of these mechanisms are to monitor, verify, and assess compliance with the agreements, the contributions that third-party actors make often stem far beyond the technical aspects of their mandates.

¹ These included a Conference on Women and Peace in the Bangsamoro held in Manila with 40 participants representing 28 organizations; a National Youth Conference on the Bangsamoro was also held, generating nationwide support among youth organizations; and 30-strong focus groups were convened in Central Mindanao (Maguindanao, Cotabato City and North Cotabato), Northern Mindanao (Lanao Del Sur, Marawi City and Lanao Del Norte) and in Western Mindanao (Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi), with a total of 368 participants (59% male, 41% female).

Difficulties and Limitations

Workshop participants also reflected upon some of the limitations of and difficulties faced by monitoring bodies. The section below draws on these discussions, which include:

- ▶ *Power Disparities at the Negotiation Table.*
Peace agreements, as documents that respond to a priority of ending violence, often prioritise the inclusion of armed actors, at the expense of non-violent actors and can therefore, lack popular support and buy-in. Exclusion is often presented as a necessary trade-off between the goal of ending violence on the one hand, and the ideal of inclusive processes which might bring better legitimacy, on the other (Ní Aoláin, 2016; Rocha Menocal, 2015; Bell, 2015). Approached from the perspective of assessing implementation, the omission of actors in negotiations can have obvious implications on what is being implemented. Assessing implementation is, in many ways, only as progressive as the negotiations that led to its formation (Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, 2017: 996).

- ▶ *Implementation processes as fluid.*
Peace processes, including the agreement implementation phase of a process, are ongoing negotiations. The fluid nature of the implementation phase raises questions regarding the flexibility of monitoring mechanisms and their ability to adapt to ongoing changes caused by persisting negotiations. If ongoing deliberations alter the terms of an agreement, how might monitoring mechanisms adapt in ways that reflect these complexities and fluid processes? The evolving nature of the implementation process raises questions about the flexibility and adaptability of monitoring mechanisms in ways that reflect these fluid processes.

► *Limitations of what can be assessed.*

Measuring the implementation of an agreement can also be limited in respect of what can be realistically measured. For instance, while measurement might include provisions that seek to improve material conditions at the sub-national level or provisions that address gender-specific issues, national measurements may fail to capture sub-national breakdown. Measurement can also fail to capture intersectional differences in the treatment of groups within groups, which are not adequately reflected in group-based measurements. For example, provisions might lack a gender dimension, failing to reflect the relevance or impact of specific areas of implementation for women, or measurements relating to the impact on women may fail to capture differences between women of different ethnicities. Similarly, measurements of implementation might overlook persisting structural biases or horizontal inequalities involving people-to-people activities, everyday peace, and conflict transformation (Joshi et al., 2017: 996; Herbolzheimer, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2006).

► *The Risk of Politicising Monitoring Efforts.*

Monitoring bodies do not operate in a vacuum. Those monitoring peace agreements provide evidence on the state or stage of implementation, and monitors therefore become part of the local political context. There is the risk that monitoring bodies become politicised or that they are perceived as being political by parties to the conflict and other stakeholders. These perceptions risk undermining the legitimacy and impartiality of monitoring mechanisms.

Part 2: Benchmarks and Indicators of Peace beyond Implementation

How then should we measure or describe peace? What is it that those involved in peacebuilding are working towards and attempting to measure? Discussions emphasised the limitations of relying solely on the implementation of an accord, considering how to better understand and measure less tangible aspects of peace, such as persisting structural inequalities or biases or peacebuilding initiatives and social change that are not directly linked to the implementation of the peace agreement. By way of context-setting, the immediate discussion briefly sketches a number of existing approaches to measuring peace before engaging with workshop discussions.

Existing Measurements of Peace

(i) Programme Monitoring and Evaluation

Beyond measuring the implementation of agreements, a range of monitoring and evaluation frameworks has been developed by various organisations to assess progress in peace processes.

These frameworks establish benchmarks which, broadly stated, are targets that have been defined by an existing standard, a minimum requirement for something to work, the performance of a leading actor in a field of competition (i.e. a best practice)', and so on. (UN 2010: 17). Benchmarks can push beyond measuring implementation of an agreement or a set of policies to questioning the impact of these measures. For example, while a peace agreement provision might state the importance of creating mechanisms to facilitate private sector investment, such as micro-credit agencies, a benchmark might be a stated level of required investment sought. Although the installation of the micro-credit agency might provide the mechanism or catalyst through which to achieve this goal, the implementation of the mechanism itself is not the benchmark. Rather, it is the level of investment.

To assist in identifying how and to what extent benchmarks are reached, indicators are often used. An indicator is a variable that is typically used to measure program or project outputs. It is 'that thing' that shows that an undertaking has had the desired impact. It is on the basis of indicators that evidence can be built on the impact of any undertaking. In most cases, benchmarks are set to help establish the results of a range of interventions from actors as diverse as multilateral institutions to civil society organisations.

At least, in theory, the advantages of programmatic benchmarks and indicators are that they provide donors and other organisations involved in peacebuilding with the tools through which to assess impact. Measuring progress is often necessary when seeking to justify actions taken, as is reflected in M&E frameworks underpinned by theories of change.

(ii) Indices Relating to Peace

There are also a host of additional indices of peace, which measure the relative position of nations' and regions' peacefulness. Examples include: The State Fragility; Political Instability Index; and the Global Peace Index. These various indices provide a score based on a range of indicators, which are combined to give an overall rating, which can be compared with other countries.

Additionally, depending on the context in question and while not focusing on measuring peace per se, there are other indicators that might be relevant to measuring peace. These are typically indices developed to examine the performance of countries in specific areas, such as the PRIO/GIWPS Women, Peace and Security index. The relative nature of their relevance derives from the extent to which issues are viewed as pertinent to the peace process.

There are, in theory, various advantages to production and use of standardised data. For one, they enable comparison between countries in order to assess the state of 'peace' in a given area. This can provide comparative information with which to assess progress vis-à-vis other contexts. Standardised data might also contribute to backwards tracing: standardised data, when read alongside implementation data, can also be used to trace why improvements have been made. For example, levels of implementation might explain why two countries have different scores in respect of levels of transparency. When supplemented with additional qualitative research, possibilities might exist for understanding the specific aspects of implementation that lead to these divergences, to inform other peace processes in the future.

Limitations of Existing Measurements of Peace

However, it was primarily with the limitations of existing approaches to measuring peace that workshop participants focused on:

► *The Pitfalls of Linearity:*

Indicators often presuppose a closed system, whereby 'root causes' of conflict can be assessed, solutions proposed, and indicators defined in a linear path. This reflects the predominant approach to liberal peace building, which has included a package of peacebuilding reforms to facilitate democratization, foster economic growth, enhance good governance, build effective state institutions, strengthen the rule of law and the protection of human rights, and boost civil society (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). However, peacebuilding is rarely a linear and predictable process. It is rather complex and subject to numerous variables, indicative of open, fluid systems.

► *Limitations of Benchmarks:*

Benchmarks, based on linear, closed-systems, present uncertain results. Often indicators identified are not viewed holistically to develop the relationship of different indicators to each other. For instance, while indicators might address human rights improvements, foreign direct investment and security, it is often uncertain as to how these various indicators relate to each other in such a way as to reflect peace. Additionally, benchmarks seeking to address a range of issues are often overly ambitious and tend to underestimate the time and effort needed to achieve durable peace.

► *The Problem of Dominant Narratives:*

Peacebuilding initiatives often assume a specific, definable set of characteristics that make up a peaceful society. Whether emerging in the form of "theories of change", "pillars of peace", or priorities of donors and peacebuilding actors, these narratives are often directly into measurement frameworks used to specify the defined components of peace (Stave, 2011: 3). Other, competing narratives, are largely missing from the process of defining benchmarks and indicators. This overlooks the fact that definitions and understandings of peace are highly diverse (Jarstad et al., 2017).

- ▶ *The Restrictiveness of Quantitative Measurements:*
Participants referenced the increasing use of quantitative measurements, noting that while important and useful, they frequently fail to adequately capture issues such as public sentiment or the state of intercommunal reconciliation. It was suggested that qualitative indicators like measurements on public perceptions of the peace process or relationships between different groups, should be used in conjunction with quantitative approaches to measuring peace.

- ▶ *Organisational Bias:*
Driving dominant narratives is organisational biases: There is a tendency to select indicators that suggest progress towards the achievement of objectives stated in mandates and visions, but which neglect to show setbacks or failures (Stave, 2011: 5). Indicators and benchmarks often become an auditing and compliance tool for organisations involved in peacebuilding efforts (Mac Ginty, 2013).

- ▶ *Omission of Context:*
Participants discussed the lack of context-specific benchmarks and indicators. The lack of context informs many of the above points, emerging from dominant narratives, organisational tendencies and linear diagnoses of conflict and prognoses of peace. Completely omitted are peoples lived experiences, any reflection of cultural and context-specific realities and inclusive narratives on peace (Mac Ginty, 2013).

Box 3:
Varieties of Peace Research Program

The multifaceted understandings of peace are demonstrated in the emergence of a newly established research project. The Varieties of Peace Research program is a research initiative that will explore the multifarious meanings of peace. It does not aim at presenting a single intermediate form of peace. Instead it will look for ways of identifying and conceptualizing the diversity of peace between (and beyond) the negative/positive dichotomy, and attempts to explore different characteristics and qualities along important dimensions of peace to identify different variants of peace. (for further information, see (<https://www.varietiesofpeace.net/>))

The workshop discussions all pointed towards levels of discontent associated with current measurements of peace which, while seemingly progressive and having a certain resonance at the national level, often fail to adequately reflect contextual realities, multiple-narratives, the complexity of peace processes, and local ownership.

Part 3:

Potential Improvements: Inclusive Implementation

Implementing, measuring and monitoring implementation of an agreement is essential, whatever the difficulties. The correlation between implementation and improvement in specific areas, and the experience of the dynamic role played by monitoring bodies in the Philippines and Colombia, point to the importance of monitoring and implementation. However, the difficulties of implementation indicate the potential to improve practice in this area. This report forms a first step. We set out the following ideas, all of which are rooted in a major conclusion of the discussion that inclusive peace processes and inclusive implementation mechanisms are critical to ensuring that the peace agreement agenda for change can be implemented in a politically turbulent post-settlement environment.

(i) Implementing and Measuring Implementation

Inclusive negotiations:

Monitoring the implementation of an accord takes the provisions of an agreement as its measurements. As such, who and which groups are involved in the negotiation phase impacts on what provisions are to be implemented and subsequently monitored. Workshop participants underlined the importance of inclusive negotiations, and drawing on the case of women, offered a number of strategies to improve inclusion:

- ▶ direct participation at the negotiation table (McWilliams, 2015);
- ▶ drawing on either normative standards or arguments relating to effectiveness, to advocate for inclusion (i.e. UNSC Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security).
- ▶ establishing parallel processes to influence or feed into negotiations; for example, in Sub-commission on Gender in Colombia (see further (Salvesen and Nylander, 2017);
- ▶ finding champions to push for inclusion on a groups behalf (McWilliams, 2015); and
- ▶ ensuring that women are organised (see further Kirkham, Close, and Yousuf, 2018; O'Rourke 2017) and taking advantages of opportunities that arise for greater inclusion (Bell and Pospisil, 2017).

Implementation mechanisms.

Monitoring bodies can play important roles in identifying and measuring what is and what is not implemented. While this can have the effect of increasing implementation in lagging areas, it is not a guarantee for it. To this end, participants also discussed the importance of implementation mechanisms to ensure that peace agreement provisions move from paper to practice. There were, however, competing ideas about the forms that implementation mechanisms should take:

► *Robust v flexible mechanisms:*

Some suggested that implementation mechanisms should be robust and capable of responding to immediate challenges to the agreement. They are mechanisms that would help to avoid the recurrence of the conflict. Others suggested, in line with discussions on the ongoing nature of negotiations, that implementation mechanisms should be flexible, capable of responding to the complexities of the implementation phase by providing spaces for disagreement, changes to the terms of an agreement, and “adjustment capacity” when necessary

Inclusion in Implementation and monitoring mechanisms:

Workshop participants also highlighted the importance of inclusion within implementation and monitoring mechanisms. Discussions regarding inclusion in peace processes typically focus on inclusion in negotiations or in the outcomes of those negotiations (for example quotas on minority participation in government). Less attention has been directed towards inclusion in the implementation phase and implementation mechanisms. The importance of inclusion in the implementation phase can be understood from two broad perspectives:

► *Safeguarding the gains made during negotiations:*

Inclusion in implementation mechanisms is important to ensure that hard-fought gains are protected and implemented.

► *Participation in the ongoing process:*

If the implementation phase is indeed a site for ongoing negotiation, arguably opportunities arise for further inclusion and input. For example, in El Salvador, under the New York Agreement (29 September 1991), civil society organisations were granted the opportunity to participate in the drafting of legislation to give effect to the agreement.

Participants suggested, in line with the approaches adopted in other peace agreements, that the implementation process and those mechanisms that are tasked with implementing an agreement should be more inclusive, both to protect gains made and to enable further gains in the future.

Box 4:

Examples of Inclusive implementation and monitoring mechanisms

“Community elders shall administer the implementation of the mediating committee’s recommendations.” Somalia, Adadda Peace Agreement, 15 May 1997

“The implementation of this Agreement, especially the community development projects shall be governed by the following structures: A Joint Committee (JC) composed of two (2) representatives from GPH, two (2) representatives from CBA-CPLA and one (1) representative from either civil society organization (CSO), academic institution or technical institution, mutually agreed by the Parties, shall be established.” Philippines/ Cordillera, Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the CBA/CPLA ... 4 July 2011

“Upon request by MAQL, it is agreed to request that the Confederation of Evangelical Churches verifies compliance with the commitments made by the parties during the peace negotiation process.’ Colombia, Acuerdo Final entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame, Campamento de Pueblo Nuevo Caldono-Cauca, 27 May 1991

“To oversee the implementation of the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant and Resolutions THE Dinka-[composed of] three members, one of whom shall be a woman, shall be chosen by each county/province”. South Sudan, Wunlit Dinka Nuer Covenant and Resolutions, 8 March 1999

Increasing implementation and monitoring at the sub-national level:

When considering specific priorities and indicators at the sub-national level, there are obvious limitations associated with what monitors can and cannot achieve. In the context of Colombia, for instance, Kroc already monitors 578 specific stipulations in the accord, which are then grouped into 70 subthemes and 18 themes. However, one approach might be to consider increasing the number of implementation and monitoring bodies, at the sub-national level.

Localised implementation and monitoring efforts have also been used in other contexts. For instance, in both Burundi and Myanmar, agreements provide for Joint liaison teams that function at the national, provincial and local levels to monitor a ceasefire agreement (Burundi, Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government, 2 December 2002; Myanmar, Joint Monitoring Committee guideline for Each Level (Draft), 15 October 2015). In contexts like Central African Republic, the Philippines and Croatia, national monitoring committees are required to establish regional and local sub-committees (CAR, Accord de cessation des hostilités en République Centrafricaine, 23 July 2014; Croatia/Yugoslavia (former), Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994), 29 March 1994; Philippines/ Mindanao, Annex on Normalization to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), 25 January 2014). Moreover, in such contexts as Bougainville (Agreement covering Implementation of the Ceasefire (Arawa Agreement (30 April 1998) localised implementation mechanisms are established. Participants suggested that thinking more about the involvement of implementation and monitoring mechanisms at the sub-national level could improve implementation and buy-in.

Box 5:


Feeding public perceptions into monitoring processes

A recent collaboration between Kroc and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, entitled Monitoring Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) project is attempting to develop an innovative survey to measure people's perceptions of and experience with the peace process in Colombia (Binningsbø, et al. 2018). The survey will cover all regions of Colombia and produce systematic and representative data at the local level and will serve as a tool for implementing the peace accord by informing policy planning and decision-making.

Feedback Loops and Adaptive Monitoring:

Responding to concerns regarding the adaptability of monitoring mechanisms, participants noted the potential for thinking about integrating public perceptions into the work of those monitoring agreements. Irrespective of whether discussing implementing agreements or peacebuilding efforts more generally, there are often levels of disconnect between actions taken and the public perception of them. In the context of monitoring implementation, by drawing on public perceptions (arrow A on figure 1), monitors could feed public concerns into the implementation process by providing feedback to parties on how the public perceives implementation, including areas of concern (Arrow B on figure 1).

Figure 1: Feedback Loops



As figure 1 illustrates, feedback loops are also relevant in other ways. For instance, given that implementation processes are ongoing negotiations, where terms and substance of the agreement are likely to alter, those implementing peace agreements can provide information to monitoring bodies on changes that have been negotiated through the implementation process (Arrow C). These can also be conveyed to the public, increasing awareness of, and involvement in, the broader process (Arrow D). The inclusion of feedback loops and multiple channels of communication could be understood as a novel way of better reflecting complexity, the importance of local inclusion, and the constantly evolving nature of the implementation and monitoring process.

(ii) Measuring Peace

Inclusive negotiations:

Workshop participants also responded to the limitations of existing measurements of peace. Participants stressed the importance of spending more time conceptualising indicators: The following ideas emerged:

- ▶ *Thinking in terms of systemic change rather than achievement of specific outcomes:*
Often indicators are set without considering the relationship of these indicators to each other and this to the system of peacebuilding. Participants highlighted the importance of thinking about how indicators relate to each other and thus to the overall picture of peace.
- ▶ *Embracing non-linearity and adaptability:*
In addition, the causes of conflict can change suddenly, making it impossible to predict and control the results of violent conflict prevention and peace building work. Workshop participants drew attention to the importance of thinking about ways to adopt less prescriptive and rigid indicators, to reflect the complexity and changing nature of peacebuilding.

- ▶ *Adopting a multi-narrative approach:*
When conceptualising indicators and benchmarks, participants highlighted the importance of narratives. Thus, there is the need for thinking about more inclusive forums to help define indicators and benchmarks, embracing the plurality of views and opinions.
- ▶ *Allowing context to drive the conceptualisation of indicators:*
The value of unique contextual indicators is that they are generally based on in-depth knowledge of a local conflict and culture, together with a creative understanding of the contextual signals that reflect the condition and development of peace in a society (Stave, 2011: 4 ; Mac Ginty, 2013).
- ▶ *Defining priorities and short/long term implementation goals:*
Comprehensive agreements, in particular, can include a broad array of areas for reform. Different stakeholders have different priorities, which can create tensions between those monitoring and reporting on implementation and those on the ground.
- ▶ *Relating indicators to levels and groups:*
It is likely that different indicators will be more relevant to particular levels (i.e. national, sub-national) than others. Thus, workshop participants also highlighted the importance of thinking about indicators that better speak to the realities of local contexts, suggesting that different indicators may be more relevant to specific groups.

Conclusion: Implementation, Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace

The time is ripe to pay more attention to peace agreement implementation as critical to conflict prevention (in the form of non-reoccurrence). Peace agreements contain agendas for change which the parties and international actors have committed to. Peacebuilding increasingly focuses on the importance of understanding the complexity of local contexts and remaining adaptive and capable of dealing with new political challenges (De Coning 2013, 2018, 2016; Pospisil, 2017). It is, therefore, critical that we understand better the challenges of implementing, monitoring and measuring peace process outcomes, informed by creative approaches in peace processes.

The discussions in this workshop illustrated the importance of:

- ▶ social inclusion in the process of negotiating agreements and implementation mechanisms, to creating the support necessary to carry the commitment to the agreement through turbulent political times;
- ▶ understanding creative initiatives for monitoring implementation such as that of the Kroc Institute's Barometer Initiative in Colombia and the Third Party Monitoring Mechanism in the Philippines;
- ▶ understanding the connections between peacebuilding and peace implementation;
- ▶ identifying how challenges of implementation could be better anticipated and dealt with at the negotiation and design stage of implementation; and
- ▶ using the scholarly community to build better understanding as to how various methodologies that might be used in pursuance of these aims, could better speak to each other.

The debate is vital to both concepts of conflict prevention ((UN & World Bank 2018), and the concept of "sustaining peace" (see UN GA Resolution 70/262 2016 and UN SC Resolution /2882 of 2016).

In the peace agreement implementation context, preventing further conflict and sustaining peace, does not involve just reaching agreement. It includes building mechanisms that will be able to navigate the implementation process, and build the types of broad participation in peace agreement implementation mechanisms that will legitimise and sustain the new political settlement through the inevitable new political challenges that will arise and were not predicted or provided for in the agreement's text.

In terms of how we understand implementation there remains a challenge of understanding the options available to parties when negotiating agreements for providing for monitoring of implementation. However, there is also a challenge of understanding the relationship of peace agreement implementation to wider processes of peacebuilding which itself involve ongoing negotiation and agreement as to what an end to conflict might look like and what type of change for the better it might deliver.

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Peace Agreements

Agreement data is taken from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database also produced by PSRP, which can be viewed in detail at www.peaceagreements.org.

[Bougainville, Agreement covering Implementation of the Ceasefire \(Arawa Agreement\), 30 April 1998.](#)

[Central African Republic, Brazzaville Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 23 July 2014.](#)

[Colombia, Acuerdo Final entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame, Campamento de Pueblo Nuevo Caldon-Cauca, 27 May 1991.](#)

[Croatia/Yugoslavia \(former\), \(Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994\), 29 March 1994.](#)

[El Salvador, New York Agreement, 29 September 1991.](#)

[Myanmar, Joint Monitoring Committee guideline for Each Level \(Draft\), 15 October 2015.](#)

[Philippines/ Mindanao, Third Party Monitoring Team \(TPMT\) and its Terms of Reference, 25 January 2013.](#)

[Philippines/Cordillera, Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the CBA/ CPLA towards the CPLA's Final Disposition of Arms and Forces and its Transformation into a Potent Socio-Economic Unarmed Force \(Closure Agreement\), 4 July 2011.](#)

[Philippines/ Mindanao, Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, 15 October 2012.](#)

[Philippines/ Mindanao, Annex on Normalization to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro \(FAB\), 25 January 2014.](#)

[Somalia, Adadda Peace Agreement, 15 May 1997.](#)

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[Burundi, Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil National pour la Defence de la Democratie-Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie, 2 December 2002.](#)

Annex 1: Workshop Programme

Venue:	Sant Pau art nouveau pavilions
Address:	Carrer Sant Antoni Maria Claret, 167, 08025 Barcelona
Date:	Wednesday, May 30, 18.00-20.00: public forum

The public forum will frame the discussions of the workshop that begins the following day: What determines a successful peace process? How can this be measured, described, and enhanced? What nature and extent of change can a peace agreement deliver? What are the additional paths to peace?

Opening remarks:

Manel Vila, Director General of Development Cooperation, Government of Catalonia
Xavier Masllorens, President, Catalan International Peace Institute

Speakers:

- ▶ David Cortright, Kroc Institute for International Peacebuilding.
- ▶ Christine Bell, University of Edinburgh.

May 31 – June 1: Workshop

The sessions will proceed around guiding topics. Each guiding topic will be introduced by two 10-minute presentations and followed by an open dialogue between all participants.

Thursday, May 31 (full day): *measuring peace*

The first day of the workshop will present and discuss different forms and methodologies to monitor peace after the signing of a peace agreement.

09.15 **Opening remarks:** Kristian Herbolzheimer, Conciliation Resources

09.30 **Panel 1: *Monitoring and influencing implementation of peace agreements.***

What is the background, the mandate and the composition of recently established agreement monitoring bodies? How did they decide on the methodology of their task? How is their relationship with the signatories of the peace agreement? How do they engage with the public opinion? What are their main challenges they face? How do they support the signatories of the peace agreement to respond to emergent challenges?

- ▶ Huseyin Oruç, Third Party Monitoring Team (Mindanao).
- ▶ Borja Paladini Adell, Kroc Institute - Peace Barometer (Colombia).
- ▶ Moderator: Christine Bell (University of Edinburgh).

11.30 **Panel 2: *Looking back: monitoring and influencing change after peace agreement.***

What has changed (for better or worse) since the signing of the peace agreement? What are the mechanisms for monitoring that change? How much change can be attributed to the peace agreement? What additional actors and processes have influenced change?

- ▶ Bishnu Sapkota, Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative.
- ▶ Madhav Joshi, Kroc Institute for International Peacebuilding.
- ▶ Moderator: Mabel González (the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution NOREF).

14.30 **Panel 3: *Public perceptions of peace.***

What socio-economic indicators are available to monitor peaceful change? What additional information do public surveys offer? What are their limitations?

- ▶ Jan Hofmeyr, South Africa Reconciliation Barometer
- ▶ Havard Nygaard, PRIO
- ▶ Moderator: Borja Paladini (Kroc Institute).

16.30 Panel 4: *Gender and peace*

How is a gender perspective changing the perceptions on progress in peace processes? What is the relation of women's wellbeing and empowerment in relation to peace? What innovative tools are being developed to monitor participation and assess impact?

- ▶ Louise Olsson, PRIO
- ▶ Rosa Emilia Salamanca, CIASE-Coalición 1325 (Colombia)
- ▶ Moderator: Maria Villellas (School for a Culture of Peace).

Friday June 1 (half day): *understanding and influencing change*

The second day of the workshop will focus on a more conceptual as well as practical discussion on how change happens, and what developments monitoring bodies and mechanisms need to pay attention to in order to capture (and enhance) these changes.

9.30 Panel 5: *Cutting-edge research*

What are the possibilities and limitations in measuring peace? How does complexity theory and other thinking apply to conflict transformation? What key factors determine outcomes in a peace process? How can these outcomes be described and monitored?

- ▶ Svein-Erik Stave, FAFO Institute for Applied International Studies (Norway)
- ▶ Malin Åkebo, Varieties of Peace Project (Sweden)
- ▶ Moderator: Kristian Herbolzheimer (Conciliation Resources)

11.30 Panel 6: *Conclusions and wrap-up session*

What are the trends in monitoring peace? How can peace agreement monitoring bodies support the countries in transition to adapt the peacebuilding process to emergent challenges? Is mediation / facilitation / international accompaniment still needed in the implementation phase? Why? For how long? What works best?

- ▶ Borja Paladini Adell (Kroc Institute), Kristian Herbolzheimer (Conciliation Resources)

Annex 2: Workshop Participants

SPEAKERS	ORGANISATION
David Cortright	Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
Christine Bell	University of Edinburgh
Huseyin Oruç	IHH (Turkey) and Third Party Monitoring Team, Mindanao
Bishnu Sapkota	Transition to Peace Initiative, Nepal
Madhav Joshi	Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
Louise Olsson	Peace Research Institute of Oslo, PRIO
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Jan Hofmeyr	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, South Africa
Håvard Mogleiv Nygård	Peace Research Institute of Oslo, PRIO
Svein-Erik Stave	FAFO (Norway)
Malin Åkebo	Varieties of Peace research project, University of Umeå
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Gail Morgado	US State Department
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Michael Aeby	Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, IPTI (Geneva)
Sofía Zitouni	Folke Bernadotte Academy, FBA (Sweden)
Helena Sterwe	European External Action Service, EEAS
Helena Sterwe	European External Action Service, EEAS
Jamie Pring	Swisspeace

CONVENORS	ORGANISATION
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Kristian Herzbolheimer (Lead convenor)	Director Transitions to Peace Programme, Conciliation Resources
Mario Andrés Pineda	Peace Barometer Colombia, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
Kathryn Tomlinson	Director of Programmes, Conciliation Resources
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Carme Gual	Director, Catalan Agency of Development Cooperation, ACCD
Maria Fanlo	Catalan International Peace Institute, ICIP
Xavier Masllorens	President, Catalan International Peace Institute, ICIP
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Elisabeth de Nadal	Barcelona International Public Policy hub, BIPP-HUB

About Us

The Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) is centrally concerned with how political settlements can be made both more stable, and more inclusive of those affected by them beyond political elites. In particular, the programme examines the relationship between stability and inclusion, sometimes understood as a relationship between peace-making and justice.

The programme is addressing three broad research questions relating to political settlements:

1. How do different types of political settlements emerge, and what are the actors, institutions, resources, and practices that shape them?
2. How can political settlements be improved by internally-driven initiatives, including the impact of gender-inclusive processes and the rule of law institutions?
3. How, and with what interventions, can external actors change political settlements?

The Global Justice Academy at The University of Edinburgh is the lead organisation. PSRP partners include: Conciliation Resources (CR), The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), The Rift Valley Institute (RVI), and the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI, Ulster University).

Find out more at: www.politicalsettlements.org

